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Preface 
Payment for environmental services (PES) starts gaining global attention. Only two decades ago, the 
concept of environmental service was not well-understood and was often interpreted by the general 
public as a rubbish truck picking up our domestic waste. Just a decade ago, the PES concept was 
introduced in Asian developing countries thus contesting pros and cons about its application in 
countries with high poverty incidence and poor environmental governance. Today governments, 
companies, academics and environmental practitioners are increasingly expressing interest and 
commitment in the concept.  
Yet, pioneering efforts in Asia have shown that the process to establish PES in practice poses great 
challenges. Application of market-based environmental services in Asian developing countries 
involves some issues beyond exchanging money for such services, such as intrinsic rights for land, 
moral issues in monetizing environmental services, social concerns and lack of adequate good 
environmental governance. How to effectively develop a PES scheme in developing countries with 
such intricate linkages between conservation and poverty alleviation? How to design and implement 
an efficient and fair PES scheme for relevant actors with a tremendous variety of socioeconomic and 
cultural contexts? How to avoid marginalized actors to become worse-off? Despite my years of 
involvement with the Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services in Asia (RUPES) project of 
the World Agroforestry Centre, I still found myself puzzled and concerned about the debate.  
This thesis is the final result of my PhD journey which provides myself and the readers with some 
answers to these questions, and provides guidelines for the development of efficient and fair PES 
schemes in developing countries. Taking empirical experiences from Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Nepal, this book describes a wide-range of practical cases in which efficiency and fairness aspects are 
balanced and attentively considered in designing emerging PES schemes. These cases show that there 
is no simple solution and this thesis is therefore not about PES efficiency or fairness as separate 
conditions but about developing payment schemes that are “fairly efficient and efficiently fair” which 
might work better in the real world which is not black or white.       
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background & problem statement 
Environmental degradation and climate change have become prominent problems in today’s world, 
especially in Asia, where almost two thirds of the world’s population live. Soil erosion, land 
degradation, water resource degradation, deforestation and loss of biodiversity are among the most 
serious environmental problems with increasing trends of destruction in rural Asia (FAO 1995; 
Suzuki 2003; UNEP 2010). These adverse phenomena have an increasingly negative impact on the 
livelihood of especially poor people who depend on natural resources in many ways (MA 2005). A 
multitude of complex and interacting root causes are responsible for the environmental problems in 
Asia (Tomich et al. 2004). Two of the most important causes are market imperfections and policy 
distortions that have neglected the social and economic importance of natural resources and 
environmental quality (Tomich et al. 2004; TEEB 2010; Carpenter et al. 2006; MA 2005).  
According to most literature sources, environmental degradation and poverty are closely interlinked 
leading to a “vicious circle” between both problems (Reardon and Vosti 1995). To break this vicious 
circle, poverty alleviation and reduction of environmental degradation must be dealt both 
simultaneously. Forty years ago, the ‘Club of Rome’ reports (Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992; 
Tinbergen 1976) opened the eyes of policymakers on the environment-poverty linkage and stimulated 
concepts of sustainable development in Reshaping International Order. Falling short of achieving this 
order, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development endorsed the synergy between 
environmental and economic development and led to wide promotion of concepts derived from 
environmental economics: the need for internalization of environmental costs, polluters-pay principle 
and compensation for victims of pollution and other environmental damage (UN 1992).  These 
concepts which are collectively called “market-based instruments” have become alternatives to 
complement non-market-based policy – including regulatory, legal and administrative instruments – 
in solving a range of environmental problems.  
Market-based instruments include broad approaches from “fines and sanctions that are linked to 
traditional command-and-control regulations to laissez-faire concept that depend on consumer 
advocacy or private litigation to provide incentives for improving environmental management” 
(Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Da Motta 1998). Da Motta et al. (1999) concluded that market-based 
instrument are used to address a variety of goals: improve cost-effectiveness, decrease externalities, 
generate revenue, and mitigate uncertainty by applying market forces and flexibility for private actors 
to meet a given (environmental) standard.  
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With the release of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the concept of ecosystem services was 
introduced to expand the domain of environmental concerns to all benefits that humans gain from 
ecosystems. The services provided by ecosystems range from provisioning services supplying 
tangible value to people, such as food, fuel, and other consumable goods; to regulating services (such 
as air and water purification), habitat or supporting services (e.g. nursery services), and cultural and 
amenity services that give intangible benefits to human well-being (MA 2005; De Groot et al. 2010). 
These services provide many economic benefits and over the years a wide variety of financing 
mechanisms have been developed to capture at least some of the monetary value of these economic 
benefits, including government regulated (taxes & subsidies), government supported market creation 
(offset and cap & trade-schemes, such as carbon credits), private market mechanisms (e.g. user fees & 
payment for environmental services) and private non-market mechanisms (e.g. donations & lotteries) 
(De Groot et al., 2007). 
The principle of market-based instruments is applied for capturing the financial value of ecosystem 
services through monetization and commoditisation of ecosystem services (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
2010) of which payment for environmental services (PES) is an important component. Initial debates 
on PES focussed on the quest of enhancing economic efficiency of conservation and enforcing 
markets to link supply and demand for ecosystem services. The main reason for the application of 
market-based instruments for ecosystem services is because the real value of ecosystem services to 
human wellbeing is not, or only partially included in market economics (Costanza et al. 1997; De 
Groot 1992; Turner, Pearce, and Bateman 1994). This situation refers to market failures, i.e. the 
failure of markets to reflect to full or true value of so-called free services such as pure water (without 
the need for purification) or pollination enhancing crop yields, and neglect to recognize negative 
effects of economic activities on environmental public goods (i.e. so called negative externalities). 
The articulation of market forces in solving these negative externalities aims to transfer external 
values to local decision makers in providing such environmental services at the lowest possible social 
cost. Effective legal structures with well-defined and enforceable policy rights can overcome the 
problems of market failures associated with environmental externalities (Coase 1960). Schemes with 
voluntary contracts as opposed to strict command-and-control instruments may better approximate 
social optimum and increase efficiency in generating environmental goods and services.  
A valid line of argument on PES exists among scientists and practitioners that a PES instrument 
should not be burdened by additional social equity goals in achieving its environmental and cost-
effectiveness goals of ES provisions. The question is what environmental integrity aspects can be 
segregated from social inequity issues? Nevertheless, recent literature discussed that the Coase’s and 
pure market approach, that dominate the conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and 
implemented in practice (Muradian et al. 2010). Moreover, Kosoy and Corbera (2010) through the 
lens of “commodity fetishism” argued the commoditisation of ecosystem services was problematic. 
Case studies in Latin America showed social values beyond merely financial payment induced 
participation in PES (Kosoy et al. 2007) and monetization of environmental services was mostly 
rejected by the PES recipients (Asquith, Vargas, and Wunder 2008). However, potential combination 
between equity and efficiency may be possible (Pascual et al. 2010). Thus, there is a clear need to 
adjust Coase’s argument and incorporate context and perspective of local stakeholders. Especially, 
when PES schemes are applied in developing countries with  skewed wealth distribution, contested 
property rights, low law enforcement and weak institutions (Neef and Thomas 2009).  
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1.2. Objectives and research questions  
The conceptualization and analysis of PES in Asian countries is still partly analysed. PES has multiple 
interpretations and definitions since it is an evolving concept, How to balance between efficiency and 
fairness involved in changing current land use, socio-cultural values and behaviour of relevant 
stakeholders remains poorly known. Based on empirical research in Indonesia, Philippines and Nepal, 
this PhD thesis aims to test the overarching hypothesis that without combining efficiency and fairness 
aspects, the PES concept will not provide sustainable solutions and its implementation may achieve 
neither an increase of ES provision nor livelihood enhancement.  
The overarching hypothesis is tested through a number of research questions:  
1. How do current PES designs and practices in Asia balance fairness and efficiency of the 
payment schemes?  
Sub-questions include:  
How broad can the basic PES concept be interpreted beyond its formal, restrictive 
definition?  
How does its design, including the defining types and forms of rewards, adapt to the local 
context? 
2. What are the key considerations in designing and implementing a PES scheme as a multiple-
goal policy instrument in the context of densely populated Asian landscapes?   
Sub-questions include:  
To what extent does the concept of a market-based approach of PES match with the strict 
conditionality of PES?  
How does the ecological knowledge of PES actors influence efficiency and fairness of  PES 
establishment? 
3. How to integrate PES mechanisms into a wider concept of sustainable development in a 
developing country context and what policy recommendations can be offered?  
Sub questions include:  
How can the sustainable livelihood framework be captured in the establishment of PES 
schemes?  
To what extent does the actual cash flow to individual service providers contribute to 
poverty alleviation? 
1.3. Research framework and explanation of used concepts 
Knowledge on and experience with PES has been enriched over the past decade, but there is no 
unified understanding of the ES and PES concepts as yet. Efficiency and fairness of PES are also 
often perceived differently by researchers and practitioners depending on their views and disciplines. 
This section is to clarify the concept of ES and PES, including its efficiency and fairness aspects that 
are carried throughout this PhD thesis. 
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1.3.1 Environmental services and ecosystem services 
Environmental services and ecosystem services are two important terms widely used in the academic 
and empirical literature to discuss environmental policy, sometimes as synonyms, sometimes with 
different delineations. The concept of services in both terms refers to the flows of benefits obtained by 
people. The MA concept of ecosystem services included provisioning services which focus on goods 
that can be derived from ecosystems. Some definitions of environmental services exclude the 
provisioning services categories. Most of the environmental degradation issues can be linked to an 
overdependence on provisioning services, at the cost of the other services, so combining them into a 
single category is not helpful. Markets generally function for the goods obtained from provisioning 
services, and the main market failures may be due to lack of enforceable property rights and/or 
effective collective action, rather than lack of appreciation for this category of services.  
Other differences in interpretation refer to agro-ecosystems and ecosystems with a strong human 
management component. Environmental services are defined as human benefits derived from natural 
and/or actively managed landscapes, which involve natural capital in their generation, while 
ecosystem services is a subcategory of it, provided by “natural” subsystems (Swallow et al. 2009; 
Muradian et al. 2010). Ecosystem services are interpreted as the flow of benefits from natural capital 
and its processes to human-being (Wegner and Pascual 2011; MA 2005). Natural capital is an 
autonomous complex system providing ecological services and amenities that contribute to human 
welfare without ever passing through market (Costanza 2003). In theory, the notion of environmental 
services is “input-based and focused on the efforts undertaken by actors to generate environmental 
improvements and improved natural capital” and ecosystem services is “outcome-based and focused 
on the wellbeing benefits provided to society from natural capital” (Greiner 2010).  
The main difference between ecosystem services and environmental services is the inclusion or 
exclusion of provisioning ecosystem services (Swallow et al. 2009). Market-based instruments are 
generally much more effective for provisioning services than for regulating, supporting or cultural 
services because provisioning services can be physically traded in a market place. Environmental 
services are provided by different human-managed land uses including agriculture or forestry that are 
primarily targeting provisioning services (Van Noordwijk, pers com). Therefore, the focus of this PhD 
research is on environmental services where markets deal with the intangible values of regulating, 
supporting and cultural services of ecosystems. Given the multiple interactions and diversity of 
situations, the term environmental services is used as umbrella while greater specificity of service, 
providers and beneficiaries is needed for various contexts. 
1.3.2 Payment, reward and compensation for environmental services 
Payment for environmental services has been defined as “a voluntary, conditional transaction where at 
least one buyer pays at least one seller for maintaining or adopting sustainable land management 
practices that favour the provision of a well-defined environmental service” (Wunder 2005). PES 
refers to a wide range of possible incentives for environmental service (ES) providers, ranging from 
one-off direct payments by ES beneficiaries to ES providers to more complex market mechanisms 
involving offset credits traded among many buyers and sellers. Early literature on PES classified the 
forms of PES in practice and recognized at least four types of PES schemes, differentiated by the 
degree of government intervention in administration of the schemes, by the characteristics of the 
buyers and sellers, and by the source of payments (Smith et al. 2006; Scherr et al. 2006). By pointing 
out the weaknesses of indirect environmental interventions such as Integrated Conservation and 
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Development Programs, Ferraro and Simpson (2005) argued that PES can create a direct incentive 
scheme between ES sellers and buyers and thus might better achieve both conservation and 
development objectives by better targeting and lowering transaction costs.   
PES is intended to be a performance-based payment where land managers (i.e. environmental service  
providers), who manage their lands through environmental benign techniques and provide and/or 
maintain a flow of environmental services, voluntarily enter agreed contractual conditions, and 
directly get payments or rewards from environmental service beneficiaries, (i.e. those who benefit  
from their conservation efforts). Its concepts were tested as a possibility to increase effectiveness in 
environmental protection and reduced (public) conservation budgets in Latin America, the US and 
Europe (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008; Pagiola and Platais 2002).   
Starting about a decade ago, PES has gained broader attention in developing counties of Asia and 
Africa (Swallow et al. 2007; Swallow et al. 2010; Neef and Thomas 2009; Ferraro 2007; Leimona, 
Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 2009). Proponents of fairness dimensions as elements that need to be added 
to effectiveness and efficiency prefer the use of the broader concept of rewards (RES) rather than 
payment for environmental services (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Chandler 2004; Gouyon 2003; 
Swallow et al. 2007). The notion of RES focuses on the “multiple goals of ecological sustainability, 
just distribution and economic efficiency and favours a variety of payment mechanisms to achieve 
these goals, both market and non-market” (Farley and Costanza 2010; Muradian et al. 2010). RES 
further involves the integration of pro-poor elements into economic instruments to enhance 
environmental services with the basic argument that poverty alleviation has to be included into any 
portfolio to protect the environment, especially in developing countries.  
The term RES also offers broader recognition to ES providers, not only focusing on financial 
transactions between stakeholders but also including in-kind reward, such as access to land, access to 
markets, capacity building, and recognition of identity and rights (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and 
Chandler 2004). Swallow et al. (2009) introduced the term  compensation and rewards for 
environmental services to refer to “a range of mechanisms linking ecosystem stewards and 
environmental service beneficiaries, including the mechanisms normally included under the term 
payment for ecosystem service”. They noted that the relationships between ecosystem stewards, 
environmental service beneficiaries and intermediaries may be more complex than a simple 
transaction, with agreements that are not wholly voluntary and payments that are not wholly 
conditional. Some in this thesis differentiate both terms and use RES for the pro-poor PES and PES 
for other special cases focused on financial transaction. However, in general, the chapters 
interchangeably use rewards for environmental services (RES) and payment for environmental 
services (PES) recognizing that the concept of PES has been broadened to encompass the equity and 
fairness aspects.  
1.3.3 Efficiency and fairness, and their trade offs 
Efficiency is to produce the greatest societal value (as determined subjectively by individuals and as 
measured by economist either in markets or by using non-market methods) for the least possible 
social cost. In short, efficiency is enhanced when net value is maximised or gained positive net 
benefit. Welfare economics refer efficiency as Pareto efficiency where “an allocation of goods is 
Pareto efficient if no alternative allocation can make at least one person better off without making 
anyone else worse off” (Boardman et al. 2001). The link between positive net benefits and Pareto 
efficiency is straightforward: if a policy has positive net benefits, then it is possible to find a set of 
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transfer, or side payments that makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse 
off.    
In environmental policy, goals reflecting other values to be relevant to social problems and the public 
policies proposed to solve them are commonly considered. Boardman et al. (2001) recommend that 
when goals in addition to efficiency are relevant, as well as when efficiency is the only goal, but 
relevant impact cannot be confidently monetized, multigoal analysis provides the appropriate 
framework. This analysis can include equity, fairness and social justice.  
 
 
Figure1.1  Elements of efficiency and fairness within a reward for environmental service scheme 
A PES scheme involves at least two actors who initiate exchanges for mutual interest and make 
agreements in achieving effective ES provisions. The actors can usually be referred to as external 
stakeholders (including regulators who benefit from the provision of ES and are willing to invest 
some capitals to gain increase in ES), and local stakeholders who provide ES through their land use 
practices and behavioural change. Figure1.1 shows the elements of efficiency and fairness within 
payment/rewards for environmental services. Efficiency refers to ES additionality gained by clearly 
linking land use practices contracted under PES scheme and ES provisions, and cost-effectiveness of 
the scheme. Fairness attributes pro-poor aspects of PES, where marginalized actors of the scheme 
have just opportunities in participating, planning, designing, implementing and monitoring the 
scheme, and getting benefits from it.  
The three main stages of development of a locally appropriate RES mechanism are (1) scoping and 
stakeholder analysis – by identifying and engaging with ES beneficiaries and all agents with credible 
land claims and threats to conservation, explicitly outlining baselines, calculating conservation 
opportunity costs and customizing reward/payment modalities; (2) negotiation – reaching agreement 
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on terms of contract, amount of payment, rights, liabilities and criteria for and modalities of 
monitoring; and (3) implementation and monitoring of contractual agreement. Each stage of RES 
development interplays efficiency focusing on ES provision and its costs, and fairness focusing on 
perceived equity of all stakeholders in access, process, decision making and outcomes of RES scheme 
(Figure 1.2).  
 
 
Figure 1.2  Stages in RES development and its links with efficiency-fairness (Adapted from van Noordwijk et al 
2011) 
1.4. Study area 
Over one-third of the Asian countries’ inhabitants depend on agriculture and natural resource based 
utilisation accounted for their livelihoods (Dixon et al. 2001). This region has immense diversity of 
landscape ranging from closed forest to open-field agriculture with many intermediate land cover, 
such as ‘upland intensive mixed’, ‘highland extensive mixed’ and ‘tree-crop mixed’. Each agro 
ecological zone provides its unique combination of environmental services. Therefore it offers many 
opportunities to explore the interactions between forest conversion, intensification of land use and 
provision of environmental services, such as biodiversity conservation, watershed function and carbon 
sequestration (Hadi and Noordwijk 2005).  
The pilot sites in Southeast Asia and South Asia where I coordinated and conducted research for this 
thesis, cover nine sites in three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal) (Figure 1.3). 
Following the analysis of Hadi and van Noordwijk (2005), some combinations of agro ecological 
zones can be distinguished from these sites for analyzing potential establishment of rewards for 
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environmental services through the interaction of tree-based and more intensive agriculture or urban 
land use system. For example, RES is potentially operational for watershed functions in Sumatra – 
Indonesia, Luzon and Mindanao – the Philippines, and some parts of South Asia, where lowland rice 
is located at the downstream of upland mosaic, forest, or tree-crop mixed, or in some parts of South 
Asia, where ‘highland mixed’ is located at the upstream of urbanized areas. Rewards for biodiversity 
conservation can occur where tree-crop or upland mosaic is located adjacent to forest threatened by 
further expansions of intensive anthropocentric land use.  
In Asian rural areas, traditional land and resource management systems fail as population increases 
and miniaturization of land leads to overuse. Skewed land distribution often compels the poor to 
survive by cultivating marginal land – erosion- prone slopes and other environmental problems. 
Without tenure, and often with only passing claims on the land they cultivate, the poor are less likely 
to make investments to protect natural resources (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Verbist 2002; 
Brandon and Ramankutty 1993). These socioeconomic conditions are apparent on research areas of 
this thesis.  
 
Figure 1.3  Research sites in Asia with pilot-level researches conducted in Indonesia 
Furthermore, the sites are action and learning sites of the Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental 
Services (RUPES) project of World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) Southeast Asia Region, which are 
the pioneers of rewards for ES initiative in each of the three countries. Indonesia and the Philippines 
were selected to represent the Southeast Asia region, where natural resource management is growing 
in practice (CGIAR 2011) and where ICRAF’s sentinel landscapes exist to provide collection of the 
long-term data sets and to test models. Nepal was included as a case study in South Asia, where 
collective action and social movement are relatively advanced, especially in its upland area. Figure 
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1.3 shows that analysis at local level was mostly conducted in Indonesia, while the case studies in the 
Philippines and Nepal provide lessons at the regional level.  
Most of the sites focus on rewards for watershed services under private and public schemes (Table 
1.1). Two of pilot sites (Singkarak, Indonesia and Kalahan, the Philippines) are testing the voluntary 
carbon market and one of the sites (Bungo, Indonesia) is seeking opportunities for eco-certification 
scheme of rubber agroforestry. The stages of implementations are also various, ranging from initial 
development of RES, where the intermediary partners are conducting scoping studies on biophysical 
and socioeconomic aspects of the pilot, to mature schemes, where contractual agreements have been 
signed and schemes are ready to be scaled up.  
Table 1.1  Research sites and the status of the applied ‘rewards for environmental service’ scheme 
Site Started in Main ES Scheme Status 
Indonesia     
Singkarak, West 
Sumatra  
2002 Watershed services 
 
Distribution of royalty of 
a parastatal 
hydroelectric power 
(HEP) company 
Ad-hoc share of royalty 
 
  Carbon sequestration 
(voluntary)  
Financial payment from 
an international carbon 
broker 
Agreed 10 year contract 
in total 49 hectares 
Bungo, Jambi 2002 Agrobiodiversity 
conservation of jungle 
rubber  
Financial payment from 
a philanthropic scheme   
Ad-hoc reward of a 
micro hydro  
   Eco-certification for 
jungle rubber  
Scoping elements for 
RES development 
Sumberjaya, 
Lampung 
2002 Watershed services, 
mainly sedimentation 
reduction  
‘Conditional CSR’ from a 
parastatal HEP company  
Agreed 1 year contract 
and scaled up to other 
sites 
Cidanau, West Java 2001 Watershed services for 
domestic and industrial 
demands 
‘Conditional CSR’ from a 
water company  
Agreed 5 year-contracts 
in 4 villages 
Kapuas Hulu, West 
Kalimatan 
2008 Watershed services for a 
district water company  
Earmark payment from 
water bill  
Scoping elements for 
RES development  
Talau, East Nusa 
Tenggara 
2008 Watershed services for a 
district water company  
Earmark payment from 
water bill 
Scoping elements for 
RES development 
The Philippines      
Bakun  2004 Watershed services for 
private HEPs 
Distribution of HEP’s 
royalty to community  
 
Agreed share of royalty  
Kalahan  2002 Carbon sequestration 
(voluntary)  
Financial payment from 
national companies  
Initial negotiation with 
potential buyers 
Nepal     
Kulekhani 2002 Watershed services for a 
private HEP 
Distribution of HEP’s 
royalty to community  
Agreed share of royalty 
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters covering an array of issues in efficiency and fairness of PES 
application in Asia. Figure 1.4 presents the flow of chapters in this thesis based on Figure 1.2 and 
shows the contribution of each chapter to different stages of PES development. Table 1.2 presents 
literature as basis of theory of each chapter, assumptions that I and my collaborators made, facts that 
empirically experienced and hypothesis as the basis for this PhD research.   
 
Figure 1.4  Discussion flow of the thesis. Numbers in boxes indicate the chapter(s) 
This introductory chapter identified major challenges and opportunities arising in PES practices and 
clarified some concepts used in analyzing PES. The initial two chapters (Chapter 2-3) reviewed and 
contested the efficiency and fairness aspects of PES. Chapter 2 recommends the principles and 
concepts of pro-poor PES as the basis of analysis of the remaining chapters in this thesis. Chapter 3 
emphasizes the importance to include pro-poor approach in developing any PES schemes and 
analyzes specific circumstances where cash incentives from PES can contribute substantially to 
poverty alleviation. Chapter 4 and 5 discuss experiences in reducing information gaps among 
stakeholders involved in PES scheme by providing information through a scoping study of watershed 
service provision and an experiment in PES procurement auction in providing ES. The scoping study 
provides debates and contrasts among different perspectives of stakeholders on how watersheds 
provide hydrological services. The experiment in reverse auction was tested in providing information 
on environmental service supply curve determining opportunity cost of farmers in joining a PES 
scheme. Chapter 6 further assesses a PES scheme using the sustainable livelihood framework. 
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Table 1.2  Framework of the PhD thesis 
Literature basis  Assumption Fact Hypothesis 
The dominant conceptual 
approach towards  PES is 
derived from Coasean 
economics and PES is 
primarily seen as a way to 
improve economic efficiency 
(Muradian et al. 2010).  
Poverty alleviation is a positive 
‘side effects’ and should be 
targeted as long as their 
inclusion does not imply 
efficiency loses (Pagiola, 
Arcenas, and Platais 2005) 
A market-based instrument 
is efficient in internalising 
environmental externalities 
by “getting the price right”.  
A normative and restrictive 
vision of efficiency 
improvement as a guiding 
principle may create a 
mismatch between theory 
and practice (Pascual et al. 
2010).  
Preconditions for 
application of the PES 
concept with strict 
conditionality are not met in 
many developing countries’ 
contexts and a wider PES 
interpretation is needed. .  
 (Chapter 2)  
PES schemes are more cost-
effective than other 
approaches in conservation 
and poverty alleviation nexus, 
such as integrated 
conservation and development 
projects (Ferraro and Simpson 
2002)  
PES directly targets land 
managers who provide ES 
and payment (mostly 
financial one) must be 
sufficient relative to income 
and at least commensurate 
with opportunity cost. 
Relative numbers and 
wealth of ES providers and 
beneficiaries are varied 
thus willingness and ability 
to pay may be lower than 
willingness to accept of ES 
providers.   
Only under specific 
circumstances, will cash 
incentives from PES 
contribute substantially to 
increasing disposable 
income and alleviating 
poverty of ES providers.  
(Chapter 3)   
Monetization of environmental 
services is the basis for 
enhancing the efficiency of 
environmental policy and 
correcting market failure of ES 
by capturing total economic 
value of ES (Gómez-
Baggethun et al. 2010).  
 
Commoditization of 
environmental services 
transforms natural capital to 
financial capital. 
Cash payments are 
frequently viewed as having 
the highest degree of 
flexibility because they can 
be converted to local goods 
and services as prioritized 
by the receivers.  
Cash payments for 
participating individuals are 
mostly much smaller than 
opportunity cost.  
Indirect non-financial 
benefit at community scale 
contributes to reducing 
poverty or a common-goods 
PES design (Pascual et al. 
2010).  
(Chapter 3) 
PES schemes open links 
between community to 
various types of capitals 
(Chapter 6) 
PES schemes that aim at 
obtaining efficient outcomes 
must have a well-defined ES.  
All ES providers as ES 
suppliers participate and 
voluntarily negotiate with 
ES buyers with balanced 
power.   
PES schemes are likely to 
change (and sometimes 
reinforce) existing power 
structure and inequalities in 
decision making and 
access to resources, with 
significant equity implication 
(Corbera, Kosoy, and 
Martínez Tuna 2007; 
Pascual et al. 2010) 
Reducing discrepancies 
and improving synergies of 
ecological knowledge of all 
actors in PES balance 
effectiveness and fairness 
of a PES scheme. 
(Chapter 4) 
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Literature basis  Assumption Fact Hypothesis 
PES aims at a well-defined 
trading commodity, and active 
supply and demand sides 
must coexist with information 
asymmetries limiting the 
effectiveness of PES 
schemes.    
Procurement of goods and 
services for which there are 
no well-established market 
is commonly performed 
using auctions by using 
bidding rules and market 
competition to reduce the 
incentive for sellers to 
inflate their contract prices 
(Ferraro 2008).  
ES providers are mostly 
located in rural areas with 
low education, low asset 
endowment, small plot size 
and where market-based 
competitiveness especially 
for intangible goods is not 
so common. 
Specific elements of 
procurement auction have 
to be designed and 
administered for farmers 
with low formal education, 
prone to social conflicts and 
influenced by power 
structures within their 
community (Chapter 5)  
A PES procurement 
contract auction increases 
efficiency of PES contract 
allocation.  
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2. Principles for Fairness and Efficiency in Enhancing 
Environmental Services in Asia: Payments, 
compensation, or Co-Investment? 
The term “Payments for Environmental Services (PES)” has rapidly gained popularity, with its focus on market-
based mechanisms for enhancing environmental services (ES). Current use of the term, however, covers a broad 
spectrum of interactions between ES suppliers and beneficiaries. A broader class of mechanisms pursues ES 
enhancement through compensation or rewards (Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services – 
CRES). Such mechanisms can be analyzed on the basis of how they meet four conditions: Realistic, 
Conditional, Voluntary and Pro-poor. Based on our action research in Asia in the Rewarding Upland Poor for 
Environmental Services they provide (RUPES) program since 2002, we examine three paradigms: 
“Commoditized ES (CES)”, “Compensation for Opportunities Skipped (COS)”, and “Co-Investment in 
(Environmental) Stewardship (CIS)”. Among the RUPES action research sites, there are several examples of 
CIS, i.e. co-investment in and shared responsibility for stewardship, with a focus on “assets” (natural + human + 
social capital) that can be expected to provide future flows of ES. CES, equivalent to a strict definition of PES, 
may represent an abstraction rather than a current reality. COS is a challenge when the legality of opportunities 
to reduce ES is contested. The primary difference between CES, COS and CIS is in the way, in which 
“conditionality” is achieved, with additional variation in the scale (individual, household or community) at 
which the “voluntary” principle takes shape. CIS approaches have the greatest opportunity to be pro-poor, as 
both CES and COS presuppose property rights that the rural poor often do not have. CIS requires and reinforces 
trust-building after initial conflicts over the consequences of resource use on ES have been clarified and a 
“realistic” joint appraisal is obtained. CIS will often be part of a multi-scale approach to the regeneration and 
survival of natural capital, alongside respect and appreciation for the guardians and stewards of landscapes. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as Van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., 2010. Principles for fairness and efficiency in enhancing 
environmental services in Asia: payments, compensation, or co-investment? Ecology and Society 15: 17.  
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2.1. Introduction  
Payment for environmental services (PES) is widely seen as a way to financially internalize 
externalities and provide land managers with appropriate incentives to opt for land-use practices that 
maintain or enhance the level of environmental services (ES) 1 that are expected, but have not so far 
been appreciated, by “downstream” or ES beneficiaries (Asquith, Vargas, and Wunder 2008; Porras, 
Grieg-gran, and Neves 2008), In the case of watershed services, the term “downstream” can be taken 
literally. However, where biodiversity conservation, landscape beauty or a reduction in net emissions 
of greenhouse gases are involved, the term is used as a metaphor. There are many current and 
emerging mechanisms that use the PES terminology, ranging from subsidies for forest owners paid 
from levies on water or hydropower users, through trade in certificates of rights to pollute (based on 
certified emission reduction elsewhere), ecotourism and moral incentives to plant trees, to outcome-
based contracts to reduce sediment loads of streams and rivers. Although all these mechanisms differ 
from a command-and-control approach, there is a clear need for more careful descriptors of 
mechanisms as a basis for comparisons of performance and for re-blending of elements to adjust to 
local context. For a functional taxonomy of mechanisms we may have to initially cast the net wide 
and distinguish primary and secondary dimensions along which variation occurs. Swallow et al. 
(2009) proposed the term CRES (“Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services”) for a 
broader set of approaches that have enhancement of ES as a common goal. This builds on the 
combination of environmental science, economic mechanisms, social justice, natural resource 
management and public policy perspectives that (Tomich, Thomas, and Van Noordwijk 2004) and 
(Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Chandler 2004) saw as the conceptual basis for reducing negative 
externalities of land use decisions in the context of Asian development. As a popular summary, the 
carrot, stick and sermons language conveys three approaches to internalization. 
Wunder (2005) defined PES as a voluntary transaction in which a well defined environmental service 
is bought by at least one ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the provider 
continues to supply that service (conditionality). Strict use of this definition implies that PES does not 
currently exist in pure form, but partial matches are called “PES-like”(Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 
2008). There is a wide range of PES-like arrangements, which vary in the type of incentive (payment 
or use of other currencies), the degree of voluntariness in buyers and sellers, the rights to sell and 
rights to buy, the degree of negotiation of the transaction, the clarity on what ES is provided, and the 
way conditionality is made operational. Transforming the social roles to a buyer-seller relationship is 
not trivial and has consequences for reciprocity. 
Although PES has been tested for almost a decade now in developing countries, questions still remain 
about validity of the concept, the language in which it is couched and the array of mechanisms for its  
implementation. Emerging practice in balancing fairness and efficiency differs substantively from 
widely quoted theory emphasizing efficiency alone. Practitioners may need alternative ways to 
communicate about what they do and academic researchers may need to refine their framing of 
research questions at the interface of disciplinary traditions. Based on our direct involvement in an 
action research mode in evolving practices in Asia under the Rewarding Upland Poor for 
                                                   
1
 The term ecosystem services, according to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et al. 2006), includes both 
“provisioning” services (including all of agriculture and forest industries), which tend to have existing markets for goods, 
and regulating, supporting and cultural services that were previously labelled “environmental services”; we use the latter 
term in this paper (van Noordwijk et al. 2004a). 
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Environmental Services they provide (RUPES)2 program, we will examine the paradigms 
encountered. We start with distinguishing two main axes (fairness and efficiency) and a tentative set 
of principles and criteria for realistic, conditional, voluntary, and/or pro-poor enhancement of ES 
within CRES (Swallow et al. 2009). Three paradigms of ES enhancement differ in some key 
properties and may between them capture most of the current variation in approaches. We then 
describe the lessons learnt in RUPES and compare practice with the three paradigms, which may 
provide a better alternative to current “PES” and “PES-like” labels for the range of approaches that is 
currently evolving. 
2.2. Building blocks for this review 
2.2.1 Principles of efficiency and fairness 
The Wunder (2005) definition suggests three key attributes realistic, conditional and voluntary and 
many ways to (partially) achieve these. Van Noordwijk et al.(2007) defined three principles with 
associated criteria and indicators that refer to these properties. They all relate to efficiency, defined as 
effectiveness at minimized levels of input.  This forms the first group of axes for a comparison. A 
second group can be tentatively labeled as fairness, and requires further analysis. 
Before changes of behavior occur in choice and implementation of land use practices that influence 
ES, a number of conditions must be met: alternatives must be known and understood in their various 
consequences. In addition to that, complex willingness and motivation need to shift. The motivation 
combines monetary and cooperative aspects, linked to the social construction of identity. PES 
suggests that a buyer and seller identity can emerge that benefits both sides. The economic paradigm 
that monetary incentives shift behavior is a partial truth, however, dependent on an all other things 
being equal assumption.  
Behavioral economics (Ariely 2009) explores how monetary markets and their efficiency concept 
interact with fairness concepts that refer to social exchanges, image and identity (Akerlof and Shiller 
2009).  If monetary incentives in PES conflict with perceived fairness or aspirations of identity, 
results may be counter to what was expected. Fairness as used here, matching actual exchanges to 
accepted social roles, is a broader concept than the quantitatively measurable property of “equity” 
(Pascual et al. 2010). 
The close interactions between rural livelihoods and ES alongside accepted social roles of agents of 
developmental change have stimulated interest in pro-poor forms of CRES (Swallow et al. 2009), for 
both moral and pragmatic reasons. Poverty reduction is the inspirational core of the Millennium 
Development Goals. If PES mechanisms are not at least neutral on existing inequity, public support 
may rapidly erode. Disenfranchised rural poor may negatively affect the delivery of environmental 
services (Scott 1985). The emerging practice of including the perspectives and livelihood strategies of 
rural poor has tended to avoid marginalization of non-PES participants (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and 
Wunder 2005; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005; Leimona, Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 2009), even 
though the generation of PES is linked to land and land ownership is not in the hands of the poor. We 
thus include pro-poor here as a fourth principle, representing the fairness cluster, and broadly define 
                                                   
2
 The RUPES project Phase I was a project coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (2002–2007). The goal of the 
project was to enhance the livelihoods and reduce poverty of the upland poor while supporting environmental conservation 
through rewards for ES. For further reference, see http://www.worldagroforestrycenter.org/sea/networks/rupes/index.asp. 
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poverty as a condition lacking at least one of the assets (capitals) of the sustainable livelihood 
approach (Chambers and Conway 1992). 
2.2.2 Stocks (assets) versus flows 
The five capitals (stocks) considered in the livelihood analysis: human, social, natural, physical 
(infrastructure) and monetary capital, each have a flow (harvest, depletion, change and investment) 
equivalent.  PES connects a financial flow (or “payment”) to a flow of services. Conventional flow-
based definitions of poverty (less than US$ X per person per day) can be compared with poverty 
concepts based on critical lack of assets. Similarly, shortfalls in environmental service flows and/or 
lack of investment in their restoration are linked to the level of natural capital operating at different 
time scales (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Chandler 2004).  An alternative to the PES framing may be 
a focus on investment in natural capital as a basis for future ES (Wackernagel and Rees 1997). 
2.3. Principles, criteria and indicators 
For the four principles recognized within efficiency and fairness clusters (i.e. (1) realistic; (2) 
conditional; (3) voluntary; and (4) pro-poor), (Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007) suggested criteria 
that may require context-specific operational indicators. 
(1) Realistic: tangible and sustainable reduction or avoidance of human-induced threats to ES flows 
and associated stocks (and/or measurable recovery from past decline of ES) at relevant spatial and 
temporal scale, relative to a non-intervention (business-as-usual) baseline. 
Early signs that buyers get uneasy with a lack of service delivery in PES schemes (Kleijn et al. 2004; 
Landell-Mills and Porras 2002) have not had major consequences in the dominant PES literature, but 
the gap between perceptions and measurable indicators is receiving attention. Although the popular 
perception in many parts of Asia (and the world) is that only forests can provide the watershed 
functions required for effective use of hydropower and/or extraction of drinking water, science does 
not support such propositions. Many examples exist of watersheds with mosaics of forest patches, 
agroforestry zones and paddy rice fields that provide a regular flow of water of low sediment load, 
depending on the rainfall regime. Watershed functions do not justify special treatment for forest per 
se, and user payments for watershed services may need to be allocated beyond the forest management 
entities (Agus, Farida, and Van Noordwijk 2004; Calder 2001; Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Verbist 
2001; van Noordwijk, Agus et al. 2007; Bruijnzeel and van Noordwijk 2008). A recent turn in the 
global debate on “forests and floods” supports a focus on the actual infiltration capacity of soils rather 
than on “forest” as a land-use category (Van Dijk et al. 2009; Malmer et al. 2010) 
Compared to quantifiable watershed services, there is considerably less scope for providing full 
biodiversity conservation functions along with any extraction of goods or forms of agroforestry 
(Schroth 2004). The matrix of landscape mosaics surrounding protected areas does matter, however, 
for the biodiversity that can be conserved in the landscape as a whole (Michon et al. 2007; Scherr and 
McNeely 2007; Pfund et al. 2008). Recent meta-analyses has confirmed a positive role for ecological 
corridors(Gilbert-Norton et al. 2010), further challenged the concept of indicator species as proxies 
(Cushman et al. 2010). The current prominence of a utilitarian ecosystem services portrayal is 
increasingly questioned (Peterson et al. 2010), with more intrinsic ecosystem functioning as 
alternative concept. A proposal (Wiens and Bachelet 2010) to focus on the diversity of arena’s rather 
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than current actors in the face of climate change adaptation aligns with a need for investment in 
ecological infrastructure, rather than protecting current flagship species. In practice, however, the 
practice of conservation funding decisions does not match these concepts as yet. 
In the debate on global incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD), the issue of “realistic” depends on the negotiated “reference scenario” for national-scale 
emissions, the specific cut-off point of the forest definition used and the local opportunities for high 
carbon-stock sustainable development (Swallow 2007). 
(2) Voluntary: engagement of both ES providers and beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through 
free and informed choice at the individual level.  
Acting voluntarily contrasts with the providers being the object of enforced restrictions, such as 
government regulations towards their decisions to land practices (even if the latter implies a right to 
compensation). A perceived threat of external regulation, however, may induce “voluntary” self-
regulation. A weaker form of voluntary decision making refers to agreements at the scale of collective 
action for providers as often found in customary societies and/or beneficiaries as is common where 
electricity or water monopolists include a levy.  
Voluntary mechanisms require “free and prior informed consent (FPIC)” (Colchester 2004)as a basis 
for agreements where both sides (ES providers and beneficiaries) can judge whether or not there is a 
balance between their rights and obligations. The informed part of this refers back to the assessment 
of realistic, but there is a challenge in the efficiency of delegation (not everybody has to be at every 
meeting) versus the risks of elite capture and self-declared representativeness on behalf of key 
stakeholders. Meeting the standards for voluntary thus requires considerable effort in social 
mobilization (Leimona, Van Noordwijk, B.Villamor et al. 2008). 
The domain for voluntary enhancement of ES that can qualify for rewards or payments is the 
complement of the mandatory protection of such services through land-use restrictions in sensitive 
areas and rules against pollution of air, water or soil (Swallow et al. 2009). In many Asian countries 
the regulation is ahead of compliance in many environmental laws; thus, there is a need for national 
policy dialogues (Leimona, Van Noordwijk, Villamor et al. 2008) to revise legal frameworks. 
(3) Conditional: benefits received by ES providers depend on performance measures agreed in 
contracts between parties, with conditions known and understood by all relevant stakeholders.  
A key element to distinguish PES and CRES from taxes and subsidies is the degree to which there is a 
performance basis of conditionality for the rewards/payments rather than an entitlement based on 
nominal entities such as forest, without specifying the actual services delivered by different forest 
types in different landscape and climatic conditions. We can distinguish conditionality at the level of 
input (Did people spend the time on planting trees or guarding the forest?), the condition of the 
system (Are the trees growing? Is the forest still intact?), or the actual outcomes for ES (Clean water 
throughout the year.). Therefore, different levels of conditionality exist between local agents, i.e. ES 
providers and their associated intermediaries, and external agents, i.e. ES beneficiaries and their 
associated intermediaries: ES contracts link tangible benefits for the ES providers to the actual 
enhanced delivery of ES (level I), and/or maintenance of agroecosystems in a desirable state (level II), 
and/or performance of agreed actions to enhance ES (level III), and/or development and 
implementation of management plans to enhance ES or respect for local sovereignty in managing the 
environment for local plus external benefits (level IV) (Figure 2.1). 
18 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Four levels of conditionality between local agents (ES providers and associated intermediaries) and 
external agents (ES beneficiaries and associated intermediaries) (modified from van Noordwijk et al. 
2004b) 
Shifting from “inputs” to “condition of the system” implies respect for local managers in their ability 
to fine-tune decisions on input use, but makes it more difficult to calculate the minimum value of 
conservation contact. This calls for more subtle negotiations, and also for clear rules for monitoring 
and evaluation. It creates opportunities for net benefits to emerge at local level, beyond compensation 
for direct costs of implementation. Conditionality can be used for financial payments (as in most 
market-based delivery contracts for goods), but also for land tenure in sensitive watershed areas 
(Suyanto et al. 2008), with maintenance of healthy watersheds as a condition for the continuation of 
land-use rights. 
These three principles (realistic, voluntary and conditional) refer to effectiveness, when measured for 
impact on ES, and efficiency, when effectiveness is expressed per unit investment by ES 
beneficiaries. A fourth principle, pro-poor, refers to fairness. 
(4) Pro-poor: access, process, decision making and outcomes of the schemes are differentiated by 
wealth or gender among ES providers and beneficiaries, and support a positive bias towards poor 
stakeholders in either group to comply with the Millennium Development Goals and as a step 
towards long term sustainability. 
Rural poverty is increased by environmental degradation, but may also contribute to its cause. ES 
issues cannot be sustainably secured without reduction in poverty, but if payments focus on land 
owners, they may increase local inequity. The type of reward may need to be based on the local 
determinants of poverty and address key local concerns. 
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Leimona et al. (2009) analyzed the potential for PES to have a significant effect on poverty reduction 
in the uplands of Asia. In terms of cash-flow, the potential is limited if expressed on a per capita basis, 
as the potential number of beneficiaries is large. The potential total value of financial transfers in 
enhancing ES can be expressed relative to the current income of poor ES providers. Given a total 
value, either a small group can benefit substantially or a large group marginally, but policy-relevant 
outcomes on rural poverty alleviation can only be expected if a large group can benefit at a daily 
income level that helps in meeting the US$1 per person per day threshold (or its national poverty line 
equivalent). Leimona et al. (2009) expressed the per capita benefits in terms of a number of 
dimensionless ratios of upstream and downstream: area, population density, income, willingness to 
pay by downstream beneficiaries, transaction costs and the offset-fraction of the opportunity costs of 
alternative land uses that might generate more income, but provide fewer ES. Using available 
statistics for Indonesia, an across-the-board target of a 5% increase in disposable income in the 
uplands is only feasible in specific contexts, where area and population ratios differ from the average 
and/or if the downstream population is willing and able to pay at least 4% of their income as a 
contribution to ES provision in the upstream area.  
2.4. Action research at sites and national level 
The RUPES Phase I has been in operation since 2002 and has developed a set of six action research3 
sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal4 to build working models of rewards for ES schemes 
adapted to the Asian context. Targeted action research is identifying the ES and how can they be 
measured. It is looking at who the rewards should go to, who will pay the rewards, how and in what 
form they would be collected, and what amount or form is appropriate. We are analyzing how 
innovative institutional arrangements and reward mechanisms can be applied to foster local 
development and environmental conservation. 
These questions, in essence, were the basis for the exploration of the realistic, voluntary, conditional 
and pro-poor principles as elaborated in the conceptual basis of the program (Tomich, Thomas, and 
Van Noordwijk 2004; Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Chandler 2004). The four principles as currently 
recognized (Swallow 2007; Van Noordwijk, Leimona, Ha et al. 2008) became a major vehicle for 
synthesizing the main lessons learnt from the action research mode, where researchers and project 
staff reflected together with local project partners on what had been achieved. An overview of the 
RUPES and learning sites is provided in Table 2.1, with characterization of the main ES issue, the 
type of conditionality and the mechanism under development. 
                                                   
3
 Action research is a systematic, reflective study of one’s actions and the effects of these actions will be analyzed, shared, 
formulated to new plans for action during the next cycle. The Center for Collaborative Action Research defines action 
research as “a way of learning from and through one’s practice by working through a set of reflective stages that helps a 
person develop a form of ’adaptive’ expertise”. Source: http://cadres.pepperdine.edu/ccar/define.html downloaded on 
February 17, 2010. 
4
 Publications in various forms are accessible through the website. The models, along with the national policy dialogues, 
were initiated in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. An international workshop for practitioners and scientists reviewed 
and synthesized the results of the RUPES Phase I project. 
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Table 2.1  Site level experience in the RUPES Phase I project in Asia 
Site Focus of environmental 
service 
Conditionality applied  
(see Figure 2.1) 
Type of scheme and current 
status 
Indonesia    
Bungo “Jungle rubber” agroforestry 
system for conservation of the 
diversity of local plant species 
and wildlife habitat 
Level IV 
Management plan for rubber 
agroforestry in general, 
including specified agricultural 
techniques 
No slash-and-burn practices 
Minimizing illegal logging at the 
buffer zone  of the adjacent 
national park and traditional 
community forests lubuk 
larangan 
No intensive or commercial 
harvesting of non timber forest 
products or hunting 
 
o Hutan desa (“village forest”) 
recognition by central 
government for local forest 
management role within 
watershed protection forest 
o Testing mini-hydropower as 
intermediate reward for 
biodiversity conservation 
o A private buyer (automotive 
wheel industry) showing 
interest in rubber for 
“green” vehicles 
Cidanau Water quality and regular flow 
for private water companies 
Level II 
Planting and maintaining 
timber and fruit trees with the 
total minimum of 500 trees ha–1 
for five years 
 
o A private water company is 
paying US$120/ha for the 
contract 
Singkarak 
(Watershed) 
Water quality for hydropower, 
native fish conservation and 
ecotourism 
Level IV 
Planting a 40-ha grassland with 
timber and fruit trees 
 
o Conservation fund from 
local government to 
revitalize organic coffee in 
the upstream watershed 
Singkarak 
(Voluntary 
Carbon Market) 
Carbon sequestration for 
voluntary markets under land 
rehabilitation setting 
Level I 
Planting and maintaining a 
specified number of trees to 
achieve an agreed amount of 
carbon sequestration 
 
o Carbon market negotiated 
with private buyer 
(consumer goods 
distributor) 
Sumberjaya 
(Community 
Forestry)  
Watershed rehabilitation for the 
District Forestry Service 
Level II 
Planting and maintaining a 
specified number of trees with 
a particular composition of 
species 
 
o Conditional tenure 
rewarded to farmer groups 
Sumberjaya 
(River Care) 
Water quality for hydropower 
 
Level I 
Conducting collective action in 
riparian rehabilitation and 
sedimentation reduction to 
achieve a specified percentage 
(>30%) of erosion reduction 
 
o Hydroelectric Power 
company (HEP) royalty 
agreements signed for 
River Care groups along 
the river 
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Site Focus of environmental 
service 
Conditionality applied  
(see Figure 2.1) 
Type of scheme and current 
status 
The Philippines   
Bakun Water quality for hydropower Level III 
Setting up management plan to 
rehabilitate watershed, 
including sustainable horticul-
ture practices 
 
o HEP royalty agreements 
signed 
Kalahan Carbon sequestration under 
voluntary market 
Level I 
Planting and maintaining a 
specified number of trees to 
achieve agreed amount of 
carbon sequestration 
 
o Carbon market initial 
agreement with private 
buyer (automotive industry) 
Nepal    
Kulekhani Water quality for hydropower Level III 
Setting up management plan to 
rehabilitate watershed, 
including sustainable 
horticulture practices 
 
o HEP royalty agreements 
signed 
 
Throughout the implementation of the RUPES project, the distinction between rewards (which can 
come in any currency derived from any of the five livelihood capitals – natural, financial, human, 
social and physical – and payments (which are expected to be in monetary terms) was a recurrent 
topic of debate. On further reflection, three paradigms were identified in this debate: commoditized 
environmental services (CES), compensation for opportunity skipped (COS) and co-investment in 
stewardship (CIS), as explained in the next section. 
2.5. CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance 
ES 
Communities living in the landscape and managing (de facto if not always de jure) parts of its 
resources produce both marketable goods and environmental services (Figure 2.2) through their 
access to the five livelihood capitals. Each of these capitals increases or decreases flow processes. In 
addition to that, the community can derive income from the temporary export of labor as another way 
of using its resources. 
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Figure 2.2  Relationships between environmental goods and services provision, actors in the landscape and 
five assets (capitals):  natural (soil, land and water), human (capacity to manage resources), social 
(healthy local institutions), physical (adequate access to public infrastructure), and financial 
(adequate money to invest)  
In a landscape, the community deals with three other main groups in five major ways (see arrows in 
Figure 2.2): 
1) Private sector entities who buy marketable commodities for further processing and trade 
and/or use the landscape resources for added value (e.g. through hydropower or the sale of 
drinking water), 
2) Governments imposing rules on the private sector and their interaction with ES 
Government agencies, sometimes acting to represent international conventions, regulating 
what the community is allowed to do, how it has to organize its administration and how it can 
be part of development processes prioritized at higher levels, 
3) Consumers who buy local goods and may be interested in supporting ES as well, 
Consumers elsewhere in the world who opt for competitively priced goods, but also have 
concerns about the status of poverty indicators, natural resources and human rights in the 
area. 
The government as regulators can use three methods (loosely identified as carrots, sticks and sermons) 
to influence local resource management: (A) financial incentives (e.g. tax reduction); (B) spatially 
explicit regulation of resource access and procedures for their enforcement (e.g. putting fences 
surrounding protected area); and (C) moral persuasion. The regulators obtain their income primarily 
from the private sector and their political power comes from votes from the local community. In this 
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latter instance a balancing act arises that can be quite distinct (and distant) from the concerns of the 
external consumers. 
The interactions with the private sector are primarily through the sale of marketable goods, but may 
also involve investments in provision of agricultural inputs, land clearing and technology, as in 
outgrower schemes. The private sector transforms local marketable goods and ES (such as a regular 
supply of clean water) into marketable goods with added value. It prefers to have free access to public 
ES, but will settle for a range of other options to secure continued access to the resources it needs. 
Options that link financial outlays to greater security and a competitive edge in resource access are 
preferred. The private sector, however, also needs to produce goods with competitive pricing for its 
consumers that match their expectations of quality. If the private sector needs to invest in local ES and 
human welfare, this has to be reflected in the price of goods. 
CES, COS and CIS are three paradigms or ways to organize thinking about, and analysis of, 
compensation and rewards (including payments) for ES involving various combinations of the actors 
in Figure 2.2. The three paradigms differ in conditionality (Figure 2.1) and in primary actor 
relationships (Figure 2.2): arrows 1 and 4 for CES, 2 and 3 for COS and 1, 3 and 4 (backed up by 2 
and 5) in case of CIS.  
2.5.1 Paradigm CES: commoditized environmental services 
Paradigm CES is where ES procurement operates at conditionality level I (Figure 2.1) based on actual 
service delivery and direct marketability. The CES paradigm is focused on direct interaction between 
the community which provides ES (or the ES providers) and ES beneficiaries (arrows 1 and 4 in 
Figure 2.2). The price level for recurrent monetary payments in this paradigm may be fully negotiable 
(based on supply and demand) and provides new sources of income for those who can control land 
and the other resources necessary in the production of ES. Innovations can be expected in how to 
cost-effectively enhance commoditized ES production. There is no explicit poverty target. 
2.5.2 Paradigm COS: compensating for opportunities skipped 
Paradigm COS is paying land users for accepting restrictions (either voluntary or mandatory) on their 
use of land. COS has conditionality at level II or III (Figure 2.1). The basis of contracts depends on 
the achievement of an objectively measurable condition of the (agro)-ecosystem or the expended level 
of effort (or restrictions in input use). The COS paradigm focuses on relations between government on 
one hand (on behalf of its citizens) and the private sector and local community on the other (arrows 2 
and 3 in Figure 2.2). This paradigm may involve recurrent monetary payments based on restrictions 
imposed by local or national government and/or voluntarily accepted on privately-owned land with 
the possibility of collective action. The basis of financial compensation in this paradigm is the 
opportunity costs of foregoing economically attractive and legally permissible land-use patterns that 
reduce ES. Poverty reduction targets can be added through differentiation in pay where prices are 
externally set rather than freely negotiated.  
2.5.3 Paradigm CIS: co-investment in (landscape) stewardship 
Paradigm CIS is focused on assets and generally aspiring conditionality at level IV (Figure 2.1), with 
levels II or III in transitional forms. It combines arrow 3 in Figure 2.2 with arrows 4 and 1 (in 
response to arrows 5 and 2). Relative to a collectively owned or state-owned land and natural resource 
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base, it can include A) negotiated tenure, conditional on ES maintenance; B) reduction of land-use 
conflicts and their collateral damage to ES; C) investment in improved public services, feeder roads 
under community control, and D) land use and development planning that creates employment that 
does not damage ES. The conditionality level IV (entrust the local resource management) is where the 
buyers have full trust that the management plan (including local monitoring) set up by the community 
will enhance the provision of ES with a flexible contract, broad sanctions and a monitoring 
requirement. CIS explicitly adds social capital to the mix. 
2.6. Result 
2.6.1 Linking principles, sites and paradigms in RUPES sites  
Table 2.2 summarizes the links between different paradigms and principles in enhancing ES. Within 
the RUPES experience, the voluntary carbon project in Singkarak, Indonesia (Leimona et al. 2006) 
and Kalahan, the Philippines (Villamor and Lasco 2006) has come closest to the CES paradigm. It 
relates land use and ES with certified emission reduction as the proxy for measuring ES. The CES 
paradigm was also tested in a watershed context in the River Care case study in Sumberjaya (Suyanto 
2007).  RUPES and a hydropower company experimented with a performance-based payment for 
reducing the sediment load in streams based on locally selected actions, after a common diagnostic 
phase. In practice, however, unraveling the effect of climatic variability and landscape condition on 
the performance parameter (sediment concentration) proved to be complex (Bruijnzeel and van 
Noordwijk 2008)5. As the case evolved, performance below the previously agreed baseline was still 
accepted by the buyer as due to force majeure. Explicit appreciation by the hydropower company for 
the efforts made effectively brought in CIS-type social relationship building beyond a market-based 
CES.  
The market-based CES paradigm presupposes individual property rights because, generally, the 
contractual arrangement strictly clarifies “who provides what and how much”. However, our action 
research sites showed that collective rather than individual household decisions received most 
attention, with reliance on existing local perceptions of rights and responsibilities, even for the CES 
paradigm such as in Singkarak and Sumberjaya . Furthermore, monitoring the actual delivery of ES 
can be problematic with technical difficulties for the community (Leimona, Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 
2009). 
2.6.2 Linking principles, sites and paradigms elsewhere 
Reanalysis of popular global PES schemes, such as the Proambiante program in Brazil , the 
Pimampiro case in Ecuador (Wunder and Albán 2008; Echevarria et al. 2004), and Costa Rica’s 
Pagos de Servicios Ambientales (PES) program and related ES payment schemes for (assumed) 
watershed functions in Latin America (Southgate and Wunder 2007) and Asia (Munawir and 
                                                   
5
 The paper discusses complex interactions between weather and vegetation, and factors influencing the restoration of 
watershed functions. For example, the intensity of rainfall is the most important factor affecting annual water yield. Human-
induced action, such as removal of forest, initially increases annual water yield. Further, people can influence this process by 
choosing the type of vegetation (such as replacing trees with less “thirsty” plants such as grasses and annual crops that allow 
groundwater reserves to recover as long as soil degradation is kept moderate) and the degree of soil compaction in 
subsequent years. An interesting question that is relevant to any ES payment scheme is, “Who is the main provider of 
rainfall (that influences annual water yield)?” 
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Vermeulen 2007; Leimona, Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 2009), shows that these cases fit the COS 
paradigm. They use the efforts of ES providers (such as planting trees) as the weaker proxy for 
measuring the ES provisions (such as regular water flow for domestic water users).  
Table 2.2  Experience relevant to three contrasting paradigm across RUPES sites (listed in Table 2.1) 
 Paradigm CES  
(Commoditized 
Environmental Services) 
Paradigm COS  
(Compensation for 
Opportunities Skipped)  
Paradigm CIS 
(Co-Investment in 
Stewardship) 
Examples in global 
literature 
 
Most of the voluntary carbon 
market 
 
Proambiante program, Brazil 
Pimampiro, Ecuador 
PSA program, Costa Rica 
Most of the payment 
schemes for (assumed) 
watershed functions in Latin 
America and Asia  
Grain for Green project, 
China 
National PES project, 
Vietnam 
Andes, Bolivia (Asquith, 
Vargas, and Wunder 2008) 
Example studies in 
RUPES 
(Table 2.1) 
Sumberjaya (River Care) 
Singkarak (Voluntary Carbon 
Market) 
Kalahan (Voluntary Carbon 
Market) 
Cidanau Bungo 
Singkarak (Watershed) 
Sumberjaya (Community 
Forestry) 
Bakun 
Kulekhani 
Do schemes meet the 
principles?  
   
Realistic Yes, as long as ES is 
measurable 
Only if correctly targeted. 
Mostly long-term 
Mostly long-term 
Voluntary Yes, for those who are in a 
position to control and 
enhance ES 
Yes, for those with rights and 
opportunity to reduce ES 
Yes, for collective action 
scheme, FPIC depending on 
local social capital and 
decisions 
 
Conditionality  
(Figure 2.1) 
Level I Levels II–III Levels I–IV 
Pro-poor Possibly not: pre-supposes 
tenure security 
Possibly yes, depending on 
allocation rules 
Mostly yes, depending on 
local institutions 
Primary strength The output is based on the 
ES provision, ensuring the 
effectiveness of the project 
Relatively easy to monitor 
with tangible indicators at 
effort level rather than 
outcome level 
Trust-building and reciprocity 
redress past inequalities 
Primary challenge Considerable risk to the ES 
providers if their efforts do 
not pay off. The monitoring 
process requires technical 
capacity because of 
complexity in measuring ES.  
The conditionality might not 
directly link with the ES 
provision. Buyers have 
budget restriction for the 
financial payments 
Need high trust between the 
seller and buyer – similar to 
COS, the conditionality might 
not directly link with ES 
provision and financial 
opportunity cost might not be 
fully paid.  
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Government-driven PES programs, such as the Grain for Green project in China and Vietnam, and 
RUPES cases in Bungo, Bakun and Kulekhani, highlight that where poverty is a major issue 
enhancement of ES cannot be disentangled from development needs. The limited capacity of the 
actors involved and the lack of biophysical data for a full scientific basis for a PES to be implemented 
are reasons for broader approaches to enhance ES. As discussed above, communities in developing 
countries depend greatly on social contacts in managing their landscapes. They share customary, 
inherited values and respect trust and mutual understanding. This norm influences their relationship 
with ES beneficiaries and other group members of ES providers, and only dealing with people that 
they trust adds complexity to the scheme. All of these elements indicate that a CES relying on only 
money transfer between (individual) ES sellers and buyers with strict conditionality generally cannot 
work in developing countries. However, COS and CIS schemes have risks for not to be pro-poor 
when the co-benefit of the scheme cannot exceed both the economic and non-economic costs of the 
schemes. The magnitude of total benefits received by each ES providers is depended on benefit 
allocation rules among ES providers (Fisher et al. 2010) and robust institutional design (Corbera, 
Kosoy, and Martínez Tuna 2007), especially under a collective action scheme.  
2.7. Discussion and conclusion 
A strict interpretation of realistic, conditional and voluntary PES (paradigm CES or commoditized 
ES) appeared problematic in most sites and situations. The question “Who deserves to be paid for 
improving ES?” is not simple in current situations where the lack of clarity on natural resource tenure 
rights is a major problem in developing countries (Giller et al. 2008). The question “Who deserves 
pay for not destroying natural capital?” is morally suspect in most contexts. What starts off as an 
additional incentive may soon be seen as an entitlement. When some get paid and others do not, the 
results may be interpreted as a potential future threat to ES by those who did not get prime attention. 
The net effect of PES to the overall level of ES may then decline. This perverse effect is often 
discussed – and there are some early signs that it may be real in a number of situations. It may be 
related to the transformation of existing (but underperforming) reciprocity norms to a buyer-seller 
relation without paying an adequate price. Further analysis of the conceptual failure is needed. The 
“business” language in which PES is often expressed may be partly to blame (Lele et al. 2010; Kosoy 
and Corbera 2010; Pascual et al. 2010). 
 Recent experiments on the interface of behavioral economics and psychology support an 
interpretation that human interactions within a social capital context follow different rationality rather 
than interactions that directly involve money (Ariely 2009). Experiments showed that people 
sometimes expend more effort in exchange for no payment (in a social market, expecting reciprocity) 
than they expend when they receive low payment (a monetary market). Experimental evidence also 
demonstrates that mixed markets (markets that include aspects of both social and monetary markets) 
more closely resemble monetary than social markets (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009). Even subtle 
reminders of money elicit big changes in human behavior. Relative to participants primed with neutral 
concepts, participants primed with language about money preferred to play alone, work alone, and put 
more physical distance between themselves and a new acquaintance (Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2006). 
On the other hand, reminders of money prompted participants to work harder on challenging tasks and 
led to desires to take on more work as compared to participants not reminded of money (Vohs, Mead, 
and Goode 2008). Image motivation, the desire to be liked and well-regarded by others, as a driver in 
prosocial behavior (doing good) is crowded out by extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) (Ariely, 
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Bracha, and Meier 2009). Monetary incentives may be counterproductive for public pro-social 
activities, when they undermine existing norms and are not sufficient and/or durable enough to offset 
this loss of intrinsic motivation. Replacing the “payment” concept by “co-investment” language is an 
effort to appeal to both social and financial concepts. Whether or not this can work at a universally 
human psychological level and/or in a culture-dependent learned set of norms will require further 
analysis and experimentation.  
The interest in long-term assets versus current services varies among the ES and the amount of place-
based investment of ES beneficiaries. For example, the economic lifespan of the investment of a 
hydropower company or drinking water reservoir requires a direct matching with the time over which 
the ES are needed. A more mobile tanker-level drinking water supplier may have more choices, and 
thus less reason to invest for long time periods. Global concerns about biodiversity are focused on 
slowing the rate of anthropogenic biodiversity loss, with a long-term perspective. So, short-term PES 
schemes, which postpone local extinctions by a few years, are pointless.  
Only a small part of the ES can be “packaged” in quantities that can be traded in open markets, 
detached from the place of origin of the commodity. Reducing net emissions of greenhouse gases may 
appear to be the least place-bound, since greenhouse gases have similar effects on the atmosphere 
wherever they are emitted or sequestered. Therefore, the carbon market is probably the closest 
approximation to a full commoditization of ES. However, even here current contractual obligations 
include aspects of permanence or the complex and low-value “temporary emission reduction credits” 
that were created for Afforestation/ Reforestation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in 
the Kyoto Protocol and have found little application (Van Noordwijk, Leimona, Villamor et al. 2008). 
The comparison of rehabilitation versus avoided degradation or deforestation may illustrate a further 
point. Rehabilitation may require an initial investment. Avoided degradation or deforestation is a 
recurrent offsetting of forgone opportunities for more economically beneficial land use that still 
exists. The institutions for investment in projects that supposedly start a self-sustaining path (such as 
rehabilitation projects) are more open to private sector engagement than are those involving the long-
term modification of incentives (such as avoided degradation or deforestation projects). The latter 
may be difficult without the involvement of public sector institutions. The illustration above can show 
the contrast: one-off investment (for rehabilitation) versus recurrent payments (for avoided 
degradation or deforestation), and flows of ES (due to rehabilitation) versus securing assets (due to 
avoided degradation or deforestation). The simple PES paradigm thus requires revision or enrichment 
of both arguments – payment versus investment and flows versus stock. 
In a PES concept as defined by Wunder (2005) the markets may ultimately become the mechanism to 
efficiently balance supply and demand for ES, but at this stage information is restricted, asymmetrical 
(Ferraro 2008) and incomplete. Brokers are needed to provide access to knowledge and clarify 
bargaining positions. On the other side of the spectrum, a benevolent top–down governance system 
that tries to impose fairness in actions to enhance ES as public goods will require detailed knowledge 
of how ES are affected by the many options and realities in land use. In between these two extreme 
positions, there is a need for public investment in the development of boundary objects or knowledge 
products that can be accepted by the various stakeholders as a background for their negotiations of 
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adjusting action. Enhancing ES through forms of compensation, rewards or payments requires linking 
knowledge and action, and so may benefit from boundary organizations6 (Cash et al. 2006). 
2.7.1 Scale issues 
Within a PES scheme, the financial rewards obtained by voluntary enhancement of ES must at least 
offset the real opportunity cost of modified land use (and opportunities forgone), after paying the 
transaction costs. Levels of reward higher than this will provide real benefit, but the benefits may also 
be thought to derive from local spinoffs through enhanced local ES. In the paradigm of co-investment 
in (environmental) stewardship (i.e. CIS) this cost–benefit approach is considerably broadened. The 
function of total capital values (i.e. natural, human, social, physical and financial) supplied to ES 
providers through various forms of investment and rewards must match their opportunity cost in terms 
of the functions of all five capitals plus transaction costs. Transaction costs may themselves have a 
positive aspect of relation-building and external communication that can be valued. This broader 
approach involves tradeoffs between capital types, as well as tradeoffs between land-use practices that 
vary in their provision of goods and services. It may defy quantitative analysis. 
With global concerns over climate change, the global architecture of incentives to reduce emissions 
from land use and land-use change (including forestry) is under debate. The criteria of realistic, 
voluntary, conditional and pro-poor apply at the global scale of interactions between countries, as 
much as they apply at the local scale of CRES. However, there is considerable scope for nested 
systems that allow countries to exchange greenhouse gas emissions for financial incentives at the 
national border, and use this for an array of local incentives for forms of sustainable development that 
are compatible with “high carbon stock livelihoods” (Swallow and Van Noordwijk 2008). The 
existing legal framework for forest management may need to be adjusted so that the conditionality is 
appropriately regulated (Galudra et al. 2008). At the local level a number of barriers to farmer tree 
planting and community-based forest management have been identified, such as lack of land-use 
rights, good planting material, know-how on tree management and access to markets for tree products 
(Roshetko et al. 2008; Van Noordwijk, Suyamto et al. 2008). A multi-scale approach may use 
paradigm CES in the relationship between countries, exchanging financial capital for verifiable and 
agreed emission reduction, while the government uses the funds so obtained (or the loans that can be 
repaid in such a way) for mechanisms that are following COS or CIS language and logic, providing 
co-investment in generic ES that happen to have carbon co-benefits, rather than targeting emission 
reduction as their primary goal. 
In summary, our experiences in Asia suggest that PES schemes may need to address a livelihoods 
approach that considers the five capital types (human, social, physical, financial and natural) in their 
interactions across scales. The interactions of all livelihood capitals address the preconditions for the 
CES and COS paradigms and may well have to be the foundation for all such efforts. A language of 
CIS: “co-investment” and “shared responsibility” may be more conducive to the type of respect, 
mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable development that is needed. It retains reference 
to social exchange rather than financial transactions. Yet, there are opportunities for phased strategies. 
After creating a basis of respect and relationships through the paradigm of CIS there may be more 
space for specific follow-ups in the paradigm of CES for actual delivery of ES to meet conservation 
objectives. The simple conceptual scheme of buyers, sellers, intermediaries and regulators that was 
                                                   
6
 Organizations that sit, at least metaphorically, in the territory between science and politics – interfacing or bridging the 
pursuit of scientific research with policy decision and public actions.  
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used in many initial developments of PES schemes may need to be modified to incorporate a more 
holistic livelihoods perspective and the combined efforts through moral persuasion, regulations and 
rewards to modify local resource-use decisions in the uplands. 
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3. Can rewards for environmental services benefit the 
poor? Lessons from Asia 
Emerging approaches to payment for environmental services (PES) mostly only focus on the efficiency in 
provisioning the environmental services. Nevertheless, neglect of the perspectives of all actors in the landscape 
and their livelihood strategies can jeopardize the success of PES and contradict the global mandate. Rewards for 
environmental services (RES) link global priorities on poverty reduction and environmental sustainability and 
are designed to balance effectiveness and efficiency with fairness and pro-poor characteristics. This paper 
assesses some key issues associated with design and implementation of RES by developing and exploring two 
propositions related to conditions required for RES to effectively contribute to poverty alleviation, and to 
preferred forms of pro-poor mechanisms. Our first proposition is that only under specific circumstances will 
actual cash incentives to individual RES participants contribute substantially to poverty alleviation in ES 
provider communities. The second proposition is that non-financial incentives to ES providers will contribute to 
reducing poverty by linking the community (participants and non-participants) to access to various types of 
capital (human, social, natural, physical and financial). A review of key ratios of relative numbers and wealth of 
service providers and beneficiaries supports the first proposition and rejects the notion of widespread potential 
for reducing upstream rural poverty through individual cash payments. Results of community focus group 
discussions support the second proposition through context-specific preferences for mechanisms by which RES 
can help trigger conditions for sustainable development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as Leimona, B., Joshi, L., Van Noordwijk, M., 2009. Can rewards for environmental services 
benefit the poor? Lessons from Asia. International Journal of the Commons 3, 82-107.  
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3.1. Introduction  
The basic rationale for payments for environmental services (PES) is that without benefit transfers 
that are conditional on environmental service delivery, decisions on local resource use tend to 
overexploit resources and ignore effects on external stakeholders. Given sufficient scope of 
independent decision making by people whose actions influence environmental services (ES), 
incentives from those who receive the services can be effective to ensure continuity of ES. While 
beneficiaries of ES would generally like to receive these services free of charge, the legitimacy of 
resource use by others may have to be accepted and PES may be a viable option if it can lead to actual 
protection and restoration of natural resources and ES. For upstream ES providers, payments must be 
sufficient to exceed costs for opportunities voluntarily foregone in order for net benefits to emerge.   
Design of PES schemes as an incentive-based approach is an alternative to the command-and-control 
approach that has usually preceded it (Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Wunder 2005, 2007). 
Yet, since payments can only be provided for legitimate resource management, the effective 
functioning of PES mechanisms requires redefinition rather than abolishment of rules and their 
enforcement. PES refers to a wide range of potential incentives made to ES providers, ranging from 
one-off direct payments by ES beneficiaries to ES providers to more complex ‘market’ mechanisms 
involving offset credits traded among many buyers and sellers (Smith et al. 2006; Scherr et al. 2006). 
Four types of PES schemes can be distinguished and differentiated by the degree of government 
intervention in administration of the schemes, by the characteristics of the buyers and sellers, and by 
the source of payments: (1) private payment scheme; (2) cap-and-trade schemes, under a regulatory 
cap or floor; (3) certification schemes for environmental goods; (4) public payment schemes, 
including fiscal mechanisms.  
In developing PES schemes, economic incentives are seen as the core consideration and conservation 
is targeted more directly than when it is integrated into broader development approaches (Wunder 
2005). Realistic schemes need to be based on clear and recognizable cause-effect pathways involved 
in the production of ES. Proxies representing these pathways can be accepted as a basis for 
conditionality only in so far as these proxies are themselves subject to regular evaluation and 
refinement. 
Neglect of the perspectives of all actors in the landscape and their livelihood strategies can jeopardize 
the success of PES schemes, such as when programs are disrupted by communities who do not benefit 
from a PES. Furthermore, under global imperatives such as the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG), concerted action will be required by all sectors of society to achieve 
MDG targets such as halving the number of people living in absolute poverty by the year 2015. 
Balance at the nexus of conservation and poverty alleviation is needed to achieve these dual goals. 
But how to combine PES with broader development approaches remains a major challenge in Asia.  
PES mechanisms need to balance effectiveness and efficiency with fairness and pro-poor 
characteristics, with transaction costs as obstacles to both. Advocates of effectiveness and efficiency 
tend to see transactions in economic terms and generally prefer the term ‘payments’. Proponents of 
fairness and equity dimensions as elements that need to be added to effectiveness and efficiency 
prefer the broader concept of ‘rewards’7. (Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007) developed a set of 
                                                   
7
 In this paper, we consistently use ‘rewards for environmental services (RES)’ for our concepts and findings and ‘payment 
for environmental services (PES)’ for other special cases focused on financial transactions.  
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principles and criteria8 for rewards for environmental services (RES) that are summarized in four 
attributes (realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor). 
(a) Realistic: A RES should be able to reduce and avoid threats to environmental services that are 
likely to happen in the absence of further intervention; to do so, benefits gained by both sellers 
and buyers need to be tangible and sustainable. For ES intermediaries, there must be sufficient 
values accruing from ES to support development of RES mechanisms. 
(b) Conditional: A RES should be able to connect actual ES provision with the reward being 
provided, in a manner that ensures transparency regarding conditions when rewards can be 
granted or not. 
(c) Voluntary: A RES is voluntary when engagement of ES providers in RES schemes is based on free 
choice rather than on being the object of regulation. The key distinction between RES and purely 
regulatory solutions to ES issues is that both buyers and sellers voluntarily agree on RES 
contractual agreements. Bargaining power of both buyers and sellers can increase with insights 
into each other’s strategies. 
(d) Pro-poor: A RES considers equitable impacts on all actors, and design of RES mechanisms is 
positively biased towards poor stakeholders. 
In this paper, we assess some key issues associated with design and implementation of RES by 
developing and exploring two propositions related to conditions required for RES to effectively 
contribute to poverty alleviation, and to preferred forms of pro-poor mechanisms. These propositions 
are explored through analysis and empirical findings from a set of case study sites in Asia where RES 
projects are being implemented. 
3.2. Key issues for Rewards for Environmental Services 
The pro-poor nature of a RES scheme can be interpreted from either a design or a poverty impact 
perspective. RES strategies can be deliberately designed to be biased in favour of the poor when 
considering tradeoffs between the efficiency and fairness of the mechanisms employed (Gouyon 
2003); (Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007). From a poverty impact perspective, a RES can be 
assessed by its contribution to poverty reduction through payments that actually reach poor land users 
or poor ES providers. A RES could, for example, target support for small and medium sized farmers 
and land owners, and even give them additional portions of benefits such as income from RES (Hope 
et al. 2005); (Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007).  
3.2.1 Stages in developing RES and their constraints  
Literature on PES is already rich with discussions on a broad range of issues and constraints in 
establishing pro-poor PES, mostly in the context of Latin America (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 
2005; Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005; Robertson and Wunder 2005), with some in Asia 
(Tomich, Thomas, and Van Noordwijk 2004; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007) and only a few thus far in 
Africa (Ferraro 2007). Our summary of these constraints is framed by four stages of RES 
development, recognizing that high transaction costs can be an important constraint in all stages: 
                                                   
8
 Indicators of such criteria are available in draft version.  
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(a) Scoping. This stage clarifies linkages between land management by ES providers and the ES that 
are actually provided. ES intermediaries and buyers target specific areas considered to be 
environmental service hot-spots. This spatial specificity may not coincide with areas where the 
poor live (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005; Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007), and the 
poor may be excluded from such schemes because they may not qualify as ES providers. Even 
when the poor are legitimate ES providers, they usually own limited land. Most ES services (and 
payments) are based on particular land use at a given spatial scale. As small land-holders, the 
poorer members of a community will receive smaller proportions of benefits from PES than their 
better-off neighbors with larger land holdings. Moreover, PES programs require long-term 
investment in order to achieve significant environmental impacts, so where land tenure is 
insecure, it may be difficult to attain these types of investments (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 
2005).  
(b) Stakeholder analysis of RES key actors. Problems at this stage appear similar to those in the first 
stage, especially regarding inclusion versus exclusion of the poor as ES providers.  
(c) Negotiation between ES sellers and buyers. Insecure land tenure can become a constraint for ES 
sellers in negotiating with buyers. It can undermine the legal legitimacy of sellers and limit their 
access to financial services needed to conduct activities required by the contractual agreement. 
And since poor people usually have less power in negotiation, there are risks that their voices will 
be neglected or undermined during contract formulation. 
(d) Implementation problems in reaching the poor. Four types of negative outcomes may be 
associated with RES implementation. Firstly, PES may provide incentive for powerful groups to 
take control of currently marginal lands (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002); (Grieg-Gran, Porras, 
and Wunder 2005; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005). Secondly, livelihoods of the landless may 
be negatively affected if PES conditions limit their access to forested land (Kerr 2002), especially 
where the landless are women or herders whose livelihoods depend on gathering non-timber 
forest products, but who do not participate in PES programs. Thirdly, farm laborers may lose their 
jobs when land use practices promoted by PES have much lower labor intensity (Pagiola, 
Arcenas, and Platais 2005). Fourthly, since most PES are area-based, there is an obvious risk the 
local distribution of rewards may further enhance existing disparity in wealth. 
3.2.2 Cash incentives and non-financial incentives of RES9 
The RES argument is built on local provision of environmental services that benefit external 
stakeholders, but which depend on deliberate human action. Environmental services to be delivered 
are often supplied at suboptimal levels due to competing opportunities to produce marketable goods 
and/or participate in paid service or industrial (urban) jobs. RES as a source of income that is in a 
form equivalent to the benefits derived from marketed goods may shift decision making along the 
goods versus services trade-off curve for local agroecosystems. This argument may seem to favour 
financial forms of freely disposable rewards, unless another form of rewards more effectively 
provides welfare at a collective action level that an individual would not be able to buy with cash in 
hand. 
                                                   
9
 We define cash incentives of RES as direct financial payments from ES buyers to ES providers (participants of RES) either 
to improve their land use practices or to increase ES provisions. Non-financial incentives of RES are non-cash benefits 
gained by ES providers because of their engagement in the scheme, such as capacity building provided by intermediaries for 
participants of RES, collective benefits (such as infrastructure), access to microcredit, or various types of recognition from 
government, which in aggregate can contribute to broader development efforts and include non-participants of RES.   
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In order to have a significant effect, rewards must be sufficient relative to income and at least 
commensurate with costs of opportunities that must be forgone. Only then can RES seriously 
influence decisions about land use and their impacts on local natural capital and provision of 
environmental services. This criterion may be easier to meet when poverty levels are high.  
Cash payments are frequently viewed as having the highest degree of flexibility because they can be 
converted to local goods and services as prioritized by the receiver. Any other form of reward can be 
seen as indirect and ‘patronizing’. Notwithstanding these valid arguments, in practice, it is often clear 
that cash payments are much smaller than opportunity costs for people to fully provision an 
environmental service (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007); 
(Leimona, Jack et al. 2008). In most cases, the quantum of payment, often about US$1 per capita per 
year, is too small to be very meaningful for receiving households. Thus, we have seen that 
communities often prefer that cash available for payments be used for village or community funds for 
social and local development activities. For example, in Cidanau, Indonesia, farmer groups have 
mobilized themselves to use their payments in ways that can benefit all community members, 
including protecting and enhancing local water supplies, including investment in water pipes, and 
building a mosque (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007). In Latin America, communities in a PES 
initiative for watershed protection in Santa Rosa and Los Negros in Bolivia agreed on an annual 
payment of one artificial beehive for every 10 ha of forest protected for a year (Asquith, Vargas, and 
Wunder 2008). This has a cash equivalent of about US$3/ha/year, plus the value of accompanying 
apicultural training. Other alternatives discussed, including road improvement and marketplace or 
bridge construction, were more costly. They assumed the mediating NGO would be able to deliver a 
ready-made complete ‘package’ of benefits, which appeared to be a rational preference because local 
capacities for savings, investment and entrepreneurship are limited. Indeed, PES recipients in Santa 
Rosa specifically rejected the option of payments in cash (Asquith, Vargas, and Wunder 2008; 
Robertson and Wunder 2005). 
Preference for non-financial payments in the Latin American case is consistent with findings from 
other case studies in Asia (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007; Huang and Upadhyaya 2007). The most 
frequent reason given by rural people is that money is spent rapidly for conspicuous consumption and 
in the end leaves no long-run benefits for their livelihoods. However, cases from Cidanau and Brantas 
show that when access to information and facilitation is available from external parties such as NGOs 
or local government to support capacity building for starting new business ventures and income 
diversification, then cash payments can provide small amounts of immediately accessible start-up 
capital for these new livelihood options (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007).  
In developing RES, the service being sold to external groups may also benefit the sellers. Internal 
benefits to ES sellers may appear to weaken the negotiating position of sellers based on arguments 
such as “why should we pay for a conservation effort that also benefits the sellers?” But ES buyers 
often must acknowledge that their limited budget will not be sufficient to provide a competitive 
choice relative to more profitable alternative land use. Thus, inclusion of additional non-financial 
benefits received by local people for managing or protecting ES can actually enhance chances for a 
successful RES when budgets of buyers are limited. 
Benefits of non-financial payments can be channelled to a community as a whole and not just to the 
poor providers among them. Another type of consideration that can often be important is the use of 
public funds by government or other non ES-buyers to invest in specific assets and infrastructure, 
such as schools, health centres, or strengthening of human capital with skills not available locally. 
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Such investments may provide benefits within a timeframe that is compatible with expected external 
benefits from the environmental service. Thus, various forms of co-investment and mutual 
responsibility may be able to emerge among ES sellers, ES buyers and government units with 
compatible mandates.   
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1 Propositions 
Based on our review of literature, case studies and empirical experience, we developed two 
propositions related to the effectiveness of financial rewards in alleviating poverty: 
Proposition 1: Only under specific circumstances, will cash incentives from payment for 
environmental services contribute substantially to increasing disposable income and thus poverty 
alleviation of environmental service providers. 
Proposition 2: Indirect non-financial benefits at community scale for those who engage in a RES 
scheme contribute to reducing poverty by linking the community (both participants and non-
participants) to access to critical forms of capital, including human, social/political, natural, physical 
(e.g. infrastructure) and financial (e.g. microcredit). 
We explored these propositions at two levels: 1) a model of the potential magnitude of financial 
payments and their relevance for upstream income (Proposition 1); and 2) analysis of findings from 
focus group discussions at six RES action research sites across Asia in order to capture stakeholder 
perceptions of poverty, constraints faced by ES providers, and preferred types of RES (Proposition 2). 
3.4. A model of RES value as fraction of upstream income 
Assessment of proposition 1 requires estimates of the potential total value of financial RES transfers 
relative to current income of poor ES providers. Given a total value, either a small group can benefit 
substantially or a large group marginally, but policy-relevant impact on rural poverty alleviation can 
only be expected if a large group can benefit at a daily income level that helps in meeting the $1 per 
person per day threshold (or its national poverty line equivalent). 
In formulating estimates for a potential RES we use an upstream/downstream terminology that can be 
taken literally in the case of watershed services, and more abstractly in case of biodiversity or climate 
change mitigation.  
A RES scheme that is based on willingness to pay of downstream beneficiaries can generate a total 
volume of payments TPd ($ day-1): 
TPd = Ad Рd Id. βd  (1) 
where Ad = Area downstream (ha), Pd = population density downstream (ha-1), Id = per capita income 
downstream ($ day-1) and βd = fraction of income that is potentially available for such payments. The 
per capita benefits, expressed as fraction of the upstream income that this can generate upstream (RPu) 
are: 
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RPu = TPd. (1 – T) (1 – αu) (Au.Iu Рu)-1                       (2) 
where Au = Area upstream, Pu = population density upstream, Iu = per capita income upstream,  T = 
fraction of downstream payments that is needed to cover the transaction costs and αu = fraction of 
what the upstream population receives that is offsetting the opportunity costs of alternative land uses 
that might generate more income but provide less environmental services. By combining equations (1) 
and (2) we obtain: 
RPu = (Ad Au-1) (Id Iu-1.) (Рd Рu-1) βd (1 – αu) . (1 – T)  (3) 
which expresses the per capita benefits in terms of a number of dimensionless ratios: area, population 
density, income, willingness to pay by downstream beneficiaries, transaction costs and offset-fraction. 
RPu may have to be a ‘significant’ fraction of upstream income before upstream land users will take 
notice of the opportunity and respond.  
As a criterion for use in exploring proposition 1, we tentatively postulate a modest target of 5% of 
current average annual disposable income of upstream rural households as a meaningful contribution 
to poverty reduction. Analysis of existing data can provide the ratios of downstream/upstream 
population densities, the areas involved and the relative income levels.  
3.5. Rewards for environmental services initiatives  
To assess proposition 2, we synthesize lessons from the RUPES project10, which seeks to develop pro-
poor RES mechanisms in Asian contexts. Analyses are based on five years of implementation at six 
RUPES action sites and other partners’ sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal, combined with 
findings from participatory research conducted to elicit information about people’s perceptions and 
preferences related to potential payments for environmental services.  
The study sites (Table 3.1) include biodiversity-rich jungle rubber (Bungo), good quality sources of 
upstream river and spring water (Singkarak), suitable land and climatic conditions for coffee 
plantations (Sumberjaya) and for upstream agricultural crops such as vegetables and rice (Bakun and 
Kulekhani), and both high biodiversity and abundant water (Kalahan). All sites are forest areas 
considered to be “under threat”, where communities are allowed to harvest non-timber forest products 
for their own consumption. As in upstream areas in other parts of Asia, average areas of household 
cultivable land are less than 2 hectares, and most sites are located in undulating upstream areas. 
 
 
                                                   
10
 The Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services that they provide (RUPES) project Phase I was a project 
coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (2002-2007). The goal of the project was to enhance the livelihoods and 
reduce poverty of the upland poor while supporting environmental conservation through rewards for ES. For further 
reference, see http://www.worldagroforestrycenter.org/sea/networks/rupes/index.asp. To enhance the livelihoods and reduce 
poverty of the upland poor while supporting environmental conservation on biodiversity protection, watershed management, 
carbon sequestration and landscape beauty at local and global levels. 
38 
 
Table 3.1  Action sites for testing reward mechanisms 
Site Focus of ES  Current status  
Indonesia   
Bungo Jungle rubber for conservation of the 
diversity of local plant species and wildlife 
habitat 
 Testing mini hydropower as 
intermediate reward for biodiversity 
conservation 
 A private buyer (automotive wheel 
industry) showing interests for rubber 
for “green” vehicles  
Singkarak  Water quality for hydropower, native 
fish conservation and ecotourism 
 Carbon sequestration for voluntary 
markets under CDM setting 
 Conservation fund from local 
government to revitalize organic coffee 
in the upstream watershed.  
 Carbon market negotiated with private 
buyer (consumer goods distributor) 
Sumberjaya  Water quality for hydropower 
 Watershed rehabilitation for the District 
Forestry Service 
 Conditional tenure rewarded to farmer 
groups 
 Hydroelectric Power company (HEP) 
royalty agreements signed for River 
Care groups along the river 
The Philippines   
Bakun  Water quality for hydropower HEP royalty agreements signed  
Kalahan Carbon sequestration under voluntary 
market 
Carbon market initial agreement with 
private buyer (automotive industry) 
Nepal   
Kulekhani Water quality for hydropower HEP royalty agreements signed  
 
Bungo. In Bungo, farmers are committed to preserving jungle rubber biodiversity. The challenge of 
developing mechanisms for payments for biodiversity services is that jungle rubber does not shelter 
any charismatic animal species. Rather, it functions by providing important corridors that allow 
movement of wild animals and dispersal of plant species. Rubber gardens in Bungo household 
portfolios consist of both small plots of intensively managed rubber and small plots of extensively 
managed jungle rubber located either near their villages or further away. Farmers regard jungle rubber 
as a second best management system, after the more intensive monoculture plantations they would 
plant if they had the resources to do so. Farmers agreed to maintain jungle rubber based on rewards 
that enhance the value of their intensively managed agroforestry plots, while awaiting a longer term 
RES. The bundling of biodiversity conservation and watershed functions from jungle rubber is also 
being tested by installing micro hydropower plants to bring electrical supply to villages. 
Sumberjaya. About 40 percent of this 45,000 ha watershed is protected forest. It has a history of 
conflict, including forced evictions that caused relationships between local people and various levels 
of government to deteriorate rapidly. The RUPES-Sumberjaya project has facilitated conditional 
tenure agreements for community-based forest management that provide rewards by reducing 
transaction costs for possible win-win solutions. Under this approach the government acknowledges 
that properly managed agroforests can bring the same watershed benefits as natural forests. In 
exchange for secure land tenure, farmers promise to conserve existing patches of natural forest and to 
use good management practices. Another RES scheme employs a RiverCare group to respond to 
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challenges of conditional reward schemes. Community members of this group learned to monitor and 
control local sources of sediment in their streams and take soil conservation actions. Under a financial 
reward scheme, the hydropower company provides some upfront funds and then pays additional 
specified amounts based on effects actually achieved. RUPES also tested direct payments to the 
community based on a sliding scale starting at US$250 for a sediment reduction of less than 10%, and 
up to US$1,000 for a sediment reduction of 30% or more. This is an example of a payment for 
watershed services directly tied to delivery of the service – in this case reduction of sedimentation in 
the river. 
Singkarak. Singkarak Lake is located in West Sumatra, well known for its culture of blending its 
matrilineal society with Islamic tradition, entrepreneurship, a strong tradition of village governance 
(Nagari), and collective management of land belonging to clans (Ulayat Kaum) and local Nagari 
groups (Ulayat Nagari). In 2002, National Strategy Studies on CDM conducted by the Indonesian 
Ministry of Environment identified the Singkarak watershed as a potential site for implementing a 
national reforestation-carbon project. But despite its preparedness, the project has no confirmed 
buyers of the carbon. One of the difficultness in identifying investors is that the project was initiated 
when most rules regarding implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the carbon market in Indonesia 
were still in an embryonic stage. Beyond the carbon market, the RUPES-Singkarak team sought to 
have hydropower royalty money flow to upstream communities, to clarify links between land use and 
environmental services, and to facilitate emergence of appropriate institutional arrangements for 
managing land use. In 2005, the Nagaris surrounding the lake received about US $40,000 under their 
first allocation of hydropower royalties.  The system uses criteria that include compensation for 
damage to livelihoods in Nagaris bordering the lake, which favors relatively poor Nagaris. Funds are 
intended to provide incentives for maintaining healthy environmental conditions. As the amount of 
royalties available depends on the amount of electricity produced, all players have a strong interest in 
the good performance of the hydropower company. 
Bakun. The Philippines also has a policy of royalty payments for hydro-power. There is a tax of about 
2% on the value of power produced, some of which is meant to be spent locally, but rarely is. At the 
Bakun site there is also an agreement between the hydro-power company and local government 
providing a royalty of another 2% of the value of the power in return for watershed protection. But 
there are no specific targets for watershed protection. The Bakun Indigenous Tribes’ Organization 
(BITO) has attempted to negotiate additional payments, but has not succeeded. BITO is also 
negotiating with the local government to utilize a portion of their royalty revenue for conservation. 
BITO has been more successful in negotiating an agreement with the hydro-power company for a new 
project. The company will also pay an annual amount of P500,000 (about US$10,000) to the 
barangay government where its plant is located. The barangay of 316 households will benefit from 
these payments, which were negotiated by BITO and facilitated by the National Council of 
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 
Kalahan. The Kalahan forest reserve in Nueva Vizcaya province of the Philippines supports the 
livelihoods of approximately 550 Ikalahan families, as well as forests with diverse plant and animal 
species. Resources in the reserve, which covers 14,730 hectares of ancestral land, are managed by the 
indigenous Ikalahan people under an agreement with the Philippine Government. Originally hunters 
and gatherers, the Ikalahan have been swidden farmers for at least two centuries, coaxing the thin, 
acidic soils of their land to produce their traditional food, sweet potatoes or camote. Implemented by 
the Kalahan Educational Foundation (KEF), the RUPES project is developing contracts for carbon 
sequestration with carbon buyers. Monitoring of forest reserve carbon stocks is an on-going activity 
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for avoided deforestation buyers. To date, the KEF has conducted preliminary activities to prepare for 
these markets, especially through project idea notes and awareness building among members of the 
indigenous group. 
Kulekhani. In Nepal, the Kulekhani watershed is located in Makwanpur district of the Central 
Development Region of Nepal, 50 km southwest of Kathmandu. The watershed supplies water to two 
major hydropower plants that generate about 17 percent of Nepal’s current total hydroelectricity. The 
state hydroelectric company by law pays royalty to the central government, who then channels part of 
the royalty back to districts. Thus, the hydropower company, the central and district governments all 
benefit from the hydrology services that Kulekhani conservation activities provide, making all three 
potential buyers. Existing policy is for generators to pay a 6% royalty on the value of hydro-electric 
power they produce. The distribution of the payment is 88% for the central government and 12% for 
the district. After formal assessment of the current socio-political scenario and existing laws and 
regulations in Nepal, an alternative mechanism of reward transfer was proposed wherein the district 
government sets aside a portion of its hydropower royalty from the central government for the upland 
communities. A newly established group with representatives of Kulekhani communities proposed 
conservation programs as their contract commitment to the royalty share. The project has been 
successful in securing an agreement that 20% of the royalty paid to the district will be given to the 
local village administration (known as the Village Development Committee) at Kulekhani. This 
amounts to 0.144% of the value of power produced, which for Kulekhani is about US$50,000 per 
year. 
3.6. Participatory approach and data analysis 
To explore the second proposition, we conducted focus group discussions with communities at each 
site on how they perceive poverty, constraints in implementing RES, and preferred types of RES. To 
ensure consistency in the process and the outputs of focus group discussions at various locations, we 
conducted a cross-site training workshop and developed a set of working procedures and agreements 
on research steps to be undertaken at all sites. The results from each focus group discussion were 
collated into coherent categories to identify patterns and analyse their responses. 
Participants in these discussions were members of communities where RUPES project activities had 
been implemented. Most participants were already familiar with RES principles. One limitation of this 
method is that local perspectives could be biased towards on-going interventions because RUPES and 
other stakeholders were making progress towards RES. Table 3.2 shows the number of targeted 
respondents from each site. 
All case study analyses employed a multidimensional perspective of poverty, drawing to some extent 
on the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) originally developed by (Chambers and Conway 
1992). SLA is a unified concept of well-being that encompasses both economic and non-economic 
aspects, and it has been used both for project design and for evaluation of impacts (Ashley and 
Hussein 2000). Assumed advantages of SLA are that it is people-centred and participatory, and that it 
recognizes the importance of ‘assets’ that the poor do not own. It is also informative about causal 
processes that reduce or increase poverty (Mukherjee, Hardjono, and Carriere 2002); (Grieg-Gran, 
Porras, and Wunder 2005). Critics have pointed out that effects of different assets are overlapping 
(Angelsen and Wunder 2003); (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005). Despite such valid critiques, 
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SLA can at least provide a useful checklist of possible livelihood impacts related to introduction of 
environmental service rewards.  
Table 3.2  Sample respondents representing the households of ES providers at each site 
Sites Targeted respondents  Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of 
households 
Indonesia    
Bathin III Ulu, Bungo Five groups in sub-villages at jungle rubber locations   90 28 
Paninggahan, 
Singkarak 
Eight groups in two Nagari or village levels 
80 43 
Sumberjaya Three community groups:  
1)  two community forestry groups; 
2)  one River Care group; 
3)  one land conservation group. 
103 27 
The Philippines     
Bakun  Three main clusters based on elevation:  
1)  lower (1 barangay or village); 
2)  middle (4 barangays); and 
3)  upper (2 barangays) 
124 39 
Kalahan Ancestral 
Domain  
Two community groups based on elevation: 
 1)  high elevation – (3 barangays); and  
 2)  low elevation –  (4 barangays) 
40 27 
Nepal     
Kulekhani Seven village development committees or VDCs 97 78 
 Total 534 36 
 
3.7. Result 
3.7.1 Payment for environmental service value as fraction of upstream income 
The model of PES value as a fraction of income suggests that downstream to upstream ratios of 
population density, income per capita, and coverage area can provide rough estimates of minimum 
financial transfers to ES providers. For example, if there is an ability of the downstream population to 
pay about 1 percent of their income in order to generate an increment from RES equivalent to 5 
percent11 of income in the upstream population, the ratio of downstream population density to 
upstream density must be at least five. In other words, the number of ES buyers must be at least five 
times greater than the number of ES providers.  
                                                   
11
 We select the 5 percent as the minimal threshold for an appreciable financial incentive share to income.  
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Spatial analyses of agroecosystems in Indonesia conducted by the World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF) estimated the ratios of downstream to upstream population density and the ratios of 
downstream to upstream areas covered by agroecosystems (Table 3.3). The ICRAF team identified 
the ratio of downstream / upstream agroecosystem areas by their relative positions in a digital 
elevation model (DEM). Their analysis also found that the downstream to upstream ratio of 
population density in Java/Bali was 2.2 (Since urban poverty is a major problem in Indonesia, ratios 
of downstream income to upstream income also tend to be low. The average range of the ratio 
between urban and rural income in 2003 was about 1.3 for cities with moderate level of income, such 
as ones outside Java, to 2.0 for cities with high income level, and this proportion has been stable since 
1996. Transaction costs of community-based resource management in Nepal were found to range 
from 14 to 26 % (Adhikari and Lovett 2006). This range of values appears reasonable and is 
supported by research on transaction costs of small scale carbon projects where they were found to 
range from 13 to 30 % of total project cost (EcoSecurities and Development 2003); (Cacho and Wise 
2005). 
Table 3.4). Java/Bali agroecosystems represent a typology that has potential problems related to 
watershed functions. The ES beneficiaries are rice-field farmers or urban citizens, while their 
upstream neighbours practice intensive mixed cropping. Watershed problems in these settings are 
mostly reduced water quality caused by heavy use of agricultural chemicals and fertilizers; and/or 
insufficient water quantity due to competing domestic and agricultural uses. Another important 
typology is found in islands outside Java and Bali, where downstream farmers cultivate tree crops or 
intensive mixed crops areas and forests are located upstream. The potential ES problem in such areas 
is forest biodiversity loss due to crop expansion. The ratio of downstream to upstream area ranges 
from 0.06 (rice/urban downstream and forest upstream) to 0.79 (mixed tree crop downstream and 
forest upstream). In other words, upstream areas are more extensive in comparison to downstream 
areas in almost all parts of Indonesia.  
Table 3.3  Downstream/upstream ratios of population density and areas covered by agroecosystem 
combinations found in Indonesia 
 
Population Density  
Рd Рu-1 
Area  
Ad Au-1 
Factor (Population Density 
x Area) 
Lowland: rice/urban;  
Upland: intensive mixed 1.6 0.36 0.58 
Lowland: rice/urban  
Upland: forest 11 0.06 0.66 
Lowland: intensive mixed;  
Upland: forest 6 0.26 1.56 
Lowland: tree crop mixed;  
Upland: intensive mixed 
plantation 0.6 0.56 0.34 
Lowland: tree crop mixed;  
Upland: forest 3.6 0.79 2.84 
Source: adapted from (Hadi and Noordwijk 2005)  
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Since urban poverty is a major problem in Indonesia, ratios of downstream income to upstream 
income also tend to be low. The average range of the ratio between urban and rural income in 200312 
was about 1.3 for cities with moderate level of income, such as ones outside Java, to 2.0 for cities with 
high income level, and this proportion has been stable since 1996. Transaction costs of community-
based resource management in Nepal were found to range from 14 to 26 % (Adhikari and Lovett 
2006). This range of values appears reasonable and is supported by research on transaction costs of 
small scale carbon projects where they were found to range from 13 to 30 % of total project cost 
(EcoSecurities and Development 2003); (Cacho and Wise 2005). 
Table 3.4  Ratio of downstream/upstream population density in agro-ecosystem combinations that occur in 
various areas of Indonesia 
Population density ratio 
(downstream/upstream) 
Jawa/  
Bali 
Sumatra Sulawesi Kalimantan NTT/  NTB/  
Maluku 
Papua 
Downstream: rice/urban;  
Upstream: intensive mixed 
crops 2.2 0.6 1.8 - - - 
Downstream: rice/urban  
Upstream: forest - 6.4 - - 20.0 6.8 
Downstream: intensive 
mixed;  
Upstream: forest - 3.7 6.3 5.8 8.0  
Downstream: tree crop 
mixed ;  
Upstream: intensive mixed 
plantation - 0.7  0.6 - - 
Downstream: tree crop 
mixed;  
Upstream: forest - 2.5  4.6 - - 
Source: adapted from (Hadi and Noordwijk 2005)  
Using the data above, we undertook a modelling exercise to illustrate use of information on 
downstream-upstream population density, area, and welfare in assessing the feasibility of an ES 
reward scheme based on cash payments. First, we generalize the above information as defaults for 
Asian conditions. We then multiply each factor to make the estimated ES payment more realistic. We 
consider a payment ‘realistic’ if the value to income fraction is more than 0.05, or the payment is 
more than 5 percent of disposable income. Second, we show how ES payments as income fractions 
vary among different scenarios. 
                                                   
12
 Formal data from BAPPENAS – the Indonesian National Planning Agency downloaded from www.tempointeractive.com  
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Table 3.5  Multiplying factors for targeting payment of 5 percent of upstream income 
Scenario Ad.Au-1 Id.Iu-1 Pd. Pu-1 βd. T αu TPu 
Default 1 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0140 
Downstream/upstream area 
ratio 
3.57       
Downstream/upstream income 
ratio 
 7.14      
Downstream/upstream 
population density ratio 
  7.14     
Downstream willingness and 
ability to pay 
   0.04    
 
Our analysis suggests that if we consider current Asian upstream-downstream situations as defaults, 
several conditions need to be satisfied to achieve target payment levels as follows (Table 3.5): (1) the 
downstream coverage area should be at least 3.6 times larger than the upstream coverage area; (2) 
downstream buyers should have income at least 7.1 times higher than the upstream sellers; (3) the 
number of downstream buyers should be 7.1 times larger than the number of upstream sellers; (4) 
buyers should be willing and able to pay at least 4 percent of their income as a contribution to ES 
provision from upstream. 
Table 3.6  Outcomes from different scenarios on area, population density and welfare 
Scenario Ad.Au-1 Id.Iu-1 Pd. Pu-1 βd. T αu TPu 
Default 1 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0140 
ES providers occupied large 
area  
0.2 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0028 
ES buyers occupied large area 4 2 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0560* 
Poor downstream buyers  1 0.5 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0035 
Rich downstream buyers 1 5 2 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0350 
Highly populated upstream 
area 
1 2 0.75 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0053 
Highly populated downstream 
area 
1 2 10 0.01 0.3 0.5 0.0700* 
Low willingness and ability to 
pay of buyers 
1 2 2 0.003 0.3 0.5 0.0042 
High willingness and ability to 
pay of buyers  
1 2 2 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.0700* 
Note: * indicating that such scenarios have potential for downstream-upstream ES transactions 
In other words, a cash payment scheme that seeks to contribute substantially to poverty alleviation 
will require certain conditions: targeted ES buyers occupy a relatively large area with high population 
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density, such as big cities, and high willingness and ability to pay relative to their income (Table 3.6). 
The analysis did not include the forgone income of ES providers joining a RES scheme or the 
transaction costs involved. Transaction costs in developing a RES scheme involve costs of 
stakeholder participation, negotiation processes and institution building, which usually are expensive 
(Perrot-Maître and Davis 2001). These costs may increase further if other aspects of implementation 
are included, such as monitoring and enforcement, conflict management, and making necessary 
changes in legal and regulatory frameworks. Inclusion of opportunity costs and transaction costs will 
indeed reduce the net share of RES payments that increase upstream incomes.  
3.8. Local perspectives on poverty 
This section examines local people’s opinions on factors that contribute to poverty. Poverty factors 
are classified into the five types of capital used in the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), as 
shown in Table 3.7.  
Table 3.7  Local perspectives on factors contributing to poverty 
Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani 
Financial Low income 
Lack of 
financial 
investment 
Low income Low income Low income 
Lack of 
financial 
investment  
Low income 
No financial 
planning 
No savings  
Low prices of 
farm products 
Low income 
Physical Poor road 
infrastructure  
Not mentioned  Poor living 
condition  
Poor living 
condition  
Poor  access 
to road  
Lack of farm 
irrigation and 
farm inputs 
(fertilizer, good 
quality seed)  
Small number 
of livestock  
Poor access to 
road 
Poor living 
condition  
Poor road 
infrastructure 
No access to 
market 
Human  Lack of 
knowledge 
Laziness  
Lack of future 
planning 
Lack of 
creativity  
Poor health 
services 
 
Low education 
level 
Low education 
level 
Poor nutrition 
status 
No access to 
job market 
Poor access to 
children 
education  
Poor health 
services 
Low education 
level 
Laziness  
Unmotivated 
and bad 
working  
attitude  
Low education 
level  
Laziness  
Low education 
level  
No access to 
job market 
Poor health 
services 
Insecure food 
supply 
Large family 
size  
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Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani 
Natural  Small land 
size 
Disturbance of 
pests and 
disease to 
rubber 
plantation 
Not mentioned No access to 
good quality of 
land  
Small land 
size 
Small land 
size 
Small land 
size 
Social  Not mentioned  Insecure land 
ownership 
Low social 
participation  
Not mentioned  Not mentioned Not mentioned 
 
While results show substantial variation among communities at different sites, some general 
similarities exist. In the case of human capital, for example, lack of knowledge and access to higher 
education are the most important aspects that people at sites in all types of landscapes perceived as 
poverty related. Lack of human capital mainly limits opportunities for better jobs. Site-level 
discussions revealed that access to health services is also an important problem at most study sites, 
and especially in Kulekhani, Sumberjaya, and Bungo. With the exceptions of Singkarak and 
Sumberjaya, access to education is limited to elementary level, and drop-out levels are high. The 
condition is worse in Kulekhani where surveys indicate not more than 50% adult literacy rates. 
Compared to other sites, perceived need for physical/financial capital is the highest in Kalahan, where 
all land is either remote core forest or conservation forest. Communities in Kalahan use poorly 
maintained roads that are often inaccessible during the rainy season. The nearest market for upstream 
communities in Kalahan is about 11 to 24 km, depending on road condition, whereas distance to 
market at other sites varies from 1 to 5 km. 
Although people at case study sites in all types of landscapes have low income13, they rated financial 
capital as being only moderately associated with poverty. Discussions revealed that people have 
access to credit from various sources, which can include both formal sources (bank credit, local 
cooperatives, microcredit) and informal sources (relatives, friends, middle-men). Trends toward 
increasing levels of consumptive credit with high interest rates are associated with changing lifestyles 
in rural areas that include increased levels of consumption. 
These findings capture fairly well existing poverty conditions at each site, and also disclose major 
livelihood concerns of communities including social aspects. At all sites except Sumberjaya, small 
size of landholdings (natural/financial capital) was seen as an attribute of poverty, whereas social 
capital was not mentioned. In the case of Sumberjaya, communities have a higher social diversity that 
includes three major ethnic groups: Semendo (native Lampung), Javanese (from Central and East 
Java) and Sundanese (from West Java). Sumberjaya was a target area for migration from Java and 
widespread evictions were experienced in the past, which has resulted in high levels of legally 
insecure land tenure. This also happened in Kalahan in the past, where the indigenous people, the 
Ikalahan, struggled for the legal control of their ancestral domain claims. Interestingly, no site other 
than Bungo mentioned lack of other types of natural capital, and in Bungo this was in connection to 
investments for controlling pest and diseases in the field. 
                                                   
13
 Secondary data from 2000-2005 show that income per capita in these areas is less than US$2 per day (Philippines National 
Statistics Office, 2000; Bakun Municipal Baseline Survey 2005; Bungo District website www.bungokab.go.id; The Nepali 
Makawanpur DDC 2003; Sumberjaya in Numbers 2003; Tanah Datar in Numbers 2002). 
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3.9. Perceived constraints on rewards for environmental services 
Locally perceived constraints on implementing RES schemes are summarized according to the four 
stages of RES development (Table 3.8): 
Table 3.8  Local perspective of constraints at each RES development stage 
Stages/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan  Kulekhani 
Scoping Not mentioned Limited land 
size to provide 
ES 
Not mentioned Lack of 
information 
about types of 
land 
management 
practices 
Not mentioned Not mentioned 
Stakeholder 
analysis  
Difficult to 
identify 
(international) 
buyers 
Not mentioned Weak local 
institutions  
Not mentioned Individual 
rights/ local 
equity 
Ensuring 
transparency 
of decision 
Not mentioned 
Negotiation  Lengthy and 
cumbersome  
Lengthy and 
cumbersome  
 
Unbalanced 
power of 
negotiation, 
low capability 
of sellers to 
negotiate   
Conflict 
existing with 
potential 
buyers 
Time 
consuming 
Limited 
funding from 
buyers 
Unsure that 
rewards will 
flow back to 
the community 
Asymmetric 
information 
available 
between 
sellers and 
buyers 
Unclear 
negotiation 
rules  
Potential risk 
that the poor’s 
concerns 
neglected 
 
Lengthy and 
cumbersome  
Monitoring and 
implementation  
Difficult to 
monitor ES 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Payment not 
sustainable 
Not mentioned 
 
(a) Scoping by identifying valuable ES and measures to increase them. A constraint expressed in 
Bakun was lack of information about types of land management practices to maintain watershed 
functions. In Singkarak, people mentioned limited land ownership that might limit ability to 
contribute to ES provision. 
(b) Stakeholder analysis of RES key actors. Bungo communities had difficulty in identifying buyers, 
and even the notion of global buyers for biodiversity seemed very abstract for them. For Kalahan 
and Sumberjaya, internal constraints among community members were mostly related to needs 
for strengthening their local institutions before dealing with buyers, and for improving balance 
with regard to local equity (such as rights for being consulted and making collective decision) and 
transparency of information (such as contract contents, type of rewards gained). 
(c)  Negotiation between ES sellers and buyers. People at sites in all types of landscapes easily 
recognized this stage and identified it as a serious constraint. They are also concerned about the 
cumbersome nature of negotiation processes (due to power imbalance between the sellers and 
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buyers, or even between sellers and government or intermediaries: “rewards never flow back to 
community”). The long gap between project planning and its realization is also problematic. A 
further concern is that buyers might not have enough funds for equitable RES. 
(d)  Implementation and monitoring of contractual agreements. At this stage, people focused on the 
difficulties in monitoring ES. Bungo communities mentioned concern about procedures for 
monitoring biodiversity. They are worried about contractual obligations resulting from the 
negotiation stage and how well local people will adhere to agreed practices. The sustainability of 
RES implementation was one of the concerns of people in Kalahan.  
3.10. People’s preferences for rewards 
In order to facilitate comparison with findings in Section 2.2 on factors contributing to poverty, we 
analysed preferred forms of rewards identified by communities by classifying them under the five 
types of SLA capital (Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9  Expected environmental service rewards by local community 
Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani 
Financial  Not mentioned Not mentioned Cash Not mentioned Financial 
assistance   
Not mentioned 
Non direct 
financial  
Cooperative for 
credit access 
Reduction in 
electricity bill 
 
 
Access to soft 
loans 
Forming of a 
farmer 
cooperative 
Reduction in 
electricity bill 
 
Access to soft 
loan 
Reduction in 
electricity bill 
 
 
Physical  Micro-
hydropower 
Supply of 
rubber 
seedlings 
Road 
infrastructure 
Integrated pest 
management 
tools  
Farming tools  
Road 
infrastructure  
Road 
infrastructure 
Road 
infrastructure 
Road 
infrastructure 
Access to 
market 
Road 
infrastructure 
Access to 
market  
Human Training and 
cross-site visit 
Trainings for 
alternative 
small business 
Agricultural 
extension  
Information on 
agricultural 
technology 
Access to 
labour market   
Health 
services 
Access to 
labour market   
Educational 
services 
Trainings for 
alternative 
small business 
Public 
services  
Trainings for 
alternative 
small business, 
such as 
ecotourism 
management 
and non-timber 
forest product  
Natural  Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned 
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Capital/Site Bungo Singkarak Sumberjaya Bakun Kalahan Kulekhani 
Social Recognition as 
environmental 
champion 
Recognition as 
environmental 
champion  
Community 
forest permit 
Security of 
land tenure 
Trust from 
government 
(to maintain 
good 
environment)  
Recognition as 
environmental 
champion 
 
Two communities, in Sumberjaya and Kalahan, clearly requested reward money. Communities in all 
case study sites demanded various forms of indirect cash assistance (such as access to productive 
credit and reduction in electricity bills), productive physical inputs or assets (such as seedlings, 
farming tools, roads, access to market), and improvements in human capital (such as health and 
education services, training for alternative livelihoods and small business). People in Sumberjaya and 
Bakun demanded social capital in the form of community forestry permits and secure land tenure. 
These preferences might have been driven by their history of violence due to insecure land tenure. 
People in all other sites (Singkarak, Bungo, Kulekhani and Kalahan) solicited recognition of and trust 
in their environmentally-benign land management activities. 
3.11. Discussion and Conclusion 
Increased global commitments to poverty alleviation and conservation14 are inducing scientists and 
policy makers to focus on balancing trade-offs between poverty and conservation. This paper 
combined theory and case study evidence of RES in an attempt to analyse the contribution of actual 
cash for individual ES providers to poverty alleviation, and to observe other non-financial benefits 
gained by communities engaging in such schemes. 
Our model of the income share of RES payment value demonstrates that RES can only have a 
significant effect on rural income in upstream areas that provide ES if the scheme (1) involves 
upstream providers who have low population density and /or a small area relative to the beneficiaries 
and downstream beneficiaries who have relatively higher income than the upstream providers; (2) 
provides highly critical and non-substitutable environmental services that are substantial and worth 
paying; (3) is efficient and has low opportunity and transaction costs, but high willingness and ability 
to pay of downstream beneficiaries. Analysis of income and spatial data on agroecosystems in 
Indonesia indicates that this condition may be difficult to achieve given the population and income 
structures of downstream and upstream areas in Asia. Although the Asian data shows upstream 
income levels tend to be lower than those in downstream/urban areas (IFAD 2002), the ratio between 
urban and rural income is still quite low (less than 2.0). Indeed, in East Africa where the highlands 
provide more profitable agricultural products, we noted that upstream income can even be somewhat 
higher than downstream/urban income (Brent Swallow pers. comm). Despite current limitations on 
data, we recommend this simple model as a useful tool for initial diagnosis to determine the feasibility 
of implementing a RES/PES scheme. Accurate diagnosis during very early stages can help avoid 
useless investment and over expectations about the role of RES in alleviating poverty. 
The RES initiatives in Asia analyzed in this study were quite heterogeneous in their types of poverty, 
landscape characteristics and environmental services provided. They also differed in their socio-
                                                   
14
 Examples of global commitments are the general acceptance of the Millennium Development Goals and Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment and associated international agreements, such as Convention on Biological Diversity. 
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cultural backgrounds, and in their modes for involvement of local communities. This reinforces the 
view that each site needs a localized design for pro-poor RES that takes into account their specific 
local perspectives, as well as the dominant types of landscapes and the particular environmental 
services that are most important within the local context. 
Assessment of people’s perspectives on factors contributing to their poverty in the context of 
developing a RES payment approach highlights many interesting insights. Results can help portray 
social, economic and institutional dimensions of current situations that need to be recognized in 
designing pro-poor RES approaches that are suitable for local conditions. One particularly important 
aspect of pro-poor RES design is to identify rewards that match with people’s needs and expectations. 
From our analysis, we conclude that rewards in the forms of human capital, social capital and physical 
capital – or what are often referred to as non-financial incentives – are very often the most preferred 
and possible types of rewards. This supports our second proposition on how non-financial incentives 
can make important marginal contributions to local livelihoods, which was especially clear in the case 
of conditional land tenure in Sumberjaya. Moreover, literature on collective action in natural resource 
management indicates that social capital of community members influences the magnitude of 
transaction costs. Higher levels of social cohesion and trust within the community and its external 
linkages are associated with lower transaction costs. This suggests that investments that provide non-
financial benefits to communities, such as strengthening social capital, can help reduce overall costs 
of RES implementation. 
Among the various stages of RES development, constraints faced by communities at the stages of 
‘stakeholder analysis’ and especially ‘negotiation’ seem to be the most important initial hurdles for 
communities in all types of landscapes. Although not all communities at RUPES action sites have 
reached the ‘implementation and monitoring’ stage, communities at sites dominated by remote core 
forest and conservation forest seem to be particularly concerned about monitoring of services like 
biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Overall, it appears that the criteria ‘voluntary’ and ‘conditional’ 
for establishing rewards for ES are the most important issue for local communities. Under our 
theoretical framework, ‘voluntary’ refers to involvement based on free choice by each community 
rather than their being the object of regulation. This relates to all levels of decision making – 
internally within communities, and externally in their relationships with ES intermediaries and buyers. 
Furthermore, a conditional RES must ensure transparency regarding conditions when rewards can be 
granted or not. In designing a RES, solving problems at local levels related to voluntary participation 
and conditionality can help make the whole process more effective. Beyond that, the roles of 
intermediaries and buyers are also very important in ensuring that the RES is realistic and pro-poor. 
We limited our study to action research sites that were selected from a larger set of candidates on the 
basis of expectations that all essential requirements for RES could be met. Thus, these sites may not 
necessarily represent the broader conditions of all upstream areas of Asia. However, this study’s 
results can contribute to on-going debates related to the interface of fairness and efficiency in 
providing rewards for environmental services in Asia. 
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4. Reconciling multiple ecological knowledge for 
rewarding watershed services in the uplands of 
Indonesia  
Environmental management in the uplands affects water flows. Environmental policies to secure watershed 
services for downstream stakeholders have traditionally been based on command and control approaches. In the 
past decade, participatory approaches, economic incentives and negotiation schemes involving many 
stakeholders have enriched such policies, with variable degrees of success. Although watershed functions are 
generally negatively influenced by financially profitable land use practices, the general argument for economic 
incentives and rewards to modify the decisions of land users is not sufficiently strong to lead to effective 
downstream-upstream reward schemes. Payments for quantifiable watershed services, use rights conditional on 
the maintenance of environmental quality, and respect for the identity and sovereignty of upland people all have 
a role in watershed management, but their interaction is poorly understood.  We analyzed four case studies in 
Indonesia of emerging schemes to reward land managers for the watershed services that they actually provide. 
Our hypothesis is that reducing discrepancies and improving synergies of ecological knowledge of local people, 
that of public opinion and policy makers, and that of hydrologists and modellers in PES increases effectiveness 
of a PES scheme. Early diagnoses of differences and synergies among these knowledge systems will clarify 
expectations from all relevant actors, avoid unrealistic targets for quality of watershed services, help define 
conditionality of RWS and offer appropriate monitoring procedures. Experience with strategic use of 
information and vested interests of intermediaries and donors imply that credibility, salience and legitimacy of 
knowledge for any RWS need to be secured before it can be used in actual negotiations.  The case studies 
showed considerable discrepancies between the three main knowledge systems on quantitative aspects of water 
flows in relation to forest and tree cover, but showed agreement on factors affecting the quality of surface water 
and slope stability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is adapted from Leimona, B., Lusiana, B., Van Noordwijk, M., Ekadinata, A., Mulyoutami, E. 2011. 
Reconciling multiple ecological knowledge for rewarding watershed services in the uplands of Indonesia. World 
Agroforestry Centre.   
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4.1. Introduction 
Degradation of watersheds reduces human well-being by affecting the supply and quality of fresh 
water and increasing the frequency of water-caused disasters. Increased intensity of land use in 
uplands, however, also provides livelihood options for a growing population. The trade-off between 
economic demands and watershed conservation is a chronic problem in maintaining healthy 
watersheds (Barbier and Burgess 1997; MA 2005), with the risk of overshoot of the carrying capacity 
of watersheds and a downward spiral of land degradation.  
Managing this trade-off and shifting the decisions of land managers towards conservation are 
expected to be supported by policy instruments, such as public investment and market based 
instruments (Tomich, Thomas, and Van Noordwijk 2004; Asquith and Wunder 2009; Smith et al. 
2006). Public investment in restoration efforts seems unavoidable, and as prevention is better than 
cure, a direct public role in preventing degradation is logical. Market-based instruments for watershed 
services to internalize the negative externalities of watershed problems are expressed in monetary 
units and speak the same language as the direct economic benefits of land use.  
Inspired by the way Costa Rica changed its forest subsidy scheme into a “Payment to Ecosystem 
Services” (PES) in the 1990’s (Chomitz, Brenes, and Constantino 1999), the last decade has seen 
wider experimentation with payments to markets for watershed services as policy and institutional 
options in managing watersheds. Costa Rica made substantial progress in (involuntarily) charging the 
captive audience of water users, and more limited progress in charging beneficiaries of the 
biodiversity and carbon sequestration users as the basis of their payments (Pagiola 2008). Strong path 
dependency in the way payments to service providers originated in previous forest subsidy schemes; 
however, imply considerable room for improvement in the efficiency with which the schemes 
generate environmental services (Ferraro and Simpson 2002; Ferraro 2004). Lessons from other 
public incentive schemes (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008) suggest how the environmental, 
socioeconomic, political, and dynamic context of a PES policy is likely to interact with policy design 
to produce policy outcomes, including environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and poverty 
alleviation.  
While the initial success and visibility of the Costa Rica program has encouraged experimentation 
elsewhere, including in Asia and Africa (FAO 2007; Smith et al. 2006; Van Noordwijk and Leimona 
2010; Swallow et al. 2010), a more critical literature is now emerging that suggests approaches 
supporting collective action at the local community level and address issues of fairness for all 
involved actors are now seen as essential to achieve success. This shift suggests a need to blend 
different perspectives and knowledge of various relevant actors during the planning and 
implementation of any PES schemes in enhancing watershed services.  
However, key actors in setting watershed policy often develop plans based on perceptions rather than 
scientific realities and traditional ecological knowledge. The watershed rehabilitation efforts, 
including the ones under an rewards for environmental service (RWS)15 scheme, mostly neglect 
farmers’ local practices {Joshi, 2004 #42} and concentrate on large-scale tree planting as a “one-size-
fits-all” solution. The trend from the late 1980’s onward shows that participation, inclusion of a social 
dimension, dialogue, and the concept of “farmer first” have become the central tenets of 
                                                   
15 In the rest of the text, rather than “payment”, we will use the broader term “reward for watershed services” (RWS), for any 
policy instruments that enable land managers (in this case, communities that are managing their lands in the upper part of a 
watershed) to receive benefits from downstream beneficiaries for the services provided by a well-managed watershed. 
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environmental management, acknowledging the importance of local ecological knowledge16 
(Chapman 2002; Schalenbourg 2004). Therefore, in designing and implementing an RWS scheme, it 
is important to obtain and understand the knowledge and perceptions of different stakeholders on the 
hydrological issues and watershed management in a particular area (Pelz and Gannon 1979; Rhoads et 
al. 1999).    
This paper reviews and synthesizes the multiple ecological knowledge systems in hydrological 
scoping study for rewarding watershed services schemes in Indonesia. Although the recognition of 
multiple knowledge system has been common in watershed management (Olsson and Folke 2001; 
Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004; Rhoads et al. 1999), analysis of such knowledge for negotiated 
rewards for environmental services has not yet become common practice and described in literature. 
Our hypothesis is that reducing discrepancies and improving synergies of ecological knowledge of all 
actors in PES increases efficiency and fairness in negotiating a PES scheme. Section 2 clarifies the 
research methodology of assessing multiple knowledge systems. Section 3 describes four case of the 
knowledge scoping in Indonesia: Singkarak –West Sumatra, Sumberjaya – Lampung, Kapuas Hulu –
West Kalimantan and Talau –East Nusa Tenggara. These watersheds are the target for testing and 
implementing RWS schemes located in different landscape and climatic zones across Indonesia. In 
Section 4, we present our findings based on the knowledge of the local stakeholders and public/policy 
makers and the ecological knowledge of the hydrologists, and a review of the rewards for watershed 
services in Indonesia. Finally, the last two sections discuss the interaction of the three knowledge 
systems and analyze the uptake on the watershed services scoping study results by the ES 
intermediaries in designing and implementing the RWS, and present our conclusion. 
4.2. Theoretical framework  
Stakeholder negotiation is a key stage in establishing a conservation agreement among RWS 
stakeholders that can lead to an established RWS scheme. It requires optimal and symmetric 
information among the providers, beneficiaries, and intermediaries of the RWS schemes as a minimal 
necessity to guarantee a relatively conflict-free agreement and to avoid a tedious process of 
negotiation (Ferraro 2008; Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Verbist 2002). During the negotiation 
process, the flows of knowledge can be upwards from land managers as ES providers and 
intermediaries to downstream stakeholders as ES beneficiaries, as well as downwards from 
downstream stakeholders to upstream communities, and the interaction can potentially enrich both (as 
knowledge is a non-consumable good, not reduced by its use).  
Van Noordwijk et al. (2001) proposed the concept of a “negotiation support system” (NSS) in 
integrated watershed management that provided a solution that “optimizes the way in which multiple 
objectives could be achieved, and then would make decisions to be imposed on the various actors and 
stakeholders”. The integrated natural resource tools used with the NSS concept were to respond to the 
fact that any multi-stakeholder process will engage a large number of individual decisions coming 
from different perspectives and accessing different sources of knowledge and information. Further, 
these individuals communicate through different technical means to organize exploitation, and with 
different objectives, constraints, priorities, and strategies (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Verbist 2002; 
Dixit and Olson 2000; Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004).  
                                                   
16
 We define ecological knowledge as experience acquired of direct human contact with the environment  
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The generic term watershed function means different things to different stakeholders in different 
situations and it may be constrained by gaps in understanding of the watershed functions and service 
provisions. The watershed functions are derived from human-induced landscape through land-cover 
types and spatial patterns driven by mostly external policy and planning of watershed management 
(Figure 4.1). The combination of upstream dynamic of land use change and external drivers will 
provide both positive and negative consequences for downstream community. To close the feedback 
loop (Figure 4.1), external stakeholders, such as policy makers and downstream users utilize decisive 
(i.e. regulations), incentive (i.e. payment for environmental services) and facilitating (i.e. moral 
persuasion) environmental policy tools to modify upstream land use practices in producing positive 
externalities. Ideally, such policy tools will allow positive impacts in managing negative 
environmental externalities in countries with strong institutions and good governance, the reality in 
many developing countries is otherwise (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and Verbist 2001; Tomich, 
Thomas, and Van Noordwijk 2004). Therefore, at least four aspects have to be considered in 
enhancing the likelihood of negotiated policy tools, including RWS schemes: (1) shared perceptions 
of way identifiable watershed functions are influenced by upland land use and affect downstream 
interests; (2) existence of trade-offs between the local utility of upland land-use decisions and these 
identifiable watershed functions; (3) presence of community scale institutions that effectively 
facilitate collective land-use decisions and that can secure compliance with agreements; (4) presence 
of trust among all relevant actors as a basic condition for negotiation and compliance by all partners to 
agreements (Van Noordwijk 2005{; Jeanes et al. 2006).  
 
 
Figure 4.1  Feedback loop influencing real drivers of behavioural and land practice changes (adapted from 
Jeanes et al. (2006))  
In practice, efforts to link scientific and empirical knowledge and action on the ground are a 
complicated and difficult endeavour. Analysis of boundaries in a knowledge-action system or 
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boundary work is defined as “the process through which the research community organizes its 
relations with the worlds of action and policy making” (Cash et al. 2002; Clark et al. 2010).  The 
exploration on the interaction of the three knowledge systems needs to appreciate the knowledge and 
its explanatory systems in its local context and against its empirical basis, before it can be compared 
with generic, de-contextualized science. The boundary work studies in developing countries indicated 
that articulation of users’ demand for technical information is one of the essential contributions of 
boundary work and the extreme politicization of formal knowledge is not uncommon in rural 
development situations (Clark et al., 2010). 
Clark et al. (2011) recently explored how the knowledge generated by A) a single discipline or B) by 
multiple disciplines and knowledge systems can be used for 1) general enlightenment, 2) decision 
support for key stakeholders and 3) negotiations among multiple stakeholders who tend to have and 
selectively use multiple knowledge claims. Conflicts over the use of uplands in active forest margins 
and efforts to turn round a current lose-lose situation for local and external situations have been the 
archetypical case where negotiation support needs to balance multi-stakeholder process of trust 
building as well as knowledge requirements (van Noordwijk et al., 2001).  
4.3. Materials and Methods  
This study employed a combined qualitative and quantitative research methodology, encompassing 
both primary and secondary analysis of empirical evidences from Indonesian cases (Table 4.1). The 
four case studies were based on hydrological assessment gathering information and synthesizing the 
three knowledge systems: local, public/policy maker and modeler/hydrologist ecological knowledge 
(Jeanes et al. 2006).  
The local’s and public/policy maker’s knowledge acquisition method was modified from the 
knowledge based system approach (Dixon et al. 2001). It was started with stakeholder analysis to 
comprehend the actors in watershed management and their roles by conducting stakeholder 
identification. The next step was knowledge articulation through capturing the perceptions of the 
stakeholders who were local stakeholders and policy makers on hydrological functions, water 
movement and the consequences of land use options on the landscape. Local people are the actual 
land managers who work and interact with the watershed landscape on a day-to-day basis.  Policy 
makers at the regency and provincial level are people who have been given a mandate to control and 
manage the watershed areas assuming that the policies they create will have a strong influence on the 
future condition of a watershed. 
The hydrological modelling uses the existing data available in the public domain and refers to the 
generic characteristics of the hydrological modelling, ensuring the ability of the approach to be 
repeatable across sites within different climatic zones. Based on this premise, the following are the 
activities of hydrological modelling (Jeanes et al. 2006):  
1. Gathering and reviewing existing relevant information on climatic and hydrological data of the 
watershed, including rainfall, river flow data and land cover maps;  
2. Analyzing land cover/land use change and its consequences to water balance, including the river 
flow of the watershed; 
3. Modeling the water balance of the watershed, including scenario analysis of plausible land cover 
changes and their likely impacts on watershed functions.   
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Table 4.1  Research components of local, public/policy makers, and hydrologist ecological knowledge 
Local ecological knowledge 
Goal Local-specific analysis of problem, its cause and effect.  
Source of information   Key informants, village members 
Documents needed Base map as a foundation for participatory mapping 
Questions asked and topics 
explored 
Where are hot-spots within watershed causing degradation?  
 What are existing patterns of land use in such watershed?  
 Who contribute to the current land use pattern? 
 Why do these land-use patterns developed? 
 What are the examples of areas that decrease or buffer degradation of watershed? 
 Do good practices in solving such watershed problems exist? What are those 
practices? 
Public or Policy Maker Ecological Knowledge 
Goal  Analysis of perceptions about problems of environment and water resource at 
watershed level, and their root causes and effects.   
Source of information Government officers, community leaders, general public including downstream 
stakeholders 
Documents needed  Base and thematic maps 
Reports on environmental and watershed profiles  
Questions asked and topics 
explored 
What and where do watershed problems occur? Who caused the watershed problems 
and what are the reasons?  
 What are past and current pattern of: (1) land use, (2) forest cover, (3) river flow, (3) 
water quality and use, (4) lake, (5) river?  
 Are any developmental projects planned within the watershed? Will these projects 
cause environmental degradation?  
Modeller or hydrologist ecological knowledge 
Goal  Plausible land use change scenarios with analysis of drivers and impacts to watershed 
of such scenarios 
Source of information Land use modeller and hydrologist  
Documents needed  Spatial data: topographic, landform, geology, soil, natural vegetation, land use time 
series and administrative maps.  
Climatic data: daily rainfall  
Hydrological data: daily water level of water body  
Questions asked and topics 
explored 
What changes occurred in watershed? What are the drivers of such land use 
changes? 
 How do land use change influence water balance and use within the watershed?  
 What are main indicators in influencing water quantity and water quality of the 
watershed?  
 What are impacts of land cover on water balance and river flow of the watershed?  
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The hydrological modelling recognizes multiple scales (Ranieri et al. 2004; De Groot et al. 2010) 
ranging from the plot level, where infiltration is influenced by the condition of the topsoil, via the 
stream level that generally involves multiple farms, to the river level that is influenced by domestic 
water use and waste management as well as land use, and finally to the catchment level that may 
include industrial and (semi) urban use as well. To model the influence of current and future land use 
change to a watershed’s hydrological function, we applied the GenRiver 2.0 computer software 
modelling (van Noordwijk 2002; van Noordwijk et al 2010) with the minimum 20 year-time-series 
climatic and hydrological data. GenRiver is a simple water balance model that simulates river flow. It 
was developed for data-scarce situations and is based on empirical equations. The model can be used 
to explore the basic changes in river flow characteristics across spatial scales, from the patch level, 
through the sub-catchment to the catchment level. Appendix 1 shows the equations for measuring 
watershed indicators used in the hydrological models.  
To analyze the landscape configuration and land use dynamics of a watershed, we acquired spatial 
data from satellite imagery for land cover mapping, a digital elevation model for watershed 
characterization, and from thematic maps for the analysis of the landscape configuration. The next 
step was to conduct terrain processing for watershed delineation and analysis of land use/cover 
changes and their trajectories. 
Complete studies at each site have been coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) in 
Aceh (Khasanah et al. 2010), Singkarak (Farida et al. 2005), Kapuas Hulu (Lusiana et al. 2008) and 
Talau (Lusiana et. al., 2008). For the Sumberjaya case, studies of the three knowledge systems were 
conducted separately, that is hydrological ecological knowledge  (Verbist et al. 2005), and local and 
public ecological knowledge (Agus, Gintings, and Van Noordwijk 2002; Chapman 2002; 
Schalenbourg 2004).   
In addition, we organized a series of interviews with key stakeholders, mostly the project managers, 
who were involved in the implementation of RWS schemes. The interviews aimed to gain some 
information on: the progress of the RWS schemes, the types of scenarios that had resulted from the 
scoping study applied to establish conservation contracts between ES providers and buyers, and 
information on the strengths and weaknesses of the application of multiple knowledge in designing 
and planning an RWS scheme. Three of the sites were coordinated by the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) Indonesia in collaboration with the consortium of “Equitable Payment for Watershed 
Services” of CARE International, and the International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED) (Kapuas Hulu –West Kalimantan and Talau –East Nusa Tenggara). The other two sites 
(Singkarak – West Sumatra and Sumberjaya – Lampung) were action research sites of the Rewarding 
Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES Phase 2) project coordinated by ICRAF in 
collaboration with local NGOs and government.  
4.4. Case studies from watersheds in Indonesia: setting the scene  
Figure 4.2 shows the location of the four case studies on scoping study in Indonesia: Singkarak –West 
Sumatra, Sumberjaya – Lampung, Kapuas Hulu –West Kalimantan and Talau –East Nusa Tenggara. 
The sites represent substantially different human and landscape characteristics across Indonesia. 
Kapuas Hulu is dominated by a tropical forest landscape with very low human density, while the 
remaining sites have medium to high population density and are dominated by agricultural landscapes 
ranging through complex tree crops and horticulture to paddy field. Being in the driest part of 
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Indonesia, grassland for forage is the most common land cover in Talau. The main characteristics of 
the sites are summarized in Table 4.2.   
 
Figure 4.2  Location of watershed scoping study sites in Indonesia 
Table 4.2  Main characteristics of study sites 
 Singkarak Sumberjaya Kapuas Hulu Talau 
Province West Sumatra Lampung West Kalimantan East Nusa Tenggara 
Regency and 
Population density 
(person.km-2) 
Upper: 
Solok (62) 
Down: 
Tanah Datar (245) 
West Lampung (150) Kapuas Hulu (7) Belu (145) 
Catchment area 
(hectares) 
10,780 54,190 980,000 72,000 
Main land use/cover Agriculture Complex mixed tree 
crop 
Forest Grassland 
% Forest coverc  (year)  16 (2002) 15 (2002) 90 (2004) 6 (2004) 
Climatic condition/ No. 
of wet months 
Humid tropics/ 
5 
Humid tropics/ 
 7 
Humid tropics/  
10–12 
Dry/ 
4 
Total annual rainfall  
mm year-1 
2760 2500 4100 1605 
 
a Based on population density of regency in 2004 (BPS, 2005). The average population density for Indonesia in 2004 was 121.7. 
b Forest cover refers to the time when the study was conducted; the year is that of the Landsat-TM acquisition that became the basis for 
the “current” land cover map.  
4.4.1 Singkarak –West Sumatra 
Singkarak Basin is a watershed forming part of Bukit Barisan consisting primarily of volcanoes with 
Lake Singkarak situated in the middle of the basin with. A hydroelectric project located in the 
downstream section of the watershed has diverted most of the lake outflow from its natural outlet (the 
Ombilin River) to the Anai River that flows westward into the Indian Ocean near Padang. The 
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Minangkabau is the dominant ethnic group in Singkarak with a matrilineal culture governing and 
enforcing its ethnic norms and conventions. Dryland agriculture and fisheries provide the main 
income sources for the majority of people around Singkarak Lake, while 10% of the people still 
practice swidden agriculture or shifting cultivation. 
4.4.2 Sumberjaya – Lampung  
Sumberjaya watershed as the main contributor of the Way Besai River is located around the Bukit 
Rigis covering the West Lampung district. Downstream of the Way Besai River, a HEP company 
produces about 480–2042 MWh of electricity daily that is distributed to three provinces in Sumatra.  
Multi ethnicity characterizes the Sumberjaya communities consisting Semendo ethnic group and 
migrants from Java (Sundanese and Javanese). The Semendo people mostly practice slash and burn 
agriculture, while the migrants practice permanent coffee-based plantations on the hilly slopes and 
paddy field along riparian strips. In general, there are two types of Robusta coffee garden in 
Sumberjaya: monoculture and a multi-strata system. The multi-strata system refers to agroforestry 
coffee systems that have been practiced since the late 1980s, where farmers plant various timber and 
fruit trees in their coffee gardens.   
4.4.3 Kapuas Hulu – West Kalimantan 
Kapuas Hulu Basin located in the northern part of West Kalimatan is the source of most of 
Kalimantan’s rivers flowing to Central Kalimantan province and Sarawak. Malaysia. In the upstream 
part of Kapuas Hulu lies the Betung Karihun National Park, a hotspot biodiversity area and one of the 
last frontiers of natural habitat in Kalimantan (Curran, 2004). Forest is the dominant land cover in 
Kapuas Hulu covering 90% of the total watershed. The Kapuas Hulu Basin is the home of several 
indigenous Dayak tribes: Iban, Kantu’, Tamanbaloh, Kayan, Bukat, and Punan. The Iban and Kantu’ 
people are mostly farmers with the egalitarian characteristics of being more open and democratic. The 
Tamanbaloh and Kaya people are also farmers with a more complex leadership structure. The Bukat 
and Punan people are forest gatherers and hunters who live in small groups; their leadership structure 
is based on seniority and skill. Farmers cultivated their horticulture lands more intensively in Sibau 
catchment, while in Kapuas, the main livelihoods of the local stakeholders were gathering forest 
products and extensive local agroforestry practices (tembawang). 
4.4.4 Talau – East Nusa Tenggara 
The Talau watershed is a cross-country watershed encompassing Indonesia and Timor Leste.  Rivers 
from the Talau watershed drain to the Ombai Strait in Timor Leste. Water springs are the main source 
of water for people in the area. Two important sub-catchments in Talau are Lahurus and Motabuik, 
representing respectively, 2 and15% of the total watershed area. The Lahurus sub-catchment provides 
water to the domestic users and the Public Water Service of Atambua (PDAM Atambua). The 
Motabuik sub-catchment is the upper most in the upper catchment for which data on river flow are 
available. Grassland is the most dominant land cover in this area (66%) and forest constitutes only 1% 
of the area.  
The dominant ethnic groups in the Belu Regency are the Tetun (Belu), Dawan (Attoin Metto), Bunak 
(Marae) and Kemak with strong cultural traditions still influencing their daily life. Customary law 
exists and influences their management and use of natural resources. The Belu ethnic group 
recognizes three strata of law:  (i) Kneter/ Neter - way of life, (ii) Ktaek/Taek – norms, and (iii) Ukun 
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badu –the taboos and restrictions. The last stratum sets the rules for natural resource management 
stating that natural resources (soil, water, big rocks, big trees, mountain, etc) are considered sacred 
and have owners. Sacred lands are usually owned communally and are governed by all ethnic group 
members.   
4.5. Results  
This section describes the findings from four case studies on the ecological knowledge of each actor: 
local communities as ES providers, public-policy makers as ES beneficiaries and regulators, and 
ecological modelers as neutral actors providing scientific facts. We also present the implementation of 
current RWS schemes at each site. This information is to analyze how the scoping study applying the 
multiple ecological knowledge influences the PES practices.    
4.5.1 Singkarak – West Sumatra 
Local and public-policy makers’ viewpoints  
In Singkarak, communities observed that the overall water availability is rather good in the 
Paninggahan area (one of the upstream nagari) and water becomes slightly scarce only in the dry 
season. They also observed that the problem of flooding around the lake has increased since the 
construction of the hydroelectric dam by HEP at the exit point. Floods enter the paddy fields around 
the lake. People surrounding the lake also have water quality problems caused by domestic pollution 
in addition to over consumption that can decrease their fishing harvest from the lake. They perceived 
that the hydroelectric power (HEP) company was not able to provide as much electricity as was 
expected because of high fluctuations in the level of the lake.  
The type of tree (pine versus broadleaf) is perceived to have an effect on the amount of 
evapotranspiration from their foliage with a subsequent influence on the total availability of water in 
the soil and water flowing downstream. The local people claim that soils have “dried up” after pines 
were planted in previously forested areas. In recent years, pine has been used extensively in 
reforestation programs in the area. As a solution to the negative influence of pines tree on water 
availability, local stakeholders mentioned mahogany and teak as examples of species that do not need 
much water.  
In 2003, under the leadership of their elected local leader i.e. wali nagari, villagers developed a 
village regulation on river protection. The purpose of this regulation was to protect the existence of a 
native fish species (ikan bilih) by allowing fish of a certain size to be harvested. The district 
government bought these fish and released them into the lake. Local communities were only allowed 
to catch the fish in the lake.  
The government officials also mentioned season, land coverage, soil type, and tree type as factors 
influencing water availability. Reforestation is seen as increasing land coverage that can decrease 
evaporation. An informal government group also agreed that trees help to hold water in the ground, 
reducing runoff and soil erosion. Government officials said that forest clearing to the south of 
Singkarak Lake is causing most problems with flooding mainly because there is less forest area that 
can hold water and reduce flooding. Farmers have a similar opinion about the factors influencing 
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flooding and the subsequent effect mainly on rice crops and also damaging fields and irrigation 
channels. 
Hydrological modelling findings 
The water balance model suggests that the overall shortfall of water for electricity generation is a 
problem of timing or lack of effective storage capacity; the storage capacity of the lake at the peak of 
the rainy season is insufficient to retain the water, so it is allowed to overflow into the Ombilin River. 
The main issue is whether the upstream watershed could retain enough water to provide stable flows 
during the dry season for around 2–3 months. Figure 4.3 shows the modelling results17 of different 
land use scenarios of the watershed: (1) all degraded lands are converted to natural forest; (2) business 
as usual: current mixed land use; (3) all lands are severely degraded. The hydrological modelling 
revealed that the presumed positive relationship between reforestation efforts and water availability 
for HEP was not likely to exist. Climatic variation influences the performance of the hydroelectric 
power company more than the land use changes in the basin.  
 
 
Figure 4.3  Water balance of Singkarak basin with different land use scenarios (Farida et al. 2005) 
In addition to that, decreasing water quality will trigger eutrophication in the lake. Although this 
condition will not affect the overall debit of the lake, it will in the end reduce the efficiency of HEP to 
produce hydroelectricity. Therefore, maintaining water quality in the lake is important for all 
stakeholders. Priority actions would have to focus on the rivers and streams that currently carry the 
highest sediment, nutrient, and organic pollutant loads, most noticeably the Sumani River that drains 
the largest area of intensive horticulture and passes by a medium-sized town. Pollution control at the 
point source level will have to complement efforts based on land cover. 
                                                   
17
 This paper will only show important and relevant results of the hydrological study. Complete results can be obtained from 
working papers of Rapid Hydrological Appraisal of Singkarak  
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Current RWS scheme  
The existing local government regulation states that the surface and ground water tax is allocated 30% 
to the province, 35% to the district producing the water, and 35% to other districts in West Sumatra. 
Similar to the water tax, the hydropower royalties stopped its distribution at the district level. In the 
beginning of the scheme, the local intermediary negotiated the redistribution of the water tax and 
hydropower royalty to local communities through nagaris as rewards for watershed service schemes. 
This was under the assumption that land rehabilitation through reforestation would increase the 
amount of water in the lake resulting in a better water supply for commercial water uses. 
Starting in 2010, at the nagari level, farmers managed 49-hectares degraded lands are involving in a 
voluntary carbon market (VCM) scheme with a private company from the Netherlands. This scheme 
applied participatory tree-selection with the farmers in rehabilitating their degraded land considering 
their local knowledge on tree species and market potential. In the same year, a proposal to Ministry of 
Environment was submitted by 12 nagari leaders surrounding the Lake Singakarak proposing various 
lake management techniques adjusted to the needs of each nagari.   
4.5.2 Sumberjaya 
Local and public-policy makers’ viewpoints  
In Sumberjaya, farmers cultivated coffee on steeper erosion-prone land and paddy field along the 
riparian area face flooding problems and river bank abrasion. They converted primary and secondary 
forest to monoculture and multistrata or agroforestry coffee gardens. Farmers have been prepared to 
invest heavily in artificial fertilisers to increase productivity and also applied a range of erosion 
restraint measures in their coffee gardens, such as terraces, trenches, ridges, and pits. They selected 
certain tree species, such as Gliricidia and positioned them and manipulated the plant components on 
the basis of soil management issues. Farmers are well aware of the consequences of an over 
enthusiastic regime of soil cultivation on steep ground, and identified the risk of soil loss if other 
conservation measures are not put in place. 
In 1998, the local government and its Forestry Department depicted that uncontrolled deforestation 
and conversion to coffee on the slopes have led to a tremendous increase of erosion and reduction of 
discharge of the Way Besai River. This negatively impacts operation of the newly constructed Way 
Besai hydro-power dam. Water availability for irrigated paddy rice downstream was reduced. The 
enforcement of forest boundaries led to the eviction of thousands of farmers between 1991 and 1996. 
Evicted farmers were resettled on the infertile acid lowland peneplain or converted swamp forest of 
northeast Lampung. After the political change of 1998, farmers needing a living returned to the area, 
often under silent approval of the local government that needed income and was interested in 
economic development. 
Hydrological modelling findings 
A time series of daily rainfall and discharge (water flow) data showed that although on average 
rainfall remained constant over the years, the average discharge had increased, with the likely cause 
being the conversion of forest to coffee gardens reducing evapotranspiration. A real decrease in the 
low flows in the Way Besai in the dry season did occur; however, the number of years with a 
prolonged dry season also decreased. An increase of El Niño years (1976 versus 1991, 1994, and 
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1997) induced the perception that dry season flows had been reduced by the local land use change 
rather than by global climate change. 
In Sumberjaya, the ICRAF scientists tested the rate of erosion under various land use types (forest, 
bare soil, multi strata and monoculture coffee systems) in two plots during 2001–2005. The research 
revealed that soil properties have a greater influence on the rate of erosion compared to the intensity 
of tree cover (Figure 4.4). The first plot showed that the rate of erosion was between 4 tonne/ha/year 
for forest and 30 tonne/ha/year for bare soil, while the second plot showed that the rate of erosion 
ranged between 0.1 (forest) and 4 tonne ha-1 year-1 (bare soil) under the same treatments (Verbist et 
al., 2005). The rate of erosion of coffee gardens was in between the rates for bare soil and forest. The 
highest rate of erosion occurred in 3-year-old coffee garden then gradually declined as litter layers 
established the soil cover. The Sumberjaya watershed has an old crater landscape with a high diversity 
of geological substrates. Even under dense forest cover some pristine headwaters can turn quite 
turbid. Further, the research show that land use plays a less important role in river sedimentation 
compared to the geological characteristics (Verbist 2008). The overall sediment yield at the watershed 
level was caused by landslides, river bank collapse, and contribution of dirt footpaths. The research 
showed that catchments with relatively high forest cover (more than 30 % coverage) are also the ones 
with the highest sediment yield.    
 
 
Figure 4.4  Average of plot level erosion in Sumberjaya for monoculture coffee and forest in three sub-
catchments (Verbist 2008) 
Note:  WR  = Way Ringkih sub-catchment; WT = Way Tebu sub-catchment; WP = Way Petai sub-catchment; F= forest; the numbers 
1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11 referring to the age of monoculture coffee gardens in the year 2 of the measurement   
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Current RWS scheme  
In 2001, the Ministry of Forestry promulgated decree 31/2001 on community forestry. The decree 
provided guidelines for community forestry (HKm) contracts requiring farmers to form farmers’ 
organizations, and follow management guidelines approved by local forestry officials. The HKm 
permit in a protection forest area could be considered as a reward for watershed services since a 
condition for farmers joining the voluntary program was to plant a minimum 400 trees per hectare. 
Conditional tenure security to utilize forest land has a probationary period of five years and can be 
extended to a maximum of 25 years if the farmers’ HKm group accomplishes all its criteria and 
indicators.  
The River Care scheme coordinated by ICRAF was a collective action program organized by 
communities living along the riparian strip who undertook the responsibility for producing clean 
water by reducing soil sedimentation. The payment was made in cash (USD 2,222 in Gunung Sari) or 
as a micro hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 5000 watt (in Buluh Kapur) with a similar 
monetary value to Gunung Sari if the community could reduce the sediment by 30% or more. There 
was a reducing level of rewards of USD 833, USD 555, and USD 278 for sediment reductions of 21–
29, 10–20, and less than 10%, respectively. Every three months, the scheme was monitored by an 
external stakeholder, such as the local Forestry Service.  
4.5.3 Kapuas Hulu 
Local and public-policy makers’ viewpoints  
In Kapuas Hulu, different tribes and livelihood options strongly influence the land use pattern along 
the river. People in the upstream tend to have less permanent dwellings, use subsistence practices and 
less technology. They are mostly hunters and subsistence food-gatherers with high income 
uncertainty. They perceived erosion and landslides caused by logging activities in the upstream areas 
and riparian zones as leading to high economic loss. In Sibau and Mendalam, people blamed the 
establishment of shortcuts across river banks to speed up water transportation as a cause of 
sedimentation. The Mendalam people were also concerned about the recent establishment of a forest 
concession company in the area.  In Kapuas, mining and small-scale logging were considered to be 
the main factors. 
The Dayak people in Kapuas Hulu use their own customary law in managing the forest. The ethnic 
law limits the provisioning service of the forest solely to domestic uses with permission granted by 
the adat leaders, for activities such as timber and animal harvesting. They also defined protected areas 
including forest and Sadong Lake and had some rules on fishing practices, such as banning fishing 
using electric shocks and poisons. The Melayu Sambus community agreed to avoid the use of 
pesticides and insecticides when opening up new lands and did not allow outsiders to open up and 
exploit lands in their area. In Mendalam, they were planning to establish an adat forum on watershed 
management.  
The Public Water Service (PDAM) of Putusibau in the capital of Kapuas Hulu indicated that turbidity 
was problematic and had resulted in a decrease in the water quality for domestic uses. Furthermore, 
gold mining activities had the potential to increase water pollution due to toxic mercury use. Local 
community and policy makers mentioned that the environmental problems in this area were forest 
degradation, river siltation, lack of fresh water, and high water pollution. The high threat of forest loss 
and fragmentation caused by fire, logging, and mining activities was perceived to be decreasing the 
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hydrological function of the watershed. River siltation leading to river shallowness could disturb river 
transportation as boats were the main vehicle in this area. 
Hydrological modelling findings 
Between 2001 and 2004, the forest area in the Kapuas Hulu basin decreased by about 130 km2 and the 
total area managed by farmers increased by around 42 km2. This change was insignificant in the 
context of the total basin area, but it represented a substantial relative increase in the agricultural land. 
In addition, settlement had more than doubled within this period. These changes mostly occurred in 
the provincial land area designated as “dry agricultural” zone. Most of the land changes occurred 
along the river outside the National Park area. 
Exploration on the effect of forest conversion on the landscape water balance revealed that reducing 
the forest cover in the area would increase the surface run-off and reduce the soil-quick flow. Thus, 
this has to be anticipated by healthy riparian zones to avoid an increase in sedimentation of the river. 
The landscape water balance analysis also showed that up until 2004, the run-off fraction in the 
Kapuas Hulu Basin was low, revealing the ability of the Kapuas Hulu basin to maintain its watershed 
function, particularly related to maintaining river flow (Figure 4.5). However, there were already 
signs of degradation at a smaller catchment scale. Estimation of landscape water balance at the 
smaller catchment level of the Mendalam sub-catchment indicated the run-off fraction was six times 
that of the overall basin (Lusiana et al. 2008).    
 
 
Figure 4.5  Water balance of Kapuas Hulu basin at different land use scenarios (Lusiana et al. 2008) 
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Current RWS scheme  
Current progress showed that the facilitators were focusing on rehabilitation along the riparian zone 
and the establishment of a local agroforestry system or tembawang to reduce sedimentation in five 
villages in the Mendalam sub-watershed. The facilitators chose to focus on the Mendalam sub-
catchment due to the development of intensified systems in the area (vegetable plots, coffee systems) 
and also the threat of a forest concession being opened up in the area. The district government 
allocated about USD 20,000 annually to each village through their village budget. The fund was 
available for allocation to both individual participants of the PES program and to village revenue. The 
percentages of both allocations have not been decided yet. The land rehabilitation was organized on 
private lands owned by the local stakeholders since the district government represented their target 
buyer, that is, the local public water service (PDAM) 
4.5.4 Talau 
Local and public-policy makers’ viewpoints  
Local knowledge on the seasons and climate is tightly linked to knowledge of the planting calendar 
because of the long dry season (8 months) and the short rainy season (3–4 months). The severe dry 
season influences the selection of plants grown by the local people. Local people believe that the 
forest has an important role as a ground water provider, regulator, and also as a source of livelihood. 
Local people also have a well-articulated understanding of the relationship between vegetation, soil, 
and water availability. According to them, plants that are suitable in the water spring area are species 
that have deep roots that can hold water in the ground, such as betel nut, mahogany and candlenut.  
Local people said that teak is not a good plant to plant close to water springs, as it takes a lot of water 
but does not keep water in its roots or stem and instead releases water into the air. The forest is 
associated with the existence of water springs. Tree density and tree species are significantly linked 
with ground water availability. Trees function as rainwater holders, groundwater keepers and prevent 
erosion.   
The local stakeholders have institutionalized the protection of water sources, access to water, and 
water allocation. Sub-ethnic groups or clans treated springs as sacred groves. They controlled and 
regulated springs and their use. The mamar or forest surrounding water springs ((Sumu 2003)) is 
protected from livestock and loggers. People who belong to the clan are allowed to use some 
economic plants such as sirih (Piper betle) and pinang (Areca catechu). In the past, only people of the 
clan were allowed to use water from springs. People from other clans need to ask permission and 
would be penalized if they refused to comply. However, recently, customary law no longer has such a 
stronghold.  This has triggered conflicts over water use in some parts of the area, mainly due to the 
distribution of water to other areas outside the surrounding village. 
Hydrological modelling findings 
From the limited information available on river flow, the overall pattern of the Talau river flow can be 
described in three phases: the early part of the rainy season, when the soil and landscape storage 
capacity for water is recharged; the second part of the rainy season, when a larger proportion of the 
current rainfall is transmitted to the river; and the dry season, when the river (and spring) flow 
depends on the gradual release of stored water underground. The buffering capacity of the Talau 
watershed is less in years with high rainfall and consequently high total water discharge. River flow in 
the Talau watershed is strongly seasonal; the risk of flash floods is especially high in the second part 
67 
 
of the rainy season, when the storage capacity of the landscape is saturated and strong rainfall is 
passed on to the river without much buffering. The landscape water balance both in the Talau 
watershed and the Lahurus sub-catchment shows strong seasonal differences (Figure 4.6). Actual 
evapotranspiration is much lower than the potential evapotranspiration, due to the strong seasonality 
of rainfall and the limited storage capacity of water in the soils.  
 
 
Figure 4.6  Estimated annual water balance of Talau watershed and Lahurus sub-catchment during rainy 
season and dry season 
From an eco-hydrological perspective, it is likely that planting more trees in the area, as currently 
suggested by local people and policy makers, will not substantially increase low flows and there is a 
risk of even lowering the current baseflow (Figure 4.7). Estimation using models showed converting 
non-productive land (defined as grassland and bush/shrub land) into agroforestry systems or forest 
does not change the annual low flow. Nevertheless, adding trees into the landscape reduced surface 
runoff and increased soil-quick flow. This result implied that rainfall will not reach the river as soon 
as it occurs, increasing the watershed buffering capacity and consequently flash flooding can be 
avoided. Assuming that runoff is highly correlated with soil erosion, a reduction in surface runoff also 
suggests a reduction in soil erosion and therefore improved water quality. 
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Figure 4.7  Water balance of Talau watershed and Lahurus sub-catchment at different land use scenarios 
(Lusiana et al. 2008) 
Current RWS scheme  
In 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Belu district government 
and the community group of Lasiolat representing seven villages in the Lasiolat sub-district, Belu as a 
response to the facilitation of the RWS scheme by CARE/WWF. The MoU stated the general role and 
the responsibility of both parties so that the community would be actively involved in the watershed 
conservation program, while the local government actively supported and implemented jointly the 
program. As a result, the local government allocated some funds through the relevant district service, 
that is, the Forestry and Plantation Services of the Belu district, for watershed conservation as part of 
their annual budget. In 2008, they allocated about USD 48,000 and estimated a similar amount 
annually up to 2011.  
4.6. Discussion  
4.6.1 Gaps among the three knowledge systems 
Most of the upstream communities in the study sites use water for domestic consumption and 
smallholder agriculture, such as paddy fields, fishponds, and plantations. They recognized the 
importance of the services of their ecosystems, such as the importance of forests and rivers, and 
connected these services to benefit their livelihood including cultural rituals. Therefore, their 
perceptions of the hydrological problems are mostly through processes that influence their daily 
activities and income. Furthermore, communities perceived that they could suffer from watershed 
problems caused by the presence of external stakeholders, such as the construction of hydroelectric 
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power schemes worsening flooding, the presence of a municipal water company reducing water 
supplies for local uses, or the presence of a concession company carrying out extensive logging 
upstream.  
Farmers at all sites mostly were able to describe in detail the different elements within their landscape, 
the interactions among them and their cause-effect relationships. Local communities tended to focus 
on solutions at the plot level and had limited ability to formulate larger scale ecological processes. 
They were aware of and applied a variety of techniques to solve their watershed problems. The 
solutions applied were somewhat consistent among sites even though the sites are geographically 
dispersed. For example, people at all sites consistently mentioned mahogany as an example of a tree 
species that retained water but they had different opinions about teak.  
In finding solutions, local community members sought location-specific solutions while general 
public and policy stakeholders referred to generic solutions in the form of forest protection and 
rehabilitation through reforestation as important actions in responding to floods, soil erosion, and 
riverbank abrasion. Policy makers, however, gave more attention to the role of the forest in providing 
beneficial watershed services (Verbist, 2005, Schalenbourg, 2004). For example, the Singkarak case 
showed that solutions preferred by policy makers (mass reforestation by planting pines) to solve 
watershed problems could cause problems to other stakeholders (drying up water resources due to the 
high evapotranspiration rate of the pines). In Kapuas Hulu, solutions to the watershed problems 
focused more on the removal of perverse policies, such as the granting of permits to logging 
companies, rather than changing land use practices at the local level. Gouyon (2002) and van 
Noordwijk et. al. (2004) proposed the removal of the current negative impacts on the environment and 
the rural poor before designing and implementing an RWS scheme.      
Cross-site analysis showed that the reality check provided by knowledge integration approach 
presented rich information on causes of watershed problems and solutions (Table 4.3). In some cases, 
imbalance in supply and demand for ES (for example, water allocation in Talau and overfishing in 
Singkarak) and human-induced activities with no direct relations to land use change (for examples, 
cutting the river bank in Kapuas Hulu) caused more watershed problems than local (upstream) land 
use practices. In the Sumberjaya case, coffee plantation under multistrata-systems could produce litter 
layers that prevented soil erosion. This was different from the previous perception that generalized all 
coffee plantations as the main cause of river sedimentation.  
Further, the results from the simulation model helped to ascertain whether stakeholders’ perceptions 
and understanding of the hydrological situation and their solutions to tackle emerging problems 
actually represent what is currently happening or what could happen in the future. For example, 
analysis of the landscape water balance of Kapuas Hulu showed that the condition of the basin under 
the “business as usual” scenario was similar to the forested condition, reflecting that this scenario can 
still maintain its hydrological function since the tree cover in the area is still “pristine” with almost 
100% tree cover. 
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Table 4.3 Analysis of multiple ecological knowledge and its management implication for RWS  
 Singkarak Sumberjaya Kapuas Hulu Talau 
Initial perceived 
problem 
Deforestation at the 
upstream of watershed 
caused floods and 
decrease of the water 
level of the lake, thus 
disturbing the operational 
of hydroelectric power 
company (HEP). 
Forest conversion to 
coffee agroforestry 
gardens caused 
increase of sediment 
yield, thus clogging 
the HEP electricity 
generator and causing 
low electricity 
production.  
Forest conversion to 
agriculture and illegal 
logging causing 
increased of sediment 
yield, thus decreasing 
the water quality for 
drinking water 
company.  
Deforestation 
surrounding the water 
spring decreased water 
supply from the spring.  
Results from 
hydrological 
analysis  
Decrease of water level 
was caused by 
ineffective watershed 
buffering in retaining 
water during rainy 
season. 
Downstream water 
quality was influenced by 
high domestic and 
agricultural pollutants.   
Floods were mostly 
caused by river stream 
diversion by HEP.  
Sedimentation mostly 
was caused by 
instable geological 
characteristics of the 
watershed.  
Coffee plantation less 
than 3 years, 
landslides (occurred in 
forested area), river 
bank collapse, and dirt 
footpaths were 
sources of sediment 
yield. 
Low run-off showed 
that watershed was 
still well-functioning 
with the current land 
practices and 
changes.  
Intensive use along 
riparian causing river 
bank collapse and 
river edge cutting for 
boat transportation 
were sources of 
sediment yield.  
Lack of water from 
water springs 
dominantly was caused 
by climatic changes and 
ineffective watershed in 
buffering water.  
Overconsumption and 
unwise use of water 
from the spring 
worsened water 
management and 
caused conflicts.  
Management 
implication from 
local 
perspectives  
Reforestation uses trees 
with low 
evapotranspiration.   
Local wisdom maintains 
clean water stream in the 
upstream and conserving 
native ikan bilih.  
Simple sediment 
retention construction 
and planting deep root 
trees, including 
compaction of dirt 
path were useful to 
reduce surface 
erosion. 
Tembawang 
traditional 
agroforestry system 
along riparian zone 
helps reducing 
pressures to soil 
erosion. 
 
  
Reviving local wisdom 
of spring water 
management can help 
solving internal conflicts.  
 
Management 
implication for 
watershed 
management 
and RWS 
Upstream village level: 
maintaining current intact 
environment, i.e. 
biodiversity conservation 
such as organic coffee, 
bundled VCM and 
watershed services.  
Villages surrounding the 
Lake: improving water 
quality of the Lake and 
connecting river.   
Collective action to 
conserve riparian 
zone involving village 
members along the 
river.  
Individual and 
collective action to 
manage coffee garden 
by applying simple 
construction and 
multistrata tree-
planting.   
Collective action to 
conserve riparian 
zone involving village 
members along the 
river.  
Collective action to 
maintain intact forest 
in the upper 
watershed as a 
potential for REDD+ 
type schemes.  
Law enforcement on 
illegal logging and 
logging permits. 
Collective and individual 
action to promote tree-
planting to increase 
watershed buffering.  
Spring water 
management with wise 
consumption and 
regulated extraction of 
PDAM. 
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4.6.2 Constraints in the application of multiple knowledge in RWS implementation  
Our case studies showed that the availability of information is a prerequisite for increasing the quality 
and sustainability of RWS programs. The review found that the factors influencing the design and 
implementation of RWS programs are varied and beyond the availability of multi-perception 
ecological knowledge and scientific data.  
Strategic use of information 
Ecosystem services intermediaries have an important role in determining the strategic use of 
environmental information. As mentioned earlier, many conservation actions are only based on 
general beliefs, such as that planting trees in the upper watershed can increase the volume of the 
stored water in a lake downstream, or even more extreme, many believe indisputably that planting 
trees can solve all environmental problems. Potential ES buyers or ES consumers may have intrinsic 
motivations based on this common myth and assume that certain conservation practices are able to 
enhance ES provision to their benefit. Revelation of the scientific fact that planting trees, conversely, 
can actually reduce the base flow due to an increase in evapotranspiration, as shown in the Singkarak 
case study (Van Noordwijk, Leimona et al. 2007), may reduce investors’ motivation to participate in 
any RWS scheme, when the buyers’ interest is water quantity increment. Moreover, an incomplete 
understanding of forest versus watershed problems can produce undesired results—namely, a 
misconception that reforestation is not important. Intermediaries as benevolent environmental 
agencies might deter the disclosure of these “contradictory” facts and will carefully consider the 
strategic use of scientific-based information and avoid creating reduced moral motivation in buyers 
engaging in the scheme. Asheim (2010) presented empirical support for this effect.  
Vested interest of donors and implementing agencies 
Van Noordwijk et al. (2004) hypothesized that both ES buyers and sellers would have to strategically 
consider options and threats to accomplish both their and others’ benefits (and losses). Applying 
SWOT analysis (the abbreviation for strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats) they explained 
that stakeholders tendentiously preferred “starting with easy wins rather than most urgent issues”. 
This tendency also seems to apply in our case studies where implementing agencies selected pilots 
with complete historical data or strategically interposed other agendas rather than establishing an 
RWS scheme per se. In addition, donors’ obligations have a great influence on determining hotspots 
or a targeted pilot area, in which case the selection of the defined ES has been made not based fully on 
scientific facts but purposively chosen as the option that best matches with project design documents 
or that is the nearest to the locations of potential buyers. This is not uncommon, since often a donor’s 
indicator for a successful RWS scheme is skewed towards having a successful transaction between 
sellers and buyers with a contract, clear business case, or memorandum of understanding signed by 
both parties. In the domain of public policies, there is a long history of the selective use of science 
(Galudra and Sirait, 2009), where forests and watershed functions are part of the considerations as 
well.  
4.6.3 Applying nested and multiple prototypes in RWS 
Our case studies and other global experiences indicated that the PES schemes currently practiced were 
still at the relatively small scale and pilot level (villages or sub-watershed levels). Most of the 
schemes were donor-driven with a limited budget, time frame, and high transaction cost since this 
approach is relatively new and needs a huge investment to mature (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 
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2005; Leimona, Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 2009). This discrepancy between the spatial and temporal 
scale in providing ES and investment in case studies implies that most of the cases cannot be used to 
prove the strict PES concept, where an environmental service becomes a tangible commodity 
transacted between its sellers and buyers. Therefore, we recommend that PES project managers might 
adopt a negotiated situation by applying nested and multiple prototypes in establishing RWS (Table 
16). Van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) identified three paradigms in the PES domain: 
commoditization, compensation, and co-investment. The applicability of these paradigms differs in 
relation to the clarity with which the concept of ES is understood in a local context, and the type of 
conditionality, efficiency, and degree of focus on fairness and equity. 
The salience, credibility and legitimacy – aspects of knowledge in the way it is communicated among 
multiple stakeholders (Clark et al., 2010) – not only applies to scientific knowledge, but also to the 
local and public policy makers components of ecological knowledge. Any RWS scheme can be 
interpreted as having an efficiency dimension, that can be analyzed as the objectively measurable 
enhancement of specified watershed functions in relation to the financial inputs required, and a 
perceived fairness dimension, which is only partially captured by an objectively measurable degree of 
equity (Pascual et al. 2010).  
Across the multiple scales that most watershed management issues entail, we can envisage the use of 
multiple incentive paradigms –commoditization environmental services (CES), compensation for any 
opportunities skipped (COS), and co-investment in landscape stewardship (CIS), as introduced by van 
Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010), and achieve a balance between fairness and efficiency at each scale 
(Figure 4.8). We presume that the applicability of the CIS, COS and CES paradigms of van 
Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) varies with scale.  
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Figure 4.8  Conceptualization of the cross-scale exchanges in the “fairness” and “efficiency” domains of 
rewards for watershed services. 
4.7. Conclusion 
Integration of stakeholders’ knowledge and perceptions on hydrological issues prior to Rewarding 
Watershed Services (RWS) scheme development could help to clarify how the watershed service is 
provided, who could be responsible for providing this service, and how the watershed service is being 
impacted upon at present. This leads to a better understanding of how rewards can be channelled to 
effectively enhance or at least maintain the underlying hydrological functions. The case studies 
showed that integration of multiple knowledge systems has helped to clarify the level of 
conditionality between the potential seller and the environmental service that the potential buyer is 
seeking.   
Early and thorough analysis of the multiple knowledge systems involved in planning, designing and 
negotiating incentives for enhancing watershed services could help in increasing the quality and 
sustainability of the emerging policies and schemes by acknowledge the common hydrological issues 
among local stakeholder, enhancing the social capital between stakeholders, increasing the perceived 
fairness dimension of any resulting RWS and provide objective forecasts on how ecosystem services 
will respond to watershed management. However, the five case studies differ in the stage of 
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development of RWS and the long-term sustainability of the emerging schemes cannot be empirically 
judged yet. Nevertheless, results showed that the recognition, appreciation, and use of multiple 
knowledge systems in the early stages of planning and designing an RWS scheme has provided a “no-
regrets” option, allowing for effective communication strategies and also allowing intermediaries and 
project managers to facilitate negotiations between ES providers and ES beneficiaries towards 
operational and sustainable reward systems. 
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Appendix 1.  Quantitative watershed function indicators (Van Noordwijk et al. 2011) 
Criteria Indicator 
1. Transmit water Total water yield (discharge) per unit rainfall(TWY) 
TWY = ΣQ/(A * ΣP)=1-(ΣE/ΣP) 
Q = river discharge 
P = rainfall 
A = area 
E = evapotranspiration 
2. Buffer peak rain event  a).Buffering indicator for peak flows given peak rain events (BI) 
BI  = (PabAvg–(QabAvg /A))/ PabAvg 
         = 1 – QabAvg / (A PabAvg) 
with 
PabAvg = Σ max(P-Pmean,0) 
QabAvg = Σ max(Q-Qmean,0) 
 
b). Relative buffering indicator, adjusted for relative water yield (RBI) 
RBI = 1 – (Pmean / Qmean)*(QabAvg / PabAvg) 
 
c). Buffering peak event (BPE) 
BPE = 1-Max(daily_Q-Qmean) /(A*Max(daily_P–Pmean)) 
d). Highest of monthly river discharge totals relative to mean monthly rainfall 
e).  Fraction of total river discharge derived from Surface quick flow (same day as rain 
event) 
 
f). Fraction of total river discharge derived from Soil quick flow (one day after rain event) 
3. Realease gradually a). Lowest of monthly river discharge totals relative to mean monthly rainfall 
 
b). Fraction of discharge derived from slow  flow (> 1 day after rain event) 
ΣQslow/(ΣQ) = (ΣPinfiltr – ΣES+V)/ ΣQ with  
Pinfiltr = amount of rainfall infiltrated into the soil 
ES+V = evaporation from soil surface an d transpiration by plants 
 
 
Note:  
Q (mm/day)  =  [Q(m3/sec) x24 hourx3600 sec/hour]/[A(km2) x106 m2/km2)]x103 (mm/m) 
Pmean =  average rainfall   
Q mean =  average debit 
P abAvg =  rainfall above average   
Q abAvg =  debit above average 
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5. Designing a field experiment of an environmental 
service procurement auction for watershed services 
in the Sumberjaya watershed, Indonesia 
Payment for environmental services (PES) is a market-based, conditional and voluntary policy option that, in 
this study, provides incentives for maintaining watershed services. The setting of this study is a watershed area 
in Lampung, Indonesia, where soil erosion has broad implications for both on-site and off-site environmental 
damage. A key condition of PES is transparency regarding the conditions under which incentives or rewards can 
be granted. Balanced information and the power of transaction are the basis for any environmental service (ES). 
A contract procurement auction is an alternative mechanism for extracting information from ES providers on 
levels of payments or incentives that will cover their costs when joining a conservation program. In this chapter 
we focus on designing a market-based payment for watershed services and using procurement auction method to 
reveal hidden information on the opportunity costs of supplying environmental services. This is an initial 
application of a procurement auction method in a rural setting in a developing country. Our study resulted in a 
set of auction rules for determining how limited watershed rehabilitation funds could be allocated. Our results 
show that a sealed-bid, multiple round, second-price Vickrey auction with a uniform price can be applied where 
most of the auction participants have a low education level, low asset endowment, small plot size, and where 
market-based competitiveness is not common. The rate of contract accomplishment was moderate and this may 
be influenced by many other factors such as the farmer groups’ leadership and their institutional arrangements 
for conducting conservation activities. The implication of these findings is that designing a proper conservation 
auction method and estimating the ‘right’ value for contracts form only minimal requirements for the success of 
any conservation contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is modified from Leimona, B., Jack, B.K., Lusiana, B., Pasha, R., 2009. Designing a procurement auction for 
reducing sedimentation: a field experiment in Indonesia. Research paper. Economy and Environment Program for Southeast 
Asia (EEPSEA) and Leimona, B., Jack, B.K., 2010. Indonesia: a pilot PES auction in the Sumberjaya watershed. In: OECD 
(Ed.), Paying for biodiversity: enhancing the cost-effectiveness of payments for ecosystem services. OECD Publishing, 
Paris, France, pp. 161-178.  
 
Elements of this case study have been previously published in Jack, B.K., Leimona, B., Ferraro, P.J., 2008. A revealed 
preference approach to estimating supply curves for ecosystem services: use of auctions to set payments for soil control in 
Indonesia. Conservation Biology 23, 359-367.   
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5.1. Introduction 
A payment for environmental services (PES) is one example of a conservation approach that provides 
incentives for maintaining the functions of a watershed by considering the supply and demand of 
environmental services. The central principles of this approach are that those who provide 
environmental services (ES) or the ES providers should be rewarded for doing so, and that those who 
receive the services should pay for their provision based on the performance in enhancing ES (Ferraro 
2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Pagiola and Platais, 2002). Compared to previous conservation 
approaches, the approach’s main innovation is the conditionality or the transparency of conditions 
wherein incentives or rewards can be granted (Wunder, 2005; van Noordwijk et al 2008). As a 
consequence of this conditionality, PES requires voluntary contractual relationships between ES 
providers or farmers as land managers18 and ES buyers.   
The conditionality of the PES requires transparent information and a balanced power of transaction as 
the basis of any ES contracts to ensure fairness and effectiveness. Information asymmetry exists when 
one actor has more or better information than the other on their benefits in being involved in the PES 
scheme. Two important information asymmetries in the design of PES contracts are hidden 
information or lack of information while negotiating a contract and hidden action or lack of 
information about the performance of the agreed contract or lack of ability to retaliate for a breach of 
an agreement (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005; Ferraro 2004).  
Hidden information (adverse selection) that often occurs in designing and negotiating a PES scheme 
is the lack of information on the opportunity costs of supplying environmental services (Ferraro 
2008). The amount of incentive required by farmers to change their behaviours to enhance 
environmental services is private information. If the incentive is too low, it will not motivate ES 
providers to improve their land-use practices and provision of ES. If the incentive is too high, the PES 
will fail to provide environmental services effectively from a given budget.  
A PES contract procurement auction is an alternative policy mechanism to extract from ES providers 
the information on level of payments or incentives that at least cover all their costs in joining a 
conservation program (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005; Ferraro 2004). It is defined as “a process 
through which a buyer of environmental services invites bids (tenders) from suppliers of 
environmental services for a specified contract and then buys the contracts with the lowest bids” 
(Ferraro 2008).  
Procurement auctions on conservation contracts have been successfully implemented in the United 
States, Australia and Europe (Stoneham et al., 2003). The award of contracts on the basis of 
competitive bidding is a method frequently used in procuring commodities for which there are no 
well-established markets (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Ferraro, 2008), such as in 
markets for environmental services.  
While inverse auctions for PES have been applied in a number of developed countries, they have to 
date not been widely adopted in developing countries. This chapter examines one of the few 
applications of inverse auctions in a rural setting of a developing country, namely in Lampung, 
Indonesia. A pilot PES scheme was implemented in 2006-2008 to induce farmers to reduce 
sedimentation in two sites in the Sumberjaya Watershed: Way Ringkih (Site 1) and Way Lirikan (Site 
                                                   
18
 In our context, we denote farmers as environmental service suppliers since they have a role in maintaining the 
environmental benefits from the watershed. Their decisions on land use practices influence the provision of environmental 
services (ES) from this landscape, including clean water, high biodiversity and the beauty of the landscape. 
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2). Site 1 consists of two villages Talang Kuningan and Talang Harapan, and Site 2 consists of 
Wanasari I and Talang Anyar. This study resulted in a set of auction rules to determine how the 
limited budget of the watershed rehabilitation fund, financed by the parastatal hydropower company, 
would be allocated. Additionally, the aim of this pilot was to obtain an understanding of the drivers of 
farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a conservation contract and to assess the 
feasibility of using auctions in a developing country context.  
In this chapter, we focus on designing a procurement auction method to reveal hidden information on 
the opportunity costs of supplying environmental services. This is the first application of procurement 
auction method in a rural setting of a developing country, where most of the auction participants have 
a low education level (less than seven years of education), low asset endowment, small plot size (most 
owned land of less than 0.5 hectares) and where market-based competitiveness is not so common.  
5.2. Theoretical Framework 
5.2.1 Experimental Auction  
Experimental auction methods are becoming more commonplace in non-market valuation because of 
their perceived benefits relative to previously used contingent valuation survey methods. The reason 
is that participants have more incentives to reveal their true value for a product compared to a 
hypothetical survey setting. In this case, real products and real money are exchanged in an 
experimental setting (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). The mechanism is particularly useful in 
low-income countries where markets are imperfect and households can behave in ways very different 
from profit maximization (Ferraro 2004).   
Four auctions are commonly used in the literature that can theoretically reveal any private information 
asked for (or incentive compatible): the English auctions, second price (Vickrey auction), Becker-
DeGroot-&-Marschak (BDM) and random n-th price auctions. The structure of each mechanism is 
outlined in Table 5.1 (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  The most widely recognized and 
straightforward method is the English auction. In an English auction, the experimenter opens the 
auction at a relatively high price and begins running down in fixed increments. Depending upon the 
setup of the auction, participants either offer descending bids or signal their willingness to stay in the 
auction as prices are decreased over time. The auction ends when only one participant is willing to 
accept the current price. This participant wins the contract, and s/he is paid.   
The other three types of auctions, namely: second price, BDM and random n-th price auctions 
basically modify the one-shot, sealed offer auction wherein each participant independently fills out 
and submits an offer-submission card that specifies the per-hectare price proposed to join the 
program.  In a second price auction, the individual with the lowest bid wins the auction and is paid the 
second lowest bid amount for joining the program. The BDM mechanism induces individuals to 
truthfully reveal certainty equivalents for lotteries. In the BDM elicitation procedures, a random 
number or price is drawn from a pre-specified distribution.  Individuals with bids lesser than the 
randomly drawn price ‘win’ the auction and are given the contracts at the randomly drawn price.  The 
random n-th price auction introduced by Shogren et al. (2001) combines elements of two classic 
demand-revealing mechanisms – the second price and the BDM mechanism. The random-n-th-price 
auction works as follows: each bidder submits a bid, each bid is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  
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A random number uniformly-distributed between 2 and k (k bidders) is selected. Each of the (n-1) 
lowest bidders wins the contract at the n-th price.  
The three auctions above give participants incentives to tell the truth because each auction separates 
what they say from what they are paid. Sincere bidding is the weakly dominant strategy. In examining 
the effects of varying numbers of bidders, more aggressive bidding happens in first price auction, 
while this treatment has essentially no impact on bidding in second-price auction and results in lower 
bids in third-price auctions (Kagel, 1995). Shogren et al (2001)concluded that second-price auction 
does a reasonable job on aggregate but falls short at the individual level. Comparison of the random n-
th  price auction to the second-price auction showed that the second-price auction works better on-
margin, and the random n-th price auction works better off-margin.   
Lusk et al. (2004) investigated the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from 
experimental auctions. They conducted multiple bidding rounds for the second-price and the random 
n-th price auctions because market prices are endogenously determined and subjects could incorporate 
market feedback into their valuations. On the other hand, in the BDM mechanism, market prices are 
exogenously determined, and as such, subjects receive no meaningful feedback from additional 
rounds. They found that the choice of auction institution significantly (both statistically and 
economically) influenced bids.  Results indicated that the second price auction generated higher 
valuations than English, BDM, and random n-th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, 
and that the random n-th price auction yielded lower valuations than the English and BDM auctions.       
Table 5.1  Incentive compatible auction19 
 Auction Institution 
English Second Price BDM Random n-th Price 
Participant 
procedure 
Sequentially offer 
ascending bids 
Simultaneously 
submit sealed bids 
Simultaneously 
submit sealed bids 
Simultaneously 
submit sealed bids 
Winning bidder Participant who 
offers the last bid 
Participant with 
highest (or lowest) 
bid 
All participants with 
bid greater  (or 
lesser) than a 
randomly drawn 
price 
All participants with 
bid greater (or 
lesser) than a 
randomly (n-th) bid 
Number of winners 1 1 0 to all participants n-1 
Market feedback? Yes, with multiple 
rounds 
Yes, with multiple 
rounds 
Yes No 
Market price Last bid offered Second highest (or 
lowest) bid 
Randomly drawn 
price 
n-th highest (or 
lowest) bid  
  
5.2.2 Designing a PES Procurement Auction in Developing Countries: Some 
Considerations   
A sealed-bid auction maintains anonymity. In a developing country where village leaders and elders 
have significant roles and dominance in decision-making, a sealed-bid auction is considered more 
                                                   
19
 Modified from Lusk et al. (2004) 
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appropriate compared to an English or Dutch auction(Ferraro 2004). A second price auction is also 
relatively easily to explain and to be understood by participants, making the bidding process more 
transparent.  
In procurement auctions, the reserve price is the maximum acceptable bid20. The announcement of a 
reserve price can influence the bidding decision and hide the bidders’ true value. However, the 
bidders also can implicitly interpret the information revealed by winning bids as reserve prices in 
multiple round auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). 
Two pricing mechanisms in auctions are uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. When more than 
one product is available in an auction, the auction may have multiple winners with different winning 
bid values. With uniform pricing at a procurement auction, all winners are paid the price offered by 
the winner with the lowest winning bid. For discriminatory pricing, all the winners are paid their exact 
bid amounts.  
Alix-Garcia et al (2003) showed that uniform pricing may be more equitable while discriminatory 
pricing is more cost-effective. A complete list of possible implications for each pricing rule is listed in 
Table 5.2.  Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005) showed that under uniform pricing a bidder’s bid 
only determines the chance of winning but not the payment received. It was assumed that the bidders’ 
dominant strategy thus is to bid their true opportunity costs.  
Table 5.2.  Comparison between two pricing rules: uniform and discriminative 
Element Uniform Discriminative Description 
Bidding strategy  + - Under discriminatory pricing, ES seller’s bid 
determines both chance of winning and price to 
be received for selected activities 
Under uniform pricing, ES sellers’ bid only 
determines chance of winning, so it reveals 
WTA more accurately 
Transaction cost + 
 
- 
 
Uniform pricing requires relatively more simple 
administration when dealing with many ES 
sellers  
Fairness + - ES sellers in discriminative pricing earn no 
profits if they submit offers equal to their 
opportunity costs 
Political interest - + High opportunity cost farmers can be 
disappointed when uniform pricing is applied 
Efficiency of ES buyer - + ES buyers might achieve environmental 
objective at least cost (McKee and Berrens 
2001; Cason and Gangadharan 2004)  
For ES sellers, since conservation payment is a 
non-stochastic income, it would lower their 
income uncertainty (Riley and Samuelson 
1981) 
Effect of risk aversion + - Risk-averse participants inflate their bids under 
                                                   
20
 Shor, Mikhael, “Reserve Price” Dictionary of Game Theory Terms, Game Theory .net, 
<http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/ url_of_entry.html> Web accessed: June 06, 2008 
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Element Uniform Discriminative Description 
(not exist) (exist) discriminative pricing 
Effect of over-bidding + 
(not exist) 
- 
(exist) 
Over bidding will increase expenditure under 
discriminative bidding 
5.3. Methods  
As part of a PES project on the island of Sumatra led by the RUPES Phase II (Rewards for, Use of 
and Pro-poor Investment of Environmental Service scheme) of the World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF), this pilot auction was implemented to elicit private information on landholders‘ payments in 
return for soil conservation investments on private coffee farms. The farmers are environmental 
service suppliers as they play a role in maintaining the environmental benefits from the watershed. 
Their decisions on land use practices influence the provision of environmental services (ES) from this 
landscape, including water quality, biodiversity and scenic beauty. Information on the supply curves 
can be valuable for designing conservation-payment programmes; estimating these costs accurately 
can inform conservation planners of the financial, ecological and socioeconomic implications of 
future scaled-up PES programmes. 
The Sumberjaya watershed is dominated by coffee crops in erosion-prone uplands. Erosion transports 
sediment loads to sensitive aquatic ecosystems and has serious negative effects on the resident flora 
and fauna. Moreover, a gradual reduction in soil organic carbon due to erosion can, depending on its 
deposition site, lead to a reduction in ecosystem carbon storage (van Noordwijk, Suyamto et al. 2008). 
Finally, soil erosion in Sumberjaya contributes to the rapid siltation of a downstream hydropower 
reservoir (the PLTA Way Besai reservoir, located approximately 30km downstream of the reservoir) 
that provides local irrigation services and electricity for three provinces in Sumatra (Sihite 2001; 
Ananda and Herath 2003). Erosion control is an impure public good that generates both private 
benefits and positive externalities. As a result, farmers tend to under-invest in soil conservation. The 
watershed rehabilitation fund in Indonesia is mostly obtained from the corporations’conservation 
funds. The legal basis of this scheme is the Letter of Ministry of Parastatal Company Affairs over 
Corporate Social Responsibility Partnership Programs. It was cited that 1% of net-benefit of state-
owned companies should be allocated for developing environmental programmes with the 
communities. This scheme could be seen as potential mechanisms for rewarding transfers through a 
governmental public investment scheme. 
Several preparatory steps were taken before the procurement auction was conducted (Figure 5.1). 
First, the sample population and potential auction participants were identified at the sub-watershed 
level. Second, the conservation contract that would be offered in the auction was designed. In 
designing the contract and local institution to implement it, some basic information was needed, such 
as: What problems would be solved by the conservation project? Do the local farmers have any 
knowledge in solving the watershed problems? What are these appropriate conservation techniques? 
What are the farmers’ preferences for terms of payment? When does the contract begin? Third, some 
elements of the auctions were tested and selected through two types of experiments: laboratory 
auction experiment with students and field framed experiments with farmers21 (Harrison and List 
                                                   
21
 This taxonomy of field experiments proposed by Harrison and List (2004) differentiated between field experiments from 
conventional lab experiments:  
A conventional lab experiment is “one that employs a standard subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and an imposed 
set of rules”; 
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2004). The final step was to conduct a natural field experiment and monitor the contract 
accomplishment of farmers who obtained a contract for one year. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Leimona et al. (2009) 
Figure 5.1  Flow of research in designing a market-based PES 
Several on farm techniques effectively reduce soil erosion from smallholder coffee farms in the 
watershed (Agus, Gintings, and Van Noordwijk 2002). Four focus group discussions involving 
76 farmers from three villages led to the selection of three scientifically appropriate techniques: soil 
infiltration pits, vegetation strips and ridging between coffee trees. Farmers preferred these techniques 
for their suitability, familiarity and simplicity (Leimona et al. 2009). All three are scalable and 
verifiable, and thus appropriate for contracts that make payments conditional upon performance. 
Moreover, the contracted techniques reduce erosion without decreasing coffee production and incur 
few fixed costs, requiring primarily labour investments using tools already owned by the farmers. 
Components of landholders’ WTA were anticipated to include both observable characteristics, such as 
                                                                                                                                                              
A framed field experiment is an experiment that “employs a nonstandard subject pool with field context in either the 
commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use”; 
A natural field experiment is “the same as a framed field experiment but where the environment is one where the subjects 
naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment”  
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plot slope, and unobservable characteristics, such as the opportunity cost of labour and individual 
discount rates. Bids in an incentive compatible auction capture all of these factors, and thus reveal the 
distribution of WTA within the population. 
We observed the socioeconomic factors influencing the auction participants in submitting their final 
bids by applying a regression analysis with Reverse Helmert coding (or difference coding) as the 
additional coding systems for ordinal and categorical variables using the STATA 9.1 software. This 
system compares each level of non-numeric variables to the mean of the subsequent level(s). Each 
variable is compared to the mean of previous level(s)22.  
We analyzed the validity of applying this auction design in a rural setting in Indonesia by testing some 
factors. These factors were (1) technical factors, such as: farmers’ understanding of auction rules, 
easiness of the rules, appropriateness of the bid offered during the auction, and fairness of the auction 
process; (2) social relationship factors, such as: impact on relationships between contracted and non-
contracted farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information 
exchange between farmers; (3) environmental perception factors, such as awareness of soil and water 
conservation and rate of contract  accomplishment.    
For analyzing the social relationship factors (impact on relationships between contracted and non-
contracted farmers, general interpersonal relationships between communities, and information 
exchange between farmers) and environmental perception factors (awareness of soil and water 
conservation and the rate of contract accomplishment), we applied Fisher’s exact tests between two 
independent categorical variables. Fisher’s exact test predicted the relationship between non-
contracted and contracted farmers on each social and environmental variable. The application of 
Fisher’s exact test assumes that each cell has an expected frequency of five or less.   
As suggested by Ferraro (2004), in addition to survey data collected on the observable characteristics 
of auction participants, the risk preferences and time preferences of participants were also considered. 
To date several approaches have been used to assess the importance and nature of risk aversion. 
Simple lottery choice tasks involving cash prizes were used to estimate the degree of risk aversion as 
well as specific functional forms. This experiment was based on six lottery choices from real 
situations (Holt  and Laury 2002).   
Individual discount rate can represent time preferences. Harrison et al (2002) indicated that constant 
discount rates for specific household types were assumed, but not the same rates across all 
households. Respondents will be asked a simple basic question in order to elicit an individual discount 
rate: for example, applying to a time horizon of six months, do you prefer Rp. 50,000 in one month or 
Rp. 50,000+x in seven months? This delayed option involves greater transaction costs and the 
revealed discount rate would include these subjective transaction costs. By having both options entail 
future income, individuals hold any transaction costs or concerns about experimenter default constant.   
5.4. Result 
This section discussed the results from the natural field experiments in two sub-watersheds involving 
82 farmers. We presented the selection of auction design and described their implementations. The 
                                                   
22
 Introduction to SAS. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group.  
from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/Stata/webbooks/reg/chapter5/statareg5.htm#HELMERT (accessed July 10, 2009). 
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procurement auctions result in participants’ bid capturing the supply curve for conservation contract. 
We compared the conservation costs captured from the auction and the cost estimates based on labour 
investment to gain some insights for efficiency gains from the auction. Finally, we analysed the rate 
of contract accomplishment and results from interviews with participants. The interviews revealed 
level of understanding of the auction, social relationship, and environmental perception after the 
farmers participated in the auction.    
5.4.1 Auction design and implementation 
The socio-economic characteristics of the farmers (i.e. the auction participants) are: low education 
level (below seven years of education), low asset endowment, small plot size (mostly less than 
0.5 hectares), where familiarity with market based competitiveness is not particularly common. 
Several of the auction design elements were selected to respond to these characteristics and general 
rural situations in developing countries, where most of the participants had strong social binding 
among their community members, and where village leaders and elders have significant roles and 
dominance in decision making (Ferraro 2004). Auction elements were chosen for their simplicity, 
equitable payments and transparency to ensure each participant had the freedom to reveal their own 
bids without any external interference. A sealed bid auction was conducted to maintain anonymity. 
The second price auction was selected since it was relatively easy to explain and be understood by the 
participants, hence making the bidding process more transparent.  
An effort-based payment mechanism was chosen because the time frame of this project was too short 
for accurate output based (i.e. level of sedimentation reduced) performance payments. Inaccurate 
measurement of environmental service outcome would bias the performance achieved by the farmers 
and at the end, could cause any disappointment both from providers and buyers. Table 5.3 summarises 
the design characteristics of the auction.
 
 
To provide an incentive for truthful cost revelation, a uniform price rule was used, where the final 
contract price equals the lowest rejected offer price. Under this uniform price rule, bidders who bid 
above their true values cannot benefit from overbidding. This is because the price is set by the lowest 
rejected bid, and bidders risk losing the contract at a price they would have been willing to accept. 
Bidders who bid below their true value increase the likelihood of winning a contract at a price below 
their minimum acceptable price. Thus, all bidders’ best (weakly dominant) strategy is to bid their true 
WTA. They can do no better, and sometimes worse, by misrepresenting their WTA. In contrast, 
discriminative price procurement auctions, where winning bidders receive a contract price equal to 
their own bid (Stoneham et al. 2003), or under a uniform price rule where the price is set by the last 
accepted offer, bidders have strategic incentives to inflate their bids to levels above their true WTA. 
Furthermore, Alix-Garcia et al (2003) show that uniform pricing may be more equitable, while 
discriminatory pricing is more cost-effective.  
In game theory, a reserve price is the maximum acceptable bid23. For this auction, a reserve price was 
preset, but was not announced since the announcement of reserve prices can influence the bidding 
strategy (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). However, the bidders can also implicitly interpret 
information in their winning bids as reserve prices in multiple round auctions. To avoid bidder 
learning between preparatory bidding rounds, only the winning ID numbers were announced, and the 
total conservation budget was not revealed.  
                                                   
23 Shor, Michael. “Reverse Price” Dictionary of Game Theory. Game Theory.net 
http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/CitationInformation.html Web accessed: July 13, 2011 
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Table 5.3  Characteristics of reverse auction design 
Characteristic Implementation 
Auction type One-sided, sealed bid procurement auction  
Bidding units Willingness to accept (WTA) 
Budget limit Predetermined, concealed 
Number of rounds 7 provisional, 1 binding 
Announcement of provisional winners By ID number  
Bid timing Simultaneous 
Pricing rule Uniform, lowest rejected price 
Tie-breaking rule Random in determining tied winners  
Bidder number Known, fixed 
Activities contracted Determined in advance  
Source: Jack, Leimona and Ferraro (2008), Leimona et al (2009) 
 
The conservation auction was carried out on consecutive days in two nearby villages in a single sub 
watershed. The villages were selected based on hydrological studies showing their contribution to 
sediment loads. A random sample of participants from the sub district population would have 
provided results more in keeping with the purposes of this study, but the interests and preferences of 
ICRAF to integrate its biophysical and socioeconomic research precluded this approach. 
The primary occupation in the two villages is coffee farming, most of which takes place on small, 
individually owned plots that are not subject to any land use regulations. The auction was limited to 
owners of private coffee plots, and excluded plots on state forest lands which are subject to other 
regulations. One village comprised 55 households, 53 of which owned private agricultural land. Of 
these, five rented or sharecropped their land, leaving 48 eligible households, all of which participated 
in the auction. In the other village, 55 of the 87 households owned private agricultural land. Of these, 
20 rented or sharecropped their land. Thus 35 households were eligible, and 34 participated in the 
auction. To ensure that participants understood the contract requirements, all participating farmers 
attended field training. The theory and practice of erosion control management techniques were 
presented, and site visits were made to adjacent villages where erosion control management was 
already in place. 
Farmers, each designated with an identification number, submitted sealed bids representing their per 
hectare price for accepting a conservation contract. They had to reveal an average willingness-to-
accept per hectare, rather than a different price for each hectare of their property because we believed 
farmers would have found varying prices per hectare confusing and because uniform-price auctions in 
which bidders bid multiple units are not necessarily incentive-compatible (Ausubel, Cramton, and 
University of Maryland at College Park. Dept. of 1996). Farmers were informed that payments would 
be made in three instalments, with the second two conditional upon verification of compliance. The 
multi-instalment payment plan provided incentives for compliance for the duration of the contract, 
which mitigated valuation problems associated with moral hazard (i.e. lowering bids because of the 
expectation of lax enforcement). In addition, the farmers expressed a preference for periodic payments 
during focus group discussions, likely due to a lack of access to credit markets. As the primary 
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purpose of the auction was to accurately estimate supply curves (rather than to maximise the 
conservation benefits per dollar spent), plots were not ranked by their erosion mitigation potential. 
Farmers were aware that enrolment decisions were based solely on their bid price per hectare. 
Contracts were treated as discrete (i.e. either all or none of plot was contracted), though contracting 
could also have treated hectares as the discrete unit. 
In each of the two villages, the auction lasted 2-3 hours, during which the participants heard the 
contract described, received instructions about the auction, and submitted their bids. Following 
Cummings et al.(2004), the auction was designed with several provisional rounds preceding the final 
allocation round. After each provisional round, the bidder identification numbers of provisional 
winners were announced. No price information was provided between rounds and participants were 
not allowed to converse. Bids were revised and re-submitted for each round, a process designed to 
increase familiarity with the mechanism (Cummings, Holt, and Laury 2004). Participants were 
informed of the number of provisional rounds in advance to ensure that final round bids were based 
solely on WTA and not subjective expectations about the number of rounds. Jack (2009) noted that 
the multiple familiarisation rounds in Sumberjaya auction resulted in reduced bid inflation, thus 
allowing a larger land area to be enrolled – or in other words, increases the efficiency of the auction.  
The contractual arrangements between the two sites were different. At Site 1, two farmer groups (one 
from each talang) signed the contracts. The members arranged working in rotation, shifting from one 
plot to another until all the contracted activities were finalised. At Site 2, farmers signed individual 
contracts with ICRAF. In other words, there were two group contracts at Site 1, and 15 individual 
contracts at Site 2. 
5.4.2 Auction outcomes and environmental impacts 
Of the 82 auction participants bidding on 70 ha, 34 participants received contracts for soil 
conservation activities on a total of 25 ha at an average price of USD 171.70 (1 USD = 9000 IDR) 
(Table 5.4). The total budget of around USD 4 450 was combined with the uniform pricing rule to 
determine the contract price of USD 177.78/ha in the first village and USD 166.67/ha in the second 
village. 
Table 5.4  Summary statistics of the reverse auction (USD per hectare) 
Number of participants 82 
Number of contracts awarded 34 
Number of hectares bid 70 
Number of hectares contracted 25 
Contract price per hectare 171.70 
Mean bid per hectare 263.14 
Median bid per hectare 181.67 
Minimum bid per hectare 66.67 
Maximum bid per hectare 2 777.78 
Standard deviation 344.91 
Source: Jack, Leimona and Ferraro (2008) 
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Just over one additional hectare of conservation investment would have been purchased if participants 
were paid their own bid (i.e. discriminative-price auction). However, as explained above, bid inflation 
under a discriminative-price rule would reduce these gains. In the following discussion, we did not 
consider a single high outlier bid. 
Figure 5.2 presents the aggregate supply curve from the two villages, i.e. describing the number of 
hectares enrolled in the program for any given price. It follows an exponential distribution with 
increasing marginal costs. Note that this supply curve represents short-run costs as estimated by the 
participants, which may change as participants learn more about the contract or the contractor. 
Measuring a supply curve in terms of erosion abated would be preferred over the proxy measure of 
hectares under soil erosion mitigation activities. Most conservation payment initiatives, including this 
study, measure performance by land use activities rather than actual services supplied, because of 
monitoring difficulties and the risk burden for landholders (Wunder 2007). 
 
Source: Jack, Leimona and Ferraro (2008) 
Figure 5.2  Supply curve resulting from reverse auction 
5.4.3 Efficiency Gains from the Auction 
To assess the efficiency of the auction, alternative methods were used to estimate the costs of the 
contracts prior to the auction. Labour costs were expected to comprise the primary investments 
needed for the contract. Labour cost information was thus elicited using two approaches. First, during 
focus groups, farmers were asked to estimate the labour requirements of the contract. Estimates were 
based on wages, number of hired workers and number of work days. The average costs approximated 
by the farmers were USD 300 per hectare, including forgone wages from the farmer’s own labour 
investment. Second, cost information was collected as part of a household survey, asking about time 
investments for past implementation of soil conservation activities. The estimates based on 
retrospective calculations were slightly lower, around USD 225.  
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The cost estimates based on labour investments are 30 to 75% higher than the auction price of 
USD 171.70 per hectare, and 24 to 65% higher than the median bid. Based on estimated labour costs, 
14.8 to 19.8 hectares of contracts could have been enrolled under the available budget, as opposed to 
the 25 hectares actually purchased under the auction (26% to 69% more). On the other hand, the mean 
bid price was between the two estimates based on labour costs, suggesting that these methods may 
have been fairly accurate in estimating mean values. This outcome does not indicate that the labour 
cost estimates were inaccurate, simply that they provided incomplete measures of farmers’ WTA. 
5.4.4 Contract monitoring 
The research team conducted two qualitative (third and ninth month of contract signing) and 
quantitative (sixth and twelfth month of the contract signing) monitoring activities in the field. The 
qualitative monitoring obtained information on the contract implementation using open-ended 
questions. The enumerators checked the general quality of the conservation structure and asked 
farmers whether or not they had any difficulties in implementing their contacts. During quantitative 
monitoring, enumerators measured the size of sediment pits and observed the quality of the ridging 
and grass strips. They also surveyed social interactions among farmers and other conservation 
structures that were not required by the contract, such as water drainage and terracing. This 
monitoring involved two external evaluators from the District Forestry Service who independently 
gave scores to the farmers’ accomplishments. The head of the village accompanied the team as a 
witness to fair evaluation. Farmers who were not able to accomplish at least 50% of the contracted 
activities had to give up and could not continue their contracts. At the final monitoring, the 
implementing agency paid the remaining fund to farmers who had accomplished at least 80% of the 
contracted activities. 
The mid-term monitoring revealed that most farmers successfully completed their obligations. Figure 
5.3 shows the average compliance for Site 1 and 2 at the six month quantitative assessment and at the 
end of the contract. Only one contract was terminated early; a farmer from Site 2 only achieved 4% of 
the required activities after six months. The exit interview revealed that the main reason for such 
performance was the higher opportunity cost for getting other side jobs than the contract value.i 
After one-year of contract implementation, again most of the farmers showed good progress in 
implementing their contracts. Farmers constructed ridgings and sediment pits over and above the 
demands of the contract, but they lagged behind in planting the vegetative strips. Farmers also 
practiced other conservation techniques such as the building of terracing and drainage that could 
optimally support the contracted conservation efforts. All farmers constructed terracing, which could 
be done simultaneously with ridging and half built drainage systems.  
The successful completion of planting vegetative strips was found to be influenced by other farm 
priorities. For example, in Talang Kuningan, Site 1, planting was successful, partly because they used 
it as extra fodder for their livestock (goats). However, in Talang Harapan, Site 1, the absence of 
livestock removed this extra incentive and less effort was put into planting vegetative strips. This 
highlights how conservation measures are especially successful when they are mutually advantageous 
for the landholders.  
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Source: Leimona et al (2009) 
Figure 5.3  Average village compliance within each site measured during the middle and at the end of the 
contract term 
In summary, 19 out of 34 farmers successfully accomplished the contract requirements (i.e. 55% 
across the two sites). Fourteen farmers did not pass the final evaluation and one farmer failed during 
the mid-term evaluation. Most of them failed in planting the grass strips although many of them 
constructed both ridging and sediment pits, even exceeding the contractual agreement. We decided 
that for the final decision, the percentage of accomplishment would not be calculated cumulatively. 
We did not add up all the percentages but evaluated these individually. Thus, farmers who failed one 
of the contracted components were not eligible for the final payment. Although the rate of 
accomplishment could be categorised as low, we could not conclude that the overall conservation 
effort was not successful. Table 5.5 shows that the rate of accomplishment was greater than 80% for 
all contracted techniques: ridging (128%), sediment pits (114%), and grass strip (88%).  
Table 5.5  Rate of contract accomplishment  
 Total number of 
farmers 
Number of failed 
farmers 
Rate of 
success (%) 
Site 1 19 10 47 
Talang Kuningan 9 0 100 
Talang Harapan 10 10 0 
Site 2 15 6 67 
Wanasari I 10 4 70 
Talang Anyar 5 2 60 
Source: Leimona et al (2009) 
Each talang (sub-villages) across the two sites had different rates of success in accomplishing their 
contracts. At Site 1, all farmers (100%) in Talang Kuningan fulfilled their contractual agreement, 
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while in Talang Harapan, no farmer received the final payment. The rate of success at Site 2 was 
higher (67%) and well distributed at each talang compared to Site 1, with a 47% rate of success. The 
different contractual arrangements and institutions are likely to have influenced the rate of success of 
each talang.  
An exit interview was conducted to examine the underlying motivations for contract performance. 
Most of the Talang Harapan farmers, where group contracts were issued, cited the lack of leadership 
and poor coordination as the major reasons why their group was not motivated in performing well. 
The field assistant observed that the group did not choose the leader voluntarily, and the group leader 
was not an active community member. Farmers also cited time constraints as a factor, due to other 
activities, such as harvesting coffee, working in the rice field and other gardens, engaging as daily 
labourers, and renting motor bikes. Unsuitable weather was another factor. In reality, many other 
farmers could easily find grass and accomplish fully the conservation activities with the current 
weather. However, most of them felt that they could not accomplish the contract at the sixth month as 
this coincided with the coffee harvesting period. Some of the farmers also assumed that receiving a 
low score during the mid-term evaluation could influence the final result, hence lowering their 
motivation to complete the contract.  
The farmers suggested some improvements to increase the conservation program’s rate of success. At 
least six farmers proposed having individual contracts rather than group contracts because weak 
coordination among members could make the whole group fail. Some contract components should be 
more flexible, they said. Most of them agreed that there should be sanction and that the current 
sanction was suitable. None of the farmers had problems with the design of the auction and the 
contractual agreement. Subsequent analysis showed that there was no significant difference in 
conservation awareness level, understanding on the auction design (rules, complexity), information 
quality and level of satisfaction between farmers who complied fully with the contract and those who 
did not.  
5.4.5 Design Factors: Farmers’ Understanding of Auction Design and the Auction 
Aftermath  
A post-auction interview revealed that most farmers understood the rules when implementing the 
conservation auction (Table 5.6). Three farmers out of 48 (4 percent) did not understand the rules and 
all of them lost. About 32 percent of the farmers, both winning and losing, understood the rules very 
well. Most farmers were satisfied with the completeness of information provided by the facilitators 
when implementing the auction. The participants found it relatively easy to understand the rules for 
implementing the auction and for deciding the winners. The wining farmers interpreted the rules more 
easily compared to the losing ones. Most farmers thought that the auction process and the 
determination of the winner had been conducted fairly (88 percent). The farmers who felt that the 
auction was unfair mostly lost. Most farmers (78 percent) were fully aware that competition was 
taking place the auction participants in order to win the contract and that the budget of auctioneer was 
limited.  
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Table 5.6  Descriptive analysis of post-auction technical factors 
Variable Frequency 
Non-contracted 
(N=48) 
Frequency 
Contracted (N=34) 
Total 
Understanding of the auction rules     
Not understand at all 3 (0.06) 0 (0.00) 3 
Moderately understand 16 (0.33) 8 (0.24) 24 
Quite understand 11 (0.23) 12 (0.35) 23 
Understand 3 (0.06) 3 (0.09) 6 
Understand very well 15 (0.31) 11 (0.32) 26 
Complexity of the auction rules    
Very difficult 2 (0.04) 1 (0.03) 3 
Quite difficult 17 (0.35) 14 (0.41) 31 
Quite easy 7 (0.15) 10 (0.29) 17 
Easy  18 (0.38) 7 (0.21) 25 
Very easy 4 (0.08) 2 (0.06) 6 
Fairness of the auction implementation     
Not fair 7 (0.15) 3 (0.09) 10 
Fair 41 (0.85) 31 (0.91) 72 
Awareness of competition among participants    
Not aware 10 (0.21) 9 (0.26) 19 
Aware 38 (0.79) 25 (0.74) 64 
Contract value received    
Too low 19 (0.40) 5 (0.15) 24 
Not too low 17 (0.35) 17 (0.50) 34 
Moderate 12 (0.25) 12 (0.35) 24 
High  - - - 
Too high - - - 
Willingness to change the offer     
Yes 12 (0.25) 12 (0.35) 24 
No 36 (0.75) 22 (0.65) 58 
Note: proportion in parenthesis  
As predicted, about 40 percent of the losing farmers considered the contract value per hectare to be 
too low. About 70 percent of all participants found that the value was either not too low or moderate. 
The median appropriate total amount of contract value per hectare according to interviewed farmers 
was USD 246 (Rp. 2,000,000) or about 12.5 percent higher than the cut-off price. Most of them would 
be likely to change their previous bid if they had another chance to offer a new bid. From the follow-
up interview, however, we found that 32 percent of farmers wanted to change their previous bids, 28 
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percent of farmers would decrease their offer and the remaining 40 percent of farmers would increase 
their offers. A statistical test revealed that the average final bid as the result of the auction differed to 
the mean of the appropriate amount of contract value in the participants’ opinion after the auction 
(Table 5.7). The overall value proposed after the auction was higher. 
The bidders’ (farmers’) learning process is influenced by the number of wins from previous rounds as 
well as farmers’ perceptions of auction design factors. Data from the multiple bids submitted by each 
individual allows insights into farmers’ understanding of the auction and learning across the multiple 
bidding rounds. Jack (2009) provides an analysis of the learning observed in the auction using the 
adjustments of bids between rounds as an indicator of learning and finds that individuals are 
responsive to previous round outcomes and rejects a simulated null hypothesis of random bidding. 
The data suggests that individuals do use the trial rounds to learn how to bid, but conclusions about 
whether they learn about the auction structure itself or about the value of the contract remain unclear. 
Table 5.7  Contract value per hectare offered by farmers after auction 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum P-value 
Appropriate total amount 
of contract value per 
hectare  
246 120 161 753 0.0000***          
N: 80 individuals 
Note: *p<.15, **p<.10, ***p<.05 
We used the framework of bid adjustments during the trial as a proxy way of learning (Jack 2009) to 
further investigate farmer responses about understanding the auction process (Table 5.8). The 
independent variable was bid adjustment for each respondent at each round and the dependent 
variables were parameters representing farmers’ perceptions of design factors such as understanding 
of auction rules, easiness of the rules, fairness of the auction process and awareness of competition 
between participants. We found that farmers who stated that they “understand” the auction rules had 
reliable different mean of bid adjustments compared to the average mean of bid adjustment of farmers 
who stated “not understand at all”, “moderately understand”, and “quite understand”. Farmers who 
thought that the auction rules were quite easy adjusted their bids upward compared to those who 
stated that the auction rules were very difficult or difficult (level 1 and level 2). We analyzed the mean 
bid adjustments of famers who were aware of competition and found a significant difference 
compared to the means of farmers who were not aware of competition. The latter had a lower mean of 
bid adjustment. 
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Table 5.8  Farmers’ understanding of auction design 
Variables  Coefficient  Standard error  P-value  
Understanding of the auction rules     
Not understand at all - -- - 
Moderately understand -0.1077 0.06 0.09** 
Quite understand -0.0262 0.05 0.57 
Understand -0.1035 0.05 0.03*** 
Very understand -0.0121 0.05 0.80 
Easiness of the rules    
Very difficult - - - 
Difficult -0.0019 0.07 0.98 
Quite easy -0.0856 0.04 0.04*** 
Easy  0.0112 0.05 0.82 
Very easy 0.0191 0.05 0.70 
Fairness of the auction implementation     
Not fair - - - 
Fair 0.0054 0.04 0.90 
Awareness of competition between 
participants 
   
Not aware - - - 
Aware -0.0604 0.04 0.14* 
    
Number of observation = 492    
Number of groups = 82    
Wald chi-square(12) = 49.94    
Prob > chi-square = 0.00    
Note: *p<.15, **p<.10, ***p<.05 
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5.4.6 Social relationship factors: impact on communities  
As far as social conditions and interaction among community members was concerned, the auction 
participants experienced slightly significant changes (Table 5.9). There was a statistically significant 
5-percent difference between the non-contracted and contracted farmers when evaluating the 
relationship between winners and losers. Non-contracted and contracted farmers had an almost similar 
perspective on interpersonal relationships among the community in the talang after the auction. The 
impact on information exchange between farmers was statistically significant at 10 percent. The 
contracted farmers gave better evaluation of the social impacts of the auction and of conservation 
contract activities compared to the non-contracted farmers.   
Table 5.9  Perspective of non-contracted and contracted farmers on social impacts 
Variable Frequency 
Non-contracted 
(N=48) 
Frequency 
Contracted (N=34) 
Fisher’s exact test 
P-value 
Impact on relationships between winners 
and losers 
  0.143* 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 5 (0.10) 6 (0.18) 
Quite good 17 (0.35) 9 (0.26) 
Good  21 (0.44) 19 (0.56 
Very good 5 (0.10) 0 (0.00) 
Impact on general interpersonal 
relationships among the community  
  0.175 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 3 (0.06) 2 (0.06) 
Quite good 18 (0.38) 13 (0.38) 
Good  21 (0.44) 19 (0.56) 
Very good 6 (0.13) 0 (0.00) 
Impact on information exchange between 
farmers 
  0.055** 
Very bad 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 7  (0.15) 0 (0.00) 
Quite good 19 (0.40) 17 (0.50) 
Good  13 (0.27) 14 (0.41) 
Very good 8 (0.17) 3 (0.09) 
 Note: proportion in parenthesis  
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5.4.7 Environmental perception factors: awareness of conservation and rate of 
accomplishment  
There were no significant differences between contracted and non-contracted farmers of their 
awareness and willingness to implement soil and water conservation on their land (Table 5.10). Some 
farmers expressed the view (via interviews) that enthusiasm amongst farmers for conserving the 
environment and for land conservation practices improved after the training, meeting and auction 
process.  
Table 5.10  Perspective on environmental impacts from non-contracted and contracted farmers 
Variable Frequency 
Non-contracted 
(N=48) 
Frequency 
Contracted (N=34) 
Fisher’s exact test 
P-value 
Awareness of soil and water conservation    0.188 
Very bad 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Bad 2 (0.04) 1 (0.03) 
Quite good 30 (0.63) 16 (0.47) 
Good  7 (0.15) 12 (0.35) 
Very good 9 (0.19) 5 (0.15) 
Willingness to implement soil and water 
conservation  
   0.340 (0.509) 
No 2 (0.04) 0 (0.00) 
Yes 46 (0.96) 34 (1.00) 
Note: results from 2-sided Fisher’s exact test are in parenthesis. The others are calculated from 1-sided Fisher’s exact test.  
For the frequency column, proportion is in parenthesis  
5.5. Discussion and Conclusions  
Based on the outcomes from the laboratory and field experiments as well as theoretical 
considerations, the design of this pilot auction was a sealed bid auction with budget constraints, 
random tie rule, uniform pricing rule, minimised collusion, announced ID numbers of provision 
winners and announced number of rounds. The auction followed a fairly standard format, with a 
single buyer and multiple sellers submitting sealed bids representing their WTA the soil conservation 
contract for their plot. Bids were assessed according to a per hectare price and the cut-off price was 
determined by a pre-set budget constraint. 
The auction for the PES programme in Indonesia was designed using a uniform price rule for fairness 
reasons. The literature on auction design finds that uniform pricing is more likely to reveal farmers’ 
true opportunity cost because bidders only determine the chance of winning. However, uniform 
pricing is relatively less cost-effective compared to the discriminative price rule.  
The auction was a multiple round consisting of eight rounds with the last binding round. The benefit 
of multiple rounds was that farmers learned from the rounds of the auction. However, the announced 
last round may introduce forms of strategic behaviour. Concealing the number of rounds will give 
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participants higher uncertainty because they have their own subjective probability distribution about 
the chance of the last round. By announcing the last round, the benefits from farmers’ learning on the 
previous round and the advantages of a one-shot auction for the last round were combined.  
The rate of accomplishment at the final monitoring was moderate. The reasons for this were various, 
ranging from lack of leadership and coordination among farmer group members, difficulty in finding 
grass seedlings to accomplish the contract, and coincidence with coffee harvesting time. In this 
specific case, private contract tends to be more successful compared to collective contract when 
leadership is lacking or “champion” among the community members does not exist. Institutional 
aspects and contract flexibility might influence the accomplishment of conservation efforts. Analysis 
showed that there were no significant differences in level of understanding, complexity, and 
competitiveness and conservation awareness between compliant and non-compliant farmers.  
A limitation of this study is that all units of the pilot site were treated as homogeneous, with respect to 
their contribution to erosion and downstream sedimentation. These sites’ contribution to 
environmental services is also heterogeneous, related to hydrological and geophysical factors that are 
unlikely to be correlated with cost. The emphasis of this pilot auction was to assess the feasibility of 
the auction approach in a developing country context and to obtain an understanding of farmers WTA 
and the drivers thereof. A scoring rule giving higher values to plots that contribute more to 
downstream problems is preferable. For instance, plots located on steeper slopes and closer to rivers 
and streams could be assigned higher values so as to enhance the cost effectiveness of a larger scale 
auction. The simplifications in this pilot auction were deemed appropriate for the research and 
valuation intentions of the study. For a larger scale allocation auction, modifications such as using 
supply curve information resulting from this procurement auction would be more appropriate. Such 
valuation information provides a reasonable platform for designing a scaled up fixed payment 
scheme, including differential rates and eligibility rules necessary for targeting participants.  
The design of an experimental auction should fit the purpose of overall objectives of a conservation 
program. In this case, the challenge was to design and administer a fair auction for farmers with low 
formal education, prone to social conflicts, and influenced by power structures within their 
community.  
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6. The livelihood impacts of incentive payments for 
watershed management in West Java, Indonesia 
The case study presented in this chapter is located in Cidanau Indonesia, a watershed for supplying domestic 
and industrial water needs of Banten Province, Java Island, Indonesia. This paper describes the process of 
initiating the PES scheme and its design, and reviews the impacts of the five year scheme on local livelihoods. 
We assessed these impacts through a series of focus group discussions with the participants and non-participants 
and interviews with implementing agencies. The Cidanau PES scheme has impacted the livelihood of PES 
participants and non-participants. Benefits were mostly non-financial: expanded social networks with external 
stakeholders; knowledge and capacity of the community; and small-scale public infrastructure investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as Leimona, B., Pasha, R., Rahadian, N., 2010. The livelihood impacts of incentive payments for 
watershed management in West Java, Indonesia. In: Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H. (Eds.), Livelihoods in the REDD?: 
Payments for Environmental Services, Forest Conservation and Climate Change. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
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6.1. Introduction  
Payment for environmental services (PES) is now quite a well-recognized approach in Asia. Interest 
and investment from international donors has enabled the testing of different PES mechanisms over 
the last decade, particularly focusing on watershed protection and carbon sequestration. With the 
exception of China and Vietnam, where the schemes are state-run, schemes in Asia are generally 
small scale community-level projects. 
The case study presented in this chapter is located in Cidanau, Indonesia. The Cidanau watershed is 
one of the most important watersheds for supplying domestic and industrial water needs of Banten 
Province, Java Island, Indonesia. The watershed covers 22,260 ha located between two regencies: 
Serang and Padeglang and their six sub-districts. The Cidanau watershed also has a special role in 
biodiversity protection. In the base of the bowl-shaped Cidanau watershed lays the Rawa Danau 
Reserve – a 4,200 hectare nature reserve which contains the only remaining lowland swamp forest in 
Java with 131 endemic species. The Reserve is important in the hydrological process too, as the 
reservoir for Cidanau River, with its tributaries flowing into the Sunda strait.  
The Cidanau project was initiated by a multi-stakeholder watershed forum – Forum Komunikasi DAS 
Cidanau (FKDC)24 and facilitated by the Rekonvasi Bhumi and the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, Education & Information (LP3ES) – both Indonesian non government organizations 
(NGOs). In the beginning, the aim of the PES scheme was to slow down the environmental 
degradation of the Rawa Danau Reserve and the watershed around it. The PES scheme in Cidanau 
officially started in 2004 when a state-owned water company – the Krakatau Tirta Industri and the 
FKDC, representing the upstream farmers, signed a contract to conserve the watershed.   
This paper describes the process of initiating the PES scheme and its design, and reviews the impacts 
of the five year scheme on local livelihoods. We assessed these impacts through a series of focus 
group discussions with the participants and non-participants and interviews with implementing 
agencies.  
6.2. Methods  
We collected qualitative data from three villages in the Cidanau Watershed (Citaman, Cikumbuen and 
Kadu Agung). In each village, we held two focus group discussions (FGD) for participants and two 
FGDs for non-participants. All the PES participants joined the discussion and for the non-participants, 
we contacted village leaders who organized available household representatives to join the FGD.  The 
non-participants were 30 households in each village. In total, the FGD participants involved to 113 
participants and 90 non-participants (Table 6.1). 
                                                   
24
 The sixty-four members of this forum are upstream and downstream stakeholders. The upstream stakeholders include 
farmer groups, government of Serang district, the Serang legislative body, provincial agriculture services (provincial and 
district forestry and environment), provincial and district planning agencies (BAPPEDA), provincial human capacity and 
development agency, provincial human settlement and regional infrastructure services and a nongovernment organization 
(NGO). Downstream stakeholders include representatives of the PT Krakatau Tirta Industry (KTI) (a private water 
company), government and legislative body of Cilegon district, agriculture services and urban water users. This body was 
later to become the primary coordination mechanism for PES. 
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Table 6.1  The sample of FGD participants 
Village Participating 
household 
Percentage of 
total 
participating 
household 
Non-participant 
household 
Percentage of 
total non-
participating 
household 
Total household 
in each village 
Cikumbuen 32 100% 30 18% 203 
Citaman 43 100% 30 18% 210 
Kadu Agung 38 100% 30 8% 414 
Total 113  90   
 
The facilitators guided the FGD through a series of questions on the impact of PES by comparing 
three time-periods: before the year 2000 (a landmark year covering the period of 1998- 2000 
remembered by communities because it marked the beginning of political reforms and economic 
crisis), between 2000 and 2004, and after signing a PES contract (2005–present). The livelihood 
impacts were discussed in terms of the five asset types covered in the Sustainable Livelihood 
Framework: financial, human, social, physical and natural. For each asset category, we asked the 
participants as a group to identify relevant impacts (Table 6.2), and to collectively rank them 
according to their relative importance. For example, under financial assets, groups listed all sources of 
income during each era. The most important ten sources were then ranked, and paper dots were used 
by the facilitators to describe the relative percentage that each income source contributed to the 
overall household income. Some impacts, such as trust and social capital, required further discussion 
to clarify their meaning  
In addition to the FGDs a one day workshop was held involving FKDC members, local government 
and the Krakatau Tirta Industry (KTI) company. We followed this up with some informal interviews 
to clarify any conflicting or unclear data from the workshop. In analysing livelihood impacts, the data 
are limited to the results from the FGDs and stakeholder interviews, as there has been no detailed 
quantitative analysis so far of household level livelihood impacts in Cidanau.    
Table 6.2  The livelihood issues discussed in focus groups 
Capital Type of information discussed 
Financial Sources of income over the three periods  
Human What (if any) capacity/skills/knowledge were gained through the scheme? 
Social What was the nature and degree of trust with other stakeholders during the three periods? 
What norms or standards of behavior did the community set itself in connection with the 
scheme (e.g. sanctions etc)? 
What were community’s networks like during the three periods?  
Natural  What benefits did they gain from the watershed and its protection? 
Physical Had any investments been made as a result of the scheme (e.g. infrastructure)? 
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6.3. The design of PES scheme 
6.3.1 The environmental problems in Cidanau 
The Cidanau watershed has been experiencing rapid change in land cover for almost two decades as 
forest is converted for agriculture due to population increase and a high dependence on farming.25  
The number of people living and farming illegally in the upstream protected area increased from 
around 600 in the late 1990s to an estimated 1,500 in 2007. This period has also seen the conversion 
of conservation forest to rice fields and other crops. In addition, the Rawa Danau reserve has 
experienced intensive encroachment and associated decreases in flora and fauna diversity. In 2000, 
about 20 percent of the Rawa Danau natural reserve area has been encroached (Darmawan, Tsuyuki, 
and Prasetyo 2005).   
As noted earlier, this conversion of forest to farming land combined with unsustainable farming 
practices degrade the environmental services (ES) provided by the Cidanau watershed. The Cidanau 
watershed is the only water supply for Cilegon housing and industrial area and also for approximately 
100 industries that operate around it. The main problems experienced by the water consumers (the ES 
beneficiaries) of Cidanau watershed are shortage of water in the dry season and water quality 
degradation due to pollution and high sedimentation (Adi 2003; Munawir and Vermeulen 2007; 
Budhi, Kuswanto, and Muhammad 2008).  
Fluctuating water flow and water quality are the most important problems in Cidanau. During the long 
dry season, the flow has been as low as 5 m³/s, especially in 1987 and 1991. The average discharge is 
12.5 m/s, fluctuating from annual minimum of 1.2 m/s in dry season (August) to an annual maximum 
of 44 m/s in the rainy season. In addition to the fluctuating water flow problem, intensive use of 
fertilizer and agricultural chemicals, and the process of burning paddy husk reduce the quality of 
Cidanau’s water. Remote sensing observation indicates that about 71 percent of the watershed is 
prone to degradation with the rate of erosion above 35.22 ton/hectare/year. The sedimentation narrows 
water channels and swallows reservoirs and contributes to the reduction of water supply and quality 
from the Cidanau catchment.  
6.3.2 PES as one initiative to rehabilitate the Cidanau watershed 
The numerous efforts that have been made to overcome the watershed problems in the Cidanau have 
had limited success. These include a transmigration program for the communities living in the Rawa 
Danau area, reforestation and land rehabilitation activities. Key issues in the failure of past efforts 
include lack of consultation and joint planning between key stakeholders, and lack of attention to 
social outcomes.  
Failures of these previous efforts at watershed management in Cidanau triggered a group of people 
concerned about the degradation of Rawa Danau to establish the FKDC in 1998. The forum tried to 
increase awareness among the public and the local government to environmental problems and 
integrated watershed management by conducting seminars and discussions. This forum received 
                                                   
25 The land cover of the Cidanau watershed is mostly dominated by agriculture lands (71%): mixed farming (36.7%) and rice 
fields (34.4%) and the remaining 18.5% and 8.4% is forest and swamp forest (Adi, 2003). 
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recognition from the newly established Banten provincial government26 and gained legal status 
through a Governors Decree in 2002.  
The concept of payment for watershed services in Cidanau was introduced by international 
organizations, such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical 
Cooperation, GTZ), the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) in 2002. A member of Rekonvasi Bhumi (a local NGO) visited 
Costa Rica to see the implementation of a PES program funded by GTZ. The conditionality aspect, 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders in watershed management and the innovative nature of the 
Costa Rican PES scheme stimulated their interest to trial such a scheme in Cidanau. In 2004, the 
FKDC invited the PT Krakatau Tirta Industry (PT KTI) to join this scheme and started facilitating 
negotiation between private land owners in the upper watershed and the company.  
6.3.3 The stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities 
The PES scheme involves many stakeholders, including farmer groups, downstream companies, 
government officers from district, provincial and national levels, supporting NGOs and universities 
(Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3  The stakeholders involved in the PES scheme 
Role Stakeholders 
ES Providers Four upstream farmer Groups from Cidanau (Citaman, 
Cibojong, Kadu Agung villages).  
ES Buyers Current single buyer: PT KTI  
Potential buyers: other companies in Cilegon such as PDAM 
(state-owned water company), Krakatau Steel, Ronn & Hass, 
PT Pelindo, PT Politrima, Chandra Asri, Bakrie Group.  
ES Intermediaries  Forum Komunikasi Cidanau (FKDC) – a multi stakeholder 
forum.  
Policy makers District government and legislative officers of Serang 
(upstream) and Cilegon (downstream)  
 Provincial government and legislative officers of Banten 
 National watershed management body coordinated by the 
Ministry of Forestry 
Main supporting NGO  Rekonvasi Bhumi, LP3ES 
Main supporting university Bogor Agricultural University  
Main supporting international 
agencies 
ICRAF, IIED, GTZ 
6.3.4 The sellers of the environmental service  
In total, 142 farmers were involved in the PES scheme: 43 from Citaman, 29 from Cibojong, 38 
farmers in Kadu Agung, and 32 in Cikumbuen (Table 6.4). Participating villages were selected 
                                                   
26
 Banten was a district in West Java Province before 2000 and became a new province in 2000. 
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according to the mapping of critical land by the local government (e.g. steep slopes and erosion-prone 
soil) and participating farmers at each village were selected by considering their involvement in 
farmer groups and private ownership. Aside from land ownership, no other socio-economic criteria 
were considered as the intermediary felt there was relatively equal wealth distribution and 
landownership rates among the communities, with the typical land of each household being between 
0.2–0.5 hectares. 
Table 6.4  Farmers involved in the PES scheme 
Village Number of farmers Starting year 
Cikumbuen 32 2007 
Citaman 43 2005 
Kadu Agung 38 2007 
Cibojong 29 2005 
(ended after 2 
years) 
Total  142  
6.3.5 The buyer of the environmental service  
KTI – the only authorized company managing water from the Cidanau watershed – is the only buyer 
in the current PES scheme. The water from upstream flows through a 28 kilometre pipe to the water 
treatment reservoir. KTI initially used this clean water for its steel industry operations. Recently, this 
company has also been supplying about 80 per cent of the water needs of 120 companies at Cilegon, 
such as PDAM (a state-owned company that supplies drinking water, which purchases the water at a 
subsidized price), and Indonesia Power Company, which supplies electricity to Java and Bali. This 
highlights the importance of the Cidanau watershed for industrial activities. KTI clarified that the 
initial source of funds for the PES scheme came from the operational budget of the company, and PES 
funding was drawn from corporate social responsibility funds.27 The company’s staff remarked that 
the motivation for engagement in PES was to support conservation efforts in the Cidanau watershed, 
rather than securing access to clean water for the production process. The company’s staff mentioned 
that the government was the one responsible for the maintenance of the constant flow of water.   
6.3.6 The intermediary for the environmental service  
FKDC’s role in the PES scheme is to manage funds, to facilitate contracts with farmer groups, and to 
monitor and verify rehabilitation activities. Their additional role is to raise awareness of payment for 
environmental services amongst other potential buyers in Cilegon industrial area. FKDC added an ad 
hoc team within its structure in 2005 to specifically facilitate the scheme. This ad hoc team consists of 
representatives of government institutions at the provincial and regency levels in Cidanau watershed 
area and an NGO.  
                                                   
27
 In Indonesia, a state-owned company must allocate 1% of net-benefit of state-owned companies for developing 
environmental programs with the communities. The legal basis of this scheme is the Letter of Ministry of State-owned 
Company Affairs about Corporate Social Responsibility Partnership Program (KEP-236/MBU/2003). 
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This team plays an intermediary role by (1) managing the payment of PES funds from the buyer to the 
farmers for their rehabilitation and conservation activities; (2) supporting planting activities on private 
farms involved in the PES project; (3) encouraging other potential buyers to join the scheme; and (4) 
advocating the integration of the PES scheme in the provincial and district governments’ 
environmental management policy.  
6.3.7 Setting the price for the environmental service  
The price-setting process in Cidanau was based on negotiations between the buyer (KTI), the 
intermediary (FKDC) and the sellers (farmer groups). The agreed price was formalised in a 
Memorandum of Agreement between KTI and FKDC (represented by the Governor of Banten 
Province). After this agreement, the chair person of FKDC Ad Hoc team and farmers groups from 
Citaman and Cibojong made another agreement covering a total land area in two villages of 50 
hectares. In 2007, the other two villages (Kadu Agung and Cikumbuen) joined the initiative, each 
with 25 hectares.  
The annual rate set in the contract between the KTI and the FKDC was US$ 35028 per hectare based 
on input costs, calculated according to funding levels provided in government tree-planting programs 
(land preparation, ground cover, seedlings, transport, fertilizers and labor) on state lands. The market 
value was established by referring to the cost per hectare of national forest rehabilitation program 
(GERHAN) coordinated by the national government. KTI made three payments within five years, and 
were subject to six percent tax. The total payment of the KTI to the FKDC was US$ 35,000.00 for 
Phase 1: 2005–2007 and US$ 40,000.00 for the following Phase 2: 2007–2009. The payment for the 
fifth year was to be renegotiated.  
The Ad Hoc Team initially offered to farmers annual payments of US$ 75 per hectare. The annual 
payments were agreed at US$ 120 per hectare, provided that 500 trees per hectare were planted and 
plantings maintained. The FKDC scaled down the payment to farmers in order to cover all the five-
year payment with the available four year fund from KTI or in other words, to provide a buffer in case 
KTI did not meet its obligations. They took this risk-management action because they still have to 
negotiate the fifth year payment in 2011. From the interview with the FKDC members, they plan 
either to involve new farmer groups in other villages or to extend the contract with the current farmers 
if the KTI disburses its third payment in 2011. 
6.3.8 Payment allocation 
Since it had a key role in the agreement and disbursement of payments to farmer groups, FKDC took 
responsibility for managing many of the transaction costs for buyers ( 
Table 6.5). FKDC members estimated that the transaction cost was around 14 percent of the annual 
payment, including the costs of capacity building activities, searching and contacting new buyers, 
information dissemination, and monitoring and verifying performance of agreements in the field.  
Farmers used about 95 per cent of their initial payment to buy seedlings, plant and maintain the trees, 
and were left with around 5 per cent to spend on their own priorities, including investment in local 
business in their first year. Interviews indicate that the operational costs for the second year were 50 
                                                   
28
 1 US$ = Rp. 10,000  
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percent lower, and many farmers chose to invest the balance on their business. Figure 6.1 describes 
the actors involved in the scheme and their flow of payments and ES.  
Table 6.5  Actual allocation of revenues by the FKDC in the first four years 
Payment allocation  US$ Fraction of total 
payment 
Payment for the 100 hectare contracted farmer lands  
 95% for buying seedlings and planting; 
 5% for investing on local business.  
60,000 80% 
Transaction cost 
 40% for conducting capacity building and 
searching more buyers (dissemination, 
publication, seminars, etc.) 
 27% for monitoring and verifying field activities; 
 33% for operational cost: 
-  16% for paying personnel cost for five persons; 
-  11% for organizing meetings; 
-  6% for administration purposes; 
10,500 14% 
Tax 4,500 6% 
Total 75,000* 100% 
Note: This amount is the payment from KTI for Phase 1 and Phase 2 (4 years). KTI still has to transfer the remaining funds for the fifth 
year, as much as US$100,000 contingent on current performance and will be transferred in 2010. The total commitment should be 
US$175,000 (100 hectares x US$350 per hectare x 5 year). 
The contract between the FKDC and the farmer groups in four villages involves: 
1. Yearly payment of US$120 per hectare for five years, subject to satisfactory implementation of 
the rehabilitation works; 
2. Implementation of rehabilitation activities, including planting and maintaining timber and fruit 
trees at a minimum of 500 trees per hectare and no cutting during the contract period; 
3. Payment schedule distributed as follows: 
 30 per cent on signing the contract;  
 30 per cent after six month of implementation; 
 40 per cent after one year of implementation.  
 
All members of the first two farmer groups received their first payment in May 2005. Three months 
later, the FKDC commenced monitoring and requested records of tree planting on contracted lands. In 
Citaman, the Ad Hoc team found that 0.5 hectare was not being maintained as per agreement because 
the owner left the village for a new job. However, since the other members of the farmer group had 
accomplished the minimum requirement of the contract, the Ad Hoc team did not disqualify the 
group. The group decided to manage the 0.5 hectare land and charged the owner the operational costs 
of managing this land under the contract. The contract is a collective one. If a farmer breaks the rule, 
the Ad Hoc team will terminate the contract of all the members. The collective contract was chosen 
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over individual ones because they assumed that by applying the “sharing responsibility principle”29, it 
can strengthen internal relationship and self-monitoring among group members.  
 
 
 
Legend: FKDC = Forum Komunikasi DAS Cidanau (Communication Forum of Cidanau Watershed); PDAM = state-owned drinking water 
company; PLN = state-owned electricity company. 
Source: adapted from Budhi et al. (2008) 
Figure 6.1  The PES scheme relationship and flows of services 
6.3.9 Implementation problems  
A number of issues associated with the PES scheme were raised in focus group discussions by FKDC 
members. 
First, the FKDC found it difficult to communicate the unique characteristics of an incentive-based 
mechanism to other stakeholders, such as local government and buyers, because of their relative 
inexperience with the operation of such mechanisms Buyers often viewed the scheme as adding 
another layer to their operational costs and have, in many cases, used corporate  social 
responsibility funds to cover the ES payment (which means it is accounted for as a promotional 
rather than an operational cost). 
Second, lengthy negotiations were unavoidable given the number of stakeholders involved and since 
KTI was unwilling to pay directly the farmer groups. There were at least three stages of negotiation 
over two years. The first stage, to establish the main design elements, was between the Rekonvasi 
Bhumi and the Ad Hoc team of FKDC and took a period of eight months. The second negotiation 
period, to draft the contract, between the KTI and the Ad Hoc team lasted about six months. The third 
                                                   
29
 In Indonesian, the term is tanggung renteng literally meaning an individual failure will become collective failure.  
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negotiation phase, to develop contracts for payment amounts and conditionality, was between the Ad 
Hoc Team and farmer groups in the villages of Citaman and Cibojong.  
Third, the FKDC members expected the communities to have a more active role in conserving the 
watershed rather than depending on the PES payment for any environmental conservation. There was 
confusion whether any formal regulation by provincial government could play an important role in 
targeting more ES buyers as well as an enabling policy environment with strong political support. 
They stated that such regulations were needed but did not have ideas about the contents of such 
regulations. Without the certainty of voluntary participation of additional buyers, FKDC was less 
able to encourage more sellers to engage in the scheme. Meanwhile, KTI demanded regulations 
obliging potential buyers to participate in the PES, having assumed that such regulations would 
optimize the role of additional buyers in conserving the watershed. 
After 2 years of implementation, the Cibojong village did not achieve the target stipulated in the 
contract and the contract was terminated. A farmer cut the trees on about 0.14 ha of land, 
reporting that the trees had been stolen (an investigation later found out that one of his family 
members had cut the trees to buy a motorcycle). Procedurally, a report should have been made to 
the FKDC, together with a letter from the police department guaranteeing that they would not 
breach the contract further. However, this was not done, and the members assumed that the 
contract had been cancelled. Villagers continued to cut trees on the PES-contracted lands, based 
on their assumption that the scheme would not provide them any further payment. An interview 
conducted by the FKDC with the members revealed that most would have preferred to remain in 
the scheme. Therefore, the cancelling of the contract would likely have been avoided if the group 
had advised the members of the correct procedure following the initial (illegal) cutting of the 
trees. 
6.4. The impacts of the PES scheme 
6.4.1 The environment 
A clear assessment of the environmental outcome of the scheme is not available yet. Although some 
data were presented earlier in this chapter on decreases in water quantity and quality in Cidanau, the 
actual link between the land use practices used to promote watershed protection and water supply are 
unclear. Also the scale of the current PES scheme may have been limited in its environmental impact 
given the size of the watershed. The monitoring system for the scheme relied on the accomplishment 
of contractually agreed land use practices as a proxy for environmental outcomes. FKDC members, 
particularly those from KTI, have visually observed that the water supply is relatively stable in 2008 
but so far this has not been backed up by scientific evidence.  
6.4.2 The livelihoods of the participants and non participants 
Financial capital 
According to focus group discussions (FGDs), the communities in Cidanau earn their income from the 
tree-crops – melinjo30, coconut, robusta coffee, durian and clove – which represent the top six income 
                                                   
30
 A fruit native to Indonesia used for vegetable soup, or ground into flour and deep-fried as crackers 
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source, and further planting of these tree crops was supported through the PES scheme. The FGDs did 
not indicate significant changes in income sources between the periods before 2000, 2000-2005 and 
after the introduction of the PES in 2005 for both participants and non-participants (Table 6.6). Tree 
species were selected, on the basis of commodity prices and market demand, to enable participants to 
build their productive base of valuable tree crops.  
Table 6.6  Household income sources (percentage) 
Source of Income After PES  
(2005- now)  
Before PES  
(2000 -2005) 
Before PES (before 
2000) 
 P NP P NP P NP 
Melinjo  26.67 28.33 23.33 31.67 15.00 16.67 
Farming labor 15.00 15.00 0.00 8.33 0.00 13.33 
Coconut 11.67 8.33 10.00 8.33 15.00 10.00 
Clove 10.00 6.67 18.33 6.67 11.67 10.00 
Coffee 10.00 10.00 15.00 10.00 16.67 18.33 
Durian 6.67 3.33 13.33 8.33 23.33 11.67 
Salak 5.00 8.33 5.00 5.00 3.33 0.00 
Wood 5.00 6.67 8.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Payment for ES 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Banana 1.67 1.67 3.33 3.33 3.33 11.67 
Cocoa 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Petai  1.67 6.67 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 
Cotton 1.67 0.00 3.33 1.67 5.00 1.67 
Jengkol 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
Paddy  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 
Upland paddy 0.00 1.67 0.00 5.00 1.67 0.00 
Others (clove labor, livestock 
labor, motorbike renting, 
construction labor, trader) 
0.00 3.33 0.00 6.67 0.00 5.00 
Note: P for participants and NP for non participants 
Indications are that the PES contract in Cidanau did not have a major impact on the livelihood options 
pursued by communities because of their existing reliance on tree crops as a primary income source 
before the scheme commenced. Some participants did mention, however, that they had lost income 
from wood harvesting and wanted the option of continuing with tree thinning on their contracted 
gardens. The income from the wood harvest could be as high as US$200 annually, around 60 per cent 
higher than the value of the PES contract. Wood harvesting had previously contributed an estimated 
five to seven percent of household income for both participants and non-participants. Some forty 
types of commodities, including leaves, flowers, and fruits that are locally marketable.   
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The annual PES income of US$120 per hectare contributed only around three percent to PES 
participants’ household income. Only one group in Citaman regarded PES as a primary source of 
income. The rest considered PES income to be short term and not a primary livelihood source, 
although during the four year operation of the scheme the total payment might have exceed their 
income from selling fruits. Around half of the participants assumed that the PES contract could 
increase the price of their land, although most non-participants did not consider it likely that the land 
price would rise as a result of the PES scheme. No transaction on land allocated to the PES scheme 
has occurred, therefore there is no information about the impact on the value of land.   
The PES scheme has stimulated local business, mostly because of additional business development 
support from NGOs and government agencies involved in the PES scheme. The facilitating NGO 
Rekonvasi Bhumi (together with the Serang Service Office of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives) has 
supported farmer groups with entrepreneurship and marketing training, and also gained advice on 
technical issues from the Environment Technology Agency (Munawir and Vermeulen 2007). Some 
areas of local business development have included production and marketing of vegetable oil from 
nilam (Pogostemon cablin) and melinjo craker production. FKDC members had observed that the PES 
scheme provided a locus for greater government support to the participating villages to (1) establish a 
nursery of fruit trees; (2) develop local business for edible mushrooms in Citaman and Kadu Agung; 
and (3) establish a poultry project in Cikumbuen. They felt that the reputation of these villages had 
been raised due to their participation in the PES scheme.   
Human capital  
PES participants and non-participants attended occasional training, conducted by the Agricultural 
Service and Forestry Service of the local government, dealing with coffee, melinjo, timber and fruit 
tree cultivation. However, the PES scheme had a particular impact on the capacity, skills and 
knowledge of participants (Table 6.7) because of their regular interaction with NGO staff and 
researchers.  
PES participants were more aware of environmental issues such as the causes of erosion, landslides 
and downstream sedimentation, as well as management measures such as erosion prevention, 
prevention of illegal cutting of trees, waste management, and the role of trees in water and soil 
conservation. However, only about 30 percent of the participants and 17 percent of the non-
participants knew about the concept of PES and how the value of the contract could be calculated. 
PES participants also reported improved capacity and skills in managing the farmers’ organization, 
including networking to improve local business and to improve implementation of the PES scheme. 
This capacity building occurred through interaction with the FKDC members. 
As noted earlier, some participants observed that they had more available time and less activity on 
their lands due to restrictions on activities under the PES scheme. Because of this, PES participants 
and non-participants focus groups identified a need for training in alternative livelihoods, such as (1) 
raising livestock and poultry; (2) cultivating fruit and timber trees; (3) making fruit crackers, from 
melinjo, banana, and cassava; (4) pest management; (5) establishing fresh water fish pond; (6) apiary 
business; (6) cultivating mushrooms. Women identified an interest in training in literacy, sewing and 
cooking. The FKDC members added that the communities also might need further training to 
strengthen their local institutions.   
Interviews with the FKDC members indicated that their knowledge about PES issues increased, such 
as the principles of PES, how to design community-based forest management, how to strengthen local 
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institutions, global issues such as global warming, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Reducing 
Emission for Degradation and Deforestation.    
Table 6.7  Type of knowledge/ capacity/skills gained by participants and non-participants after the PES 
implementation 
Type of knowledge/capacity/skills Participant 
(%) 
Non-participant 
(%) 
Conservation   
Causes of erosion, landslides and downstream sedimentation 100 17 
How to maintain clean water and to reduce air pollution   83 - 
Roles of trees in conservation  67 - 
Simple construction to prevent erosion 50 - 
Understanding of PES concept   33 17 
   
Institution and Governance    
Ability to govern an organization  67 17 
Ability to solve problems within farmer groups 67 - 
Administration of farmer groups  50 17 
Networking to improve local business and PES implementation 50 - 
Transparent financial management 33 - 
   
How to develop local business   
Livestock 33 17 
Agriculture 17 - 
Fishery  - - 
 
Social capital  
Aspects of social capital discussed in communities include behavioural norms within the community, 
reciprocity between community members, trust, and the existence of internal and external networks, 
before and after the implementation of the PES scheme.  
The focus groups with PES participants in Citaman revealed that they had written rules to guide 
members of their farmers’ group towards meeting their collective obligations under the PES contract: 
if one member defaulted on the agreement, this would become the responsibility of the whole group. 
Sanctions would be imposed on such a member in the form of expulsion from the group. In other 
villages, there were no written rules but people knew the rule that trees should not be cut in the 
contracted areas. The sanction for cutting trees involved a police report, as well as informal social 
sanctions at the community level. The informal sanctions included exclusion from social gathering. 
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The participants also commented about rent seeking by local government staff in relation to PES 
payments, i.e. requesting part of the payment for contributing to village income.  
All the participants that joined the focus groups knew about the written contract between their group 
and the FKDC, and that observing restrictions on cutting trees was necessary to receive payments, 
while cutting trees would lead to contract termination. Some participants observed that the local 
NGO, Rekonvasi Bhumi, used informal warnings as the first step if contract infringements occurred31.  
The PES contract brought opportunities for participating communities to interact more with other 
external stakeholders, which expanded the external networks of these communities to include: (1) 
researchers conducting studies on PES in Cidanau; (2) local NGOs who facilitated the PES contract; 
(3) the KTI as the buyers; (4) the FKDC as the intermediary; (5) other government agencies besides 
the Agriculture and Forestry Services, such as Natural Resource Service.. In contrast, non-participants 
only mentioned increased interaction with the local NGO and government agencies amongst their new 
contacts after PES.      
The focus groups discussed issues of trust within the community and between community members 
and external stakeholders (Table 6.8). Trust was seen as the ability to receive and give assistance from 
people beyond the immediate household and relatives in case of shortness of money or food. Focus 
groups reported that trust amongst community members (both participants and non participants) in 
Cidanau was relatively high, while the level of trust between community members and external 
stakeholders was lower. This is consistent with the observation that the four villages involved in the 
program have a high degree f internal homogeneity. Most of them are Moslem and their wealth strata 
are almost equal, which may contribute to ease of interaction and trust.32 In Cidanau, communities 
usually participate in regular collective action events to produce public goods and services, such as 
maintaining roads, bridges, community buildings and water supply systems. These activities are an 
important aspect of rural social capital in Indonesia (Grootaert 1999). This also appears to be the case 
in Cidanau.  
Some key persons, mostly group chair-persons and village elders, lead in negations with external 
stakeholders and gain access to more information than other participants. There were some signs of 
jealousy amongst non-participants regarding their exclusion from the PES scheme as a result of 
limited budget from the buyer. The interaction between participants and non-participants in the same 
village decreased as the interaction between participants and other external stakeholders increased.  
This condition somehow created an exclusive group of PES participants who did not socially blend 
with other villagers. The FKDC members also mentioned this tendency.           
There was a general agreement that trust between communities and government was lower after 2000 
and has become worse since the start of the PES project. The communities do not consider the 
government a partner from whom they can ask for assistance. The communities felt a reduced level of 
confidence in the government’s capacity and commitment to provide public services (Table 6.8). 
Since 1998, Indonesia has been in a period of transition known as Reformasi (Reform in Indonesia). 
Although this period has been characterized by greater freedom of speech, many rural communities 
considered that they had more secure livelihoods during the earlier Suharto-dominated period, which 
involved unprecedented national growth and greater integration of rural areas into national 
development. The Reformasi era provided greater autonomy to village level governments. However, 
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 Farmers from Cibojong village, where the contract had been cancelled, were not participants in these focus groups 
32
 Rahadian, the Director of Rekonvasi Bhumi, pers. comm. (2008).  
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there have been fewer nationwide programmes, as local conditions vary greatly and severe financial 
constraints during 1997-1998 led to reduced government spending on rural development (Antlov 
2003). The communities in Cidanau noted that the government had paid less attention to rural 
development after the beginning of the Reformasi era and felt a diminished sense of trust in the 
government. Rekonvasi Bhumi, the only NGO that is active in advocating the PES concept, was 
established soon after the beginning of the Reformasi era, when greater space was created for civil 
society. In Cidanau, interaction between community members and this local NGO nurtured a level of 
trust; the same was true with FKDC, the ES buyer.   
Table 6.8  Trust among internal and external stakeholders 
Relationship  How trust is expressed 
Amongst participants Borrowing money and rice; 
Sharing information; 
Mortgaging (loans); 
Collective labor sharing  
Participants and government Making identification and family card; 
Paying tax; 
Receiving administrative information; 
Getting cash assistance33; 
Maintaining security 
Participants and non-participants Collective labor sharing; 
Sharing information; 
Borrowing money, rice, daily needs and construction materials 
Participants and FKDC Delivering the payments for accomplishing the contracts; 
Sharing information; 
Maintaining transparency in managing the funds of 
organizations.  
Participants and PERHUTANI Giving seedlings; 
Giving information; 
Giving access to manage forest and plant ally-cropping on the 
area of PERHUTANI. 
Participants and NGO Implementing programs; 
Sharing information, especially on environmental services; 
Conducting meetings. 
 
Government officials shared the view that the existence of the PES scheme had increased their 
communication with stakeholders such as the FKDC members and the KTI, as well as a need for 
greater inter agency communication. They expected that PES could assist the government in 
conducting their conservation program and in improving the communities’ livelihood.   
                                                   
33
 The Indonesia government has a program called Bantuan Langsung Tunai or direct cash assistance as one of its program 
for buffering the poor from the financial crisis.  
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Natural capital 
Since the PES scheme only targeted individual farmers, and restrictions on land use only applied to 
private lands, there was no change in access to common resources. Before the scheme and after its 
beginning, communities in Cidanau utilized non timber products from the forest, such as water, wild 
boar, fish, fire wood, medicinal plants, herbs, fruits, and leaves. Around half of the participants did 
comment, however, that the PES contract had reduced their access to timber for construction because 
they could not harvest the timber from the contracted land. Currently, they have to buy some wood to 
fulfil their own needs. The FKDC reported that at the end of the contract the farmers would be 
allowed to cut 40 percent of their current plantings to fulfil their needs for wood and increase their 
income if they are willing to continue the PES contract.  
Both participants and non-participants knew the benefits of maintaining natural resources. They could 
explain environmental services provided by the healthy ecosystem and claimed that they had this 
knowledge for a long time. According to informants, the services provided by intact watershed and 
Rawa Danau conservation area included providing timber for construction and non timber forest 
products, storing water, avoiding flood, landslide and erosion, contribution to a comfortable micro 
climate, fertilizing soils, ecotourism, particularly for the Rawa Danau. In addition, the local 
government and the buyer added that the Cidanau watershed had high and strategic economic value 
because it supported the existence of important industries and households in the towns of Cilegon and 
Serang.   
The communities have been involved in various rehabilitation activities (both government initiated 
and locally organized) before and after the PES scheme. Government programs included planting 
trees, such as mahogany, clove, albizia and calliandra, joining forest fire prevention activities and 
forest patrols for the prevention of illegal logging, and terracing steep lands. The Cidanau 
communities were also involved in the National Movement of Land Rehabilitation. Self-supporting 
activities included cleaning the river annually in Kadu Agung and planting bamboo and productive 
trees, such as melinjo, durian and stink bean. However, these actions are mostly patchy, not 
integrated, and short-term with uncertain success.34 In addition, the PES project did not set up 
systematic monitoring for environmental services in Cidanau. The KTI claimed that the sedimentation 
and water quality in Cidanau improved in the last two years. However, whether this conclusion is 
correct, and whether the change in ES would have any connection with the PES scheme has not been 
scientifically demonstrated.   
Physical capital 
In Citaman, the group invested five percent of their PES payments to build a 100 meter pipeline for 
clean water to serve about 50 households. This water pipeline also served non-participants, but they 
were required to pay a service fee of US$ 0.30 per month or one kilogram of rice. In Kadu Agung, 
they planned to build a village mosque from all funds collected through the PES contract. Other 
villages did not report plans to invest their money in education and health improvements. Their 
investments on physical capital were a collective decision driven by their specific needs. Villages 
without any investment plans might simply not have collective needs.       
                                                   
34
 Reports on the failure of the National Movement of Land Rehabilitation are numerous 
(http://www.fkkm.org/Warta/index2.php?terbitan=noe&action=detail5&page=17 accessed 13 November 2009). One of the 
reasons for this failure is that the program is top-down with very little participation from the community. The government 
dominates the supply of the plant materials and determines the species that should be planted. The community acts as labors 
for the planting activities and mostly they are not interesting in maintaining their plantation because in some cases, they do 
not have access to the harvest.  
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Participants in focus groups complained about the poor condition of the roads, which doubled their 
transportation costs. This has been the case for many years and a change of government did not bring 
any changes to their village assets. However, the discussions with the FKDC highlighted that the 
community had received assistance to develop a nursery and building for community meetings in 
Ciomas village. The budget for these activities came from the provincial government in 2005 because 
they noticed the existence of PES activities in the village.  
The FKDC has no further plans to develop public facilities in the villages covered by the PES scheme. 
Nevertheless, the FKDC agreed that developing public infrastructure in the sellers’ villages could 
multiply the positive impacts of the PES scheme. For example, better roads to the villages would 
increase accessibility and bring ease in communication, coordination and monitoring as well as 
contributing to wider economic and social development. 
6.5. Conclusion  
6.5.1 Livelihood impacts 
The Cidanau PES scheme has impacted the livelihood of PES participants and non-participants. 
Benefits were mostly non-financial: expanded social networks with external stakeholders; knowledge 
and capacity of the community; and small-scale public infrastructure investments. Direct financial 
benefits were limited. So far, four villages out of five have proved successful in meeting the contract 
terms; however, there is a need to investigate further whether the non-financial benefits and limited 
financial benefits are sufficient to cover their ‘total opportunity cost’. We presume these benefits 
combined with recognition from the governments and external stakeholders can increase farmers’ 
commitment to the scheme. It is important to adjust the value of the new contract so the farmers can 
cover their true opportunity cost if the funds from the buyer allow that. This finding is in line with the 
conclusions in other PES sites in Asia (Leimona, Joshi, and Van Noordwijk 2009).       
Although the PES scheme did not drastically change the livelihoods of participants, linkages with 
external stakeholders were creating options for participants to diversify or capture greater value from 
their income sources. The external stakeholders are largely partners in the PES scheme, such as the 
FKDC and a local NGO. Exposure to these partners also increased the participants’ knowledge of 
conservation, skills to manage the farmers’ organization, and helped to build networks to improve 
their businesses and implementation of the PES scheme.  
Participants and non-participants reported that they were aware of the benefits of conservation before 
the PES scheme was implemented. Their understanding of the PES concept was still limited. The 
capacity building for PES concept at the local level has been important. However, future capacity 
building should also be focused on tangible aspects of the PES scheme and problems that put barriers 
at the local level in implementing PES such as lack of information of good planting materials and 
know-how on tree management.  
The PES scheme has created new standards and mechanisms for managing behaviour around natural 
resources. It supports the establishment of new written and unwritten rules as well as sanctions related 
to natural resource management and land-use practices. The PES contract sets out formal rules and 
sanctions binding the sellers and the intermediary supplementing their existing informal rules and 
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sanctions. These informal rules and sanctions were useful to support collective action and induce the 
accomplishment rate of the PES contract.   
There were signs of jealousy among non-participants in Cidanau towards the participants due to their 
exclusion from the PES scheme. Such jealousy has not so far destroyed social relationships in 
communities because the amount of payments is limited and it has not created inequality. The 
investment of PES income in community infrastructure, such as water supply, mosques, and meeting 
halls might reduce social conflict as they extend to the indirect beneficiaries of the scheme, although 
not the same degree in some cases. Improved government investment in PES villages, as planned but 
yet to be implemented, could also help to reduce and the risk of potential conflict between participants 
and non-participants.  
Access to common pool resources, such as state forests, did not change with the implementation of 
the PES scheme because only non timber products were taken from the forest.35 However, the 
restrictions posed by the PES scheme on landowners’ access to timber on their own lands could lead 
to illegal logging on common lands, that is, it could result in so called leakage. Monitoring of the 
nearby environment should be therefore carried by the PES scheme.  
6.5.2 Environmental impact 
There is insufficient scientific evidence to judge the impacts of the Cidanau scheme on environmental 
services. Although the selection of contracted villages was based on criteria that would maximize 
environmental outcomes, i.e. steep slopes and erosion-prone soil, and stakeholders in the scheme 
believed that planting trees would solve the watershed problems in Cidanau, the cause and effect link 
between changing land use practices and increasing ES are unclear and indirect. For the next step, 
identifying and monitoring specific indicators of watershed services in Cidanau is crucial. For 
instance, a rapid hydrological assessment in Singkarak, West Sumatra, Indonesia (Jeanes et al. 2006; 
Farida et al. 2005) concluded that the raise of the water level of the lake, sought by the ES buyer to 
increase their hydroelectric performance, is mostly influenced by changes in mean annual rainfall and 
only mildly by land cover. Without understanding of watershed functions, and related indicators, PES 
schemes such as this may not achieve the desired environmental impact, leading to disappointment 
amongst sellers and buyers. 
6.5.3 Design of the PES scheme  
The amount of the payment per hectare set out in the PES scheme in Cidanau was based on input 
costs for tree planting. Information on opportunity costs is not available for Cidanau yet. Farmers 
might have accepted the contract without further consideration of real costs and benefits in involving 
in the scheme. The agreed value of the contract might not fully represent the real opportunity cost of 
the farmers because of the dominant position of the intermediary. The transaction cost in Cidanau was 
about 14% of the total payment.  
In terms of lessons for REDD, the Cidanau case raises important issues regarding the need to factor in 
opportunity costs and co-benefit beyond financial payment when negotiating payments to ensure their 
long term sustainability. It also highlights the need for awareness of the social dynamic between 
participants and non-participants and design benefit packages to minimize community level conflict. 
                                                   
35
 Further investigation on this should be done because some literature mentioned that deforestation had been a big problem 
in Cidanau (Kiely 2005)  
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The Cidanau case suggests that the role of the intermediary is very important and possibly dominant. 
An honest and trusted intermediary is one of the keys to success.  
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7. Discussion and Conclusions  
7.1. Introduction  
Asia’s landscape, where most of its inhabitants depend on agriculture and natural resources for their 
livelihood, has an immense diversity of land-cover mosaics. This region offers many opportunities to 
explore interactions between environmental services (ES) and land use practices by its farmers. These 
farmers mostly act as land managers who have a meagre living in the upper watershed and at the 
forest boundary. These areas provide many valuable ES and at the same time are mostly under severe 
threat of degradation (MA 2005). Market imperfection and policy distortion that neglect the social and 
economic importance of ecosystems are claimed as root causes for environmental problems in Asia 
(Tomich et al. 2004; TEEB 2010)   
Supported by global agreements, the solution of environmental problems in developing countries, 
specifically in Asia have to emphasize dual goals of poverty alleviation and environmental 
conservation (Tinbergen 1976; UN 1992). Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is one of the 
tools currently being tested and practiced globally to help achieve these goals (Muradian et al. 2010; 
Pascual et al. 2010; Van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010). The PES-concept was initially strictly 
defined as a market-based environmental policy instrument to achieve environmental protection in the 
most efficient way (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005; Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008). This is 
based on the principle “you get what you pay” for positive effects on the flow of environmental 
services (Wunder 2007). However, recent literature discussed that the Coasean and pure market 
approach dominating the conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in 
practice (Muradian et al. 2010).  
This thesis presents an analysis of practical applications of PES in Asian developing countries. It 
shows that in order for PES to achieve its dual goals, the emphasis to inclusion of both efficiency and 
fairness elements to all actors involved is essential. This chapter briefly describes the obstacles to, and 
conditions for, establishing PES in developing country contexts. This PhD research investigated the 
need for broader categorisation of PES conditionality and perspectives to meet imperfect conditions 
for applying strict ES market-based policies in developing countries. Observed imperfect conditions 
are among others: insecure property rights, high incidence of poverty, poor environmental 
governance, and high potential conflict in natural resource management. This thesis suggests some 
solutions how to design a pro-poor PES based on an analysis of circumstances where PES can 
contribute to income increment, observed preferred rewards and PES outcomes to ES providers. The 
findings also include the application of multiple ecological-knowledge to improve PES efficiency and 
fairness. Further, this thesis provides lessons in designing and administering a procurement auction 
for rural farmers in Indonesia.  Table 7.1 summarizes the main finding of this thesis.  
120 
 
Table 7.1  Main findings of the thesis 
 Hypothesis Main findings 
1 Preconditions for application of the PES 
concept with strict conditionality are not met in 
many developing countries’ contexts and a 
wider PES interpretation is needed. (Chapter 2) 
In practice, strict conditionality cannot be met among ES providers, 
intermediaries and beneficiaries involved in PES contracts.  
The analysis of the research sites in Asia suggests that broader 
perspectives of PES (i.e. commoditized ES, compensation for 
opportunities forgone and co-investment in environmental 
stewardship) may well become the foundation to balance efficiency 
and fairness of PES schemes.  
2 Only under specific circumstances, will cash 
incentives from PES contribute substantially to 
increase disposable income and alleviate 
poverty of ES providers. 
(Chapter 3)  
Pro-poor PES can only have a significant effect on rural income if it 
(1) involves upstream providers who have low population density 
and/or a small area relative to the beneficiaries; (2) involves 
downstream beneficiaries who have relatively higher income than 
the upstream providers; (3) provides highly critical and non-
substitutable ES; (4) is efficient and has low opportunity and 
transaction cost, but high willingness and ability to pay of 
downstream beneficiaries.  
3 Indirect non-financial benefits at the community 
scale contributes to reducing poverty through a 
common-goods PES design (Pascual et al. 
2010). 
(Chapter 3) 
Non-financial incentives are very often the most preferred and 
possible types of rewards.  
4 Reducing discrepancies and improving 
synergies of ecological knowledge of all actors 
in PES balance efficiency and fairness of a PES 
scheme. 
(Chapter 4)  
Integration of stakeholders’ knowledge and perceptions in designing 
PES, specifically rewards for watershed services (RWS), can 
increase PES efficiency by clarifying expectations from all relevant 
actors, avoiding unrealistic targets for quality of watershed services, 
helping define conditionality of RWS and offering appropriate 
monitoring procedures, and PES fairness by reducing conflicts and 
accepting multiple perspectives. 
Experience with strategic use of information and vested interests of 
intermediaries and donors imply that credibility, salience and 
legitimacy of knowledge for any RWS need to be secured before it 
can be used in actual negotiations.  
5 A PES procurement contract auction increases 
efficiency of PES contract allocation.  
Specific elements of procurement auction have 
to be designed and administered for fairness of 
farmers with low formal education, prone to 
social conflicts and influenced by power 
structures within their community  
(Chapter 5) 
A PES procurement auction is applicable in rural communities to 
allocate contracts among land owners with high willingness to 
accept. Nevertheless, opportunity costs and co-benefits of farmers 
in joining PES cannot be fully captured. 
A sealed bid auction with budget constraints, random tie-rule, and 
uniform pricing rule with minimised collusion is relatively 
understandable by participants, considered fair and does not raise 
conflicts among community members, i.e. participants and non 
participants, contracted and non-contracted.   
6 PES schemes give local communities access to 
various types of capitals 
(Chapter 6) 
PES schemes do not drastically change the livelihoods of 
participants. Contributions to improved welfare of participants so far 
are towards social and human capital with limited effects on 
financial, natural and physical capitals.  
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7.2. Discussion of main findings 
The structure of this sub-chapter is based on the main findings presented in Table 7.1. Section 7.2.1 
summarises and discusses PES practices in Asia and their efficiency and fairness aspects in general 
(Table 7.1 number 1). Section 7.2.2 combines the discussion of the results from Chapter 3 on 
monetary payments and its implications for the ES providers, and locally determined reward-
preferences (Table 7.1 number 2 and 3). Section 7.2.3 discusses the lessons in synergizing multiple 
ecological knowledge among relevant PES actors (Table 7.1 number 4). Section 7.2.4 examines the 
application of a PES procurement auction in rural settings (Table 7.1 number 5). Finally, section 7.2.5 
discusses an evaluation of an established PES scheme using a sustainable livelihood framework 
(Table 7.1 number 6).  
Broader categorization of conditionality of PES emphasizes interdependency between 
fairness and efficiency as opposed to a strict and prescriptive PES definition 
The current PES definition reflects the Coasean conceptualization of PES i.e. efficiency gains may be 
achieved independent of the allocation of property rights (Neef and Thomas 2009; Bulte et al. 2008; 
Zilberman, Lipper, and McCarthy 2008; Muradian et al. 2010). The concept also disregards equity 
issue since the aggregate gains and losses by different economic agents is more important than how 
they are distributed in society (Pascual et al. 2010). The ideal PES schemes based on environmental 
and cost efficiency principle should “integrate environmental services36 into markets, and should be 
like any other market transaction” (Farley and Costanza 2010). Further, the inclusion of poverty 
alleviation goal might reduce economic efficiency of the scheme (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005; 
Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008). Practices in developing countries mostly rule out PES if this 
definition is strictly applied as a market-based or commoditized ES (Chapter 2).   
Our case studies proved that precondition for the Coasean conceptualization of PES could not be met. 
The reasons, among others, were lack of data and capability to measure, map, model, value and 
monitor ecosystem services at multiple scales; unclear property rights; lack of sustainable funding; 
and close links between poverty and environmental degradation (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). In addition to 
that, the Asian cases mostly placed ES providers as more marginalized community group with low 
formal education background and lack of access to information and justice. Our result aligned with 
the Heredia Declaration of Payments for Ecosystem Services introduced by an article by Farley and 
Costanza (2010). The article concluded that payment do not require commodification, however shared 
responsibility is needed to provide and protect ecosystem services.  
Analysis of global PES schemes as part of our study, including our case studies showed that strict 
conditionality of PES mostly did not exist (Chapter 2). Therefore, we recognized that in practice, 
conditionality of PES contract is stratified ranging from ES contracts link tangible benefits for the ES 
providers by the actual enhanced delivery of ES (level I), maintenance of agro-ecosystems in a 
desirable state (level II), performance agreed actions to enhance ES (level III), development and 
implementation of management plans to enhance ES with respect for local sovereignty in conserving 
the environment for both local and external benefits (level IV). This stratification contributes to 
bringing the theory of PES conditionality closer to practice.    
Based on these levels of conditionality and recognition of PES practices in Asia, we offer three 
distinct perspectives of PES. Those are commoditization of ES, compensation for opportunities 
                                                   
36
 In their article, Farley and Costanza (2010) used the term “ecosystem services” rather than “environmental services”.  
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skipped/forgone and co-investment in environmental stewardship (Chapter 2). Commoditization of ES 
operates at conditionality level I with no explicit poverty targets. Compensation for opportunities 
skipped/forgone is when land users are paid for accepting restrictions on their use of land and has 
conditionality at level II or III. Co-investment in environmental stewardship is where PES contracts 
between ES providers and buyers are flexible with broad sanction and monitoring requirement. 
Mutual trust is strong. 
Our case studies also observed that there are opportunities for phased strategies. After creating, for 
example, a basis of respect and relationship through the co-investment paradigm, there may be more 
space for specific follow-ups in the commoditization paradigm for actual delivery of ES to meet 
conservation and ES additionality objectives, i.e. a PES scheme is additional whereas the scheme 
increases environmental services compared to baselines without a PES scheme.  
In order to be pro-poor, a PES has to adapt to the local conditions, including in 
designing types, forms and expected level of rewards  
The case studies of PES in Asia experienced shifting perspectives: from legitimating cost-efficient 
and effective natural resource management to concerns about fairness in design and benefit 
distribution of the scheme. Monetization and commoditization of ES through PES can create technical 
problems in addressing both efficiency and fairness outcomes; it also raises ethical arguments by 
obscuring cultural, political and social relationship in environmental service generation (Kosoy and 
Corbera 2010).  
We analyzed the contribution of actual cash for individual ES providers from beneficiaries to poverty 
alleviation and proved that such design has to attentively consider some key ratios of relative numbers 
of service providers and beneficiaries, and their income per capita measures (Chapter 3). The analysis 
of income and spatial data on Indonesian agro-ecosystems indicated that a modest increased target of 
5% of annual disposable income of upstream rural household may be difficult to be achieved given 
the population and income structure of downstream and upstream areas in Asia.  
Identifying rewards that match with people’s needs and expectations, is one particularly important 
aspect of pro-poor RES approaches. The findings from focus group discussions at the different sites 
suggest that there is a substantial variation among communities concerning poverty concepts and 
reward preferences (Chapter 3). This provides important insights into the various dimensions that 
well-targeted reward schemes need to address. Our analysis concluded that rewards in the forms of 
human capital, social capital and physical capital – or what are often referred to as non-financial 
incentives – are very often the most preferred and possible types of rewards. Public social 
investments, such as education and health services (i.e. human capital), good road conditions (i.e. 
physical capital), security of land tenure, recognition as environmental champion and trust from 
government to maintain intact environment (i.e. social capital). In industrialized country, these public 
investment are part of government’s responsibility, however they are lacking in our case studies. 
These aspects combined with high social cohesion that defies the concept of free-rider (i.e. we don’t 
mind our neighbour enjoying our rewards from maintaining good ES and we prefer everybody is 
happy) support the preference of non-financial reward.     
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Initial investment in achieving a shared understanding of multiple ecological 
knowledge in providing and managing ES increases efficiency and fairness of PES 
scheme  
One of the main problems of a PES scheme is that there are widely held assumptions between changes 
in land cover and environmental service (ES) provision. The proposed solutions of environmental 
problems, including decrease of ES provisions, are mostly based on the relative merits of reforestation 
emphasising that ES is provided only by natural forest but not by other land uses. Furthermore, 
standardized solution to natural resource management refers to narrowly defined land-rehabilitation 
projects by, for example, planting trees and not considering other landscape management techniques, 
such as constructing simple sedimentation retainer along riparian zone.  
In natural resource management, different stakeholders may in fact have opposite interests in utilizing 
a landscape. From the policy perspective, agroforestry-mosaic landscapes as found in many Asian 
countries, can offer great opportunity for combining economic and environment targets. In these 
landscapes, farmers combine   elements of the natural forest that provide environmental services with 
trees for productive purposes and intensive food cropping systems (Van Noordwijk, Tomich, and 
Verbist 2002). Yet, potential ES buyers and policy makers in general sometimes fail recognizing these 
agroforestry systems. As the agricultural landscapes, for example, may not meet the legal definitions 
of “forest” or be in conflict with the existing land-use regulation system and policies – even though 
the land practices can provide ES at similar level to forest ecosystems can.  
The appreciation of the various quantitative environmental service indicators probably differs by 
stakeholder group. To ensure an established PES, we need to understand these ES indicators from the 
perspective of  both upstream and downstream local communities, general public and policy makers, 
and ecological modeller or hydrologist – who involve in a PES scheme (Jeanes et al. 2006; Farida et 
al. 2005). The multiple ecological knowledge approach applied in this study (c.f. Chapter 4) is to 
clarify expectations from all relevant actors, avoid unrealistic targets for quality of watershed services, 
help define conditionality of RWS and offer appropriate monitoring procedures. However, our case 
studies also showed that the availability of information is only a prerequisite for increasing the quality 
and sustainability of PES schemes. Interviews with practitioners in this study found that the factors 
influencing the design and implementation of PES programs are varied and beyond the availability of 
multi-perception knowledge and scientific data. The issue of strategic use of information, a 
discrepancy between scale in the provision of environmental services and its investment, and the 
vested interests of intermediaries and donors deter the optimal use of such multiple knowledge 
analysis in designing and implementing rewards for watershed schemes. 
A competitive market-based procurement auction enhances efficiency of contract 
allocation but it needs refining for capturing real opportunity costs and co-benefits of 
participating farmers.   
Most farmers in upland Asia are smallholders and tend to be among the poorest and most 
marginalized groups. There has been an intensive debate on whether or not small-scale farmers take a 
long-term view in their decision-making (Schultz 1980). Economists have argued that resource-poor 
farmers are forced to focus on short-term survival, and thus valuing future benefits of long-term 
investment in soil, water, and tree conservation much lower than immediate increases in productivity. 
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We administered a natural field experimental auction using a sealed bid auction with budget 
constraints, random tie-rule, and uniform pricing rule with minimised collusion. Our post-auction 
interviews suggested that farmers had good understanding of auction design. Another quantitative 
analysis of auction behaviour also concluded that farmers had gone through a learning process in 
submitting their bids (Jack 2009). In addition to that, our data showed that most of the participating 
and non-participating farmers had a good knowledge in soil and water conservation and that they 
showed willingness to implement the watershed conservation.   
Our procurement auction experiment showed ambiguous results on whether a competitive market-
based experience could increase cost-efficiency gains (c.f. Chapter 5). The auction experiment 
suggested that the cost estimates based on labour investments are higher than the auction price and the 
mean auction bid. Based on estimated labour costs, the areas of contracts that could have been 
enrolled under the available budget were smaller compared to the areas actually purchased under the 
auction. However, these auction bids did not reflect the real value of both opportunity costs and co-
benefit gained by farmers by joining a conservation contract since the contract compliance rate was 
moderate. There were various reasons for this, ranging from a lack of leadership and coordination 
between members of the farmer’s groups, to the difficulty of finding grass seedlings, to a conservation 
activity’s clash with coffee harvesting time. Thus, we presumed that there were other motivations 
beyond the financial cost-benefit that existed among the participating farmers when they submitted 
relatively lower auction bids compared to their labour investment. 
A sustainable livelihood framework enables broader analysis of local perspectives by 
encompassing various types of capitals 
Poverty as simply inadequacy of income is still fairly common in the literature on human deprivation. 
However, this view has to capture the understanding that income influences people’s live style and at 
the end contributes to impoverishment of live (Sen 2000). The perspectives on poverty inescapably 
surpass the notion of welfare utility and encompass a broader range of capabilities (Kahneman, 
Wakker, and Sarin 1997; Wegner and Pascual 2011; Sen 1999), including the capabilities of pursuing 
individual happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Therefore, increasing evidence and theory of plural 
dimensions of human well being (Wegner and Pascual 2011) support the perspective of 
multidimensional of poverty in analysing local perspectives on PES outcomes.            
Our study on local perspectives on PES outcomes showed that benefits were mostly non-financial, 
including expanded social networks with external stakeholders, knowledge and capacity of the 
community and small-scale public infrastructure investments. Direct financial benefits were limited. 
We presume the non-financial benefits combined with recognition from the governments and external 
stakeholders can well increase farmers’ commitment to the scheme. When financial payment is given, 
it is important to adjust the value of new contracts so the farmers can cover their true opportunity cost 
if the funds from the buyer allow that. However, findings in other PES sites in Asia revealed that most 
of the scheme cannot cover farmers’ true opportunity cost because of limited funds of buyers (c.f. 
Leimona et al. 2009).    
Although the PES scheme did not drastically change the livelihoods of participants, linkages with 
external stakeholders were creating opportunities for participants to diversify or capture greater value 
from their income sources. Our case study showed that exposure to these partners also increased the 
participants’ knowledge of conservation, their skills to manage the farmers’ organization, and helped 
to build networks to improve their businesses and implementation of the PES scheme. It also 
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highlights the need for awareness of the social dynamics between participants and non-participants 
and design benefit packages to minimize community level conflict.  Literature on PES mentions that 
conditional monetary PES forming extrinsic motivation might crowd out intrinsic motivation of 
people to do something right for societies (Farley and Costanza 2010). Experiences from the 
behavioural economics and psychology fields show that even only reminders to money made people 
performed independent but socially insensitive. Further, experiments showed that people might 
commit more efforts in exchange for no payment, such as in social market where reciprocity is 
expected, rather than they expend when they receive low payment, such as underpayment in a 
monetary market (Ariely 2009; Heyman and Ariely 2004).   
7.3. Conclusions  
This thesis aimed to contribute to the knowledge base on how to balance efficiency and fairness of 
PES schemes in Asia through analyses of several case studies. Its main conclusions are summarised 
below. 
First, the empirical observations on emerging PES-mechanisms in the Asian case studies indicate that 
the performance of PES to achieve and balance efficiency and fairness is strongly influenced by 
complex behaviour and decision making at the individual level. These behaviours at individual levels 
are not only limited to ES providers as the main actors of PES but also beneficiaries, intermediaries, 
and supporters of PES (e.g. governments and international agents). Motivations of stakeholders, their 
perceptions, power relations and political interest towards PES can further shape the design and 
implementation of PES. A language of co-investment in environmental stewardship may be more 
conducive to the type of respect, mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable development. 
Second, non-financial payment has to be considered as an important incentive for ES providers. Such 
payments have weaknesses, such as giving indirect benefits to ES providers, which reduces the 
effectiveness of the payment and can trigger free-riders and patronizing effects. Nevertheless, in-kind 
reward is often the most feasible transfer because the budget for PES from ES beneficiaries is 
typically small and cannot cover the full opportunity costs of the providers. Moreover, in-kind reward 
avoids neglecting non-participants and aligns with social cohesiveness characterizing rural 
communities in most developing countries. 
Third, the application of multiple ecological knowledge systems, i.e. local, public and scientific 
ecological knowledge can support the establishment of efficient and fair PES schemes. Clarifying 
problems in the provision of ES and recommending solutions at each spatial scale leads to more 
realistic expectations of all stakeholders in implementing PES schemes. The roles of each actor are 
then well-recognized and solutions based on local contexts rather than standardized ones lead to 
mutual responsibility among PES actors.  
Fourth, the ES providers’ decision making process in joining and implementing a PES contract is 
influenced by social and institutional factors beyond monetary values. However, rural communities 
are open to a market-based approach, harnessing competitiveness among its participants as long as the 
design of the market-based instrument is transparent and does not make them worse-off.  
Fifth, evaluating an established PES using the sustainable livelihood framework can provide more 
complete insights how PES makes actors involved better or worse-off. It also can more fairly evaluate 
project implementers since a broader view of impacts are captured. Our case in Indonesia suggests 
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that the role of the intermediary is very important and possibly dominant. An honest and trusted 
intermediary is thus one of the key factors to success of a PES scheme. It also highlights the need for 
awareness of the social dynamics between participants and non-participants and design benefit 
packages to minimize community level conflict.   
Finally, interdependency of fairness and efficiency is the main consideration in designing and 
implementing a PES scheme in developing countries. Neither fairness nor efficiency alone should be 
the primary aim but an intermediate PES that is fairly efficient and efficiently fair may bridge the gap 
to the practical implementations of PES on the ground.  
7.4. Synthesis and recommendations: integrating PES mechanisms into 
a wider concept of sustainable development 
As a relatively new concept, PES is facing challenges in its process of being adopted as an innovation. 
The initial theory of PES emphasized effectiveness of the scheme by maximizing ES provision in 
relation to the monetary value invested. In practice, PES often needs considering fairness aspects and 
respect for traditional practices of local communities. The difference between theory and 
implementation of PES schemes places this approach in balancing fairness and efficiency in PES 
designs and implementations in a critical light.  
Recognition of the range of PES approaches to provide incentives for enhancement of ES is needed 
rather than using “PES-like” terminology for partial matches with a theoretical framework. Such 
terminology may not reflect an optimal solution. A positive terminology for portraying PES in 
practices may avoid frustrations from practitioners, who might otherwise sense to be blamed for not 
meeting theoretical expectations (Muradian et al. 2010; Van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010).  
A broader view of efficiency can be achieved if all potential win-win exchanges across actors and 
capital types have been identified, negotiated and implemented. An ideal PES scheme, in the 
perception of the external stakeholders, can efficiently produce the desired effects or result in ES 
increments with a minimum expenditure of time, effort, skill or money across the negotiation and 
implementation phases. An ideal PES scheme from a local perspective provides substantial net 
benefits after all transaction and opportunity costs have been accounted for. While the minimum 
condition for local stakeholders is that the scheme at least does not make them worse-off socially and 
economically, and the minimum condition for external stakeholders is to break-even with alternative 
options to secure the ES they depend on. These different perceptions and expectations on distribution 
of costs and benefits among relevant stakeholders should be reflected at each stage of PES 
development. A pro-poor PES scheme is feasible under some conditions but not under other, 
depending on the degree of space-time association (rather than causal relationship) of poverty and 
environmental degradation. 
This PhD study was limited to research sites that were selected from a larger set of candidates of PES 
implementation sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam with the main results coming from the 
Indonesian case studies. Thus, these sites may not necessarily represent the broader conditions of all 
PES schemes in Asia. Nevertheless, methodologically, this PhD study contributes to the introduction 
of a nested approach and assessment of people’s perspective in identifying ES, PES supply costs, 
various types of ES rewards and livelihood outcomes of such schemes, and levelling expectations of 
all actors involved to avoid over expectations and perverse incentives. The study supports the 
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argument to incorporate a more holistic livelihoods perspective in PES schemes and to combine 
efforts through moral persuasion, regulation and rewards or incentive approaches to modify local-
resource-use decisions in the social, political and ecological realities of the Asian landscape.  
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Summary   
Payment for Environmental Service (PES) has multiple interpretations and definitions. Initially, the 
PES-concept was strictly defined as a market-based environmental policy instrument to achieve 
environmental protection in the most efficient way. The goals were to solve some of the root causes of 
environmental problems: market imperfection and policy distortion. However, empirical evidence 
showed that the prescriptive conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented 
in practice and the commodification of ecosystem services is problematic. The Coasean and pure 
market-based approach, which dominates the conceptualization of PES, is an important cause of the 
critical debate surrounding the PES concept.   
The overarching hypothesis of this thesis is that without combining efficiency and fairness aspects, 
the PES concept will not provide sustainable solutions and its implementation may achieve neither an 
increase of ES provision nor improve livelihoods. This hypothesis is tested through three main 
research questions:  
1. How do current PES designs and practices in Asia balance fairness and efficiency of the 
payment schemes? 
2. What are the key considerations in designing and implementing a PES scheme as a multiple-
goal policy instrument in the context of densely populated Asian landscapes?  
3. How to integrate PES mechanisms into a wider concept of sustainable development in a 
developing country context and what policy recommendations can be offered? 
After presenting the concept of PES and its evolution over time in Chapter 1, the preconditions for 
application of the PES concept with strict conditionality for developing countries in Asia is discussed 
in Chapter 2. The study revisits the debate on providing monetary payments and its implications for 
rural environmental service (ES) providers (cf. Chapter 3). Chapter 4 discusses the lessons learned in 
synergizing multiple ecological-knowledge systems among relevant PES actors and Chapter 5 
examines the application of a PES procurement auction in rural settings. An evaluation of an 
established PES scheme using a sustainable livelihood framework is presented in Chapter 6.  
This PhD study combines a quantitative and qualitative research approach using empirical cases in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal. Those research methods are combined through participatory 
action research in nine study sites coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre. Participatory action 
research reflects a process of progressive problem solving to improve the way PES is addressed in the 
context of developing countries. 
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Results from the analysis of experiences with evolving PES practices in Asia suggest that strict 
conditionality cannot be met among ES providers, intermediaries and beneficiaries involved in PES 
contracts (Chapter 2). Lessons learned from the empirical case studies show that conditionality of 
PES-contracts is stratified ranging from ES contracts linking tangible benefits for the ES providers by 
the actual enhanced delivery of ES (level I), to maintenance of agro-ecosystems in a desirable state 
(level II), to performance agreed actions to enhance ES (level III), to development and 
implementation of management plans to enhance ES with respect for local sovereignty in conserving 
the environment for both local and external benefits (level IV). The analysis of the research sites in 
Asia also suggests that broader perspectives of PES (i.e. commoditized ES, compensation for 
opportunities forgone and co-investment in environmental stewardship) may well become the 
foundation to balance efficiency and fairness of PES schemes. These broader perspectives of PES 
may capture most of the current variation in PES approaches compared to a normative and 
prescriptive PES definition that is commonly used.  
Chapter 3 reviewed some key issues associated with design and implementation of pro-poor PES by 
developing and exploring two propositions related to conditions required for PES to effectively 
contribute to poverty alleviation, and to preferred forms of pro-poor mechanisms. The analysis of 
income and spatial data on Indonesian agro-ecosystems indicated that a modest target of 5% of 
increase in annual disposable income of upstream rural household may be difficult to achieve given 
the population and income structure of downstream and upstream areas in Asia. The findings from 
focus group discussions at the different sites suggest that there is a substantial variation among 
communities concerning poverty concepts and reward preferences (Chapter 3). This provides 
important insights into the various dimensions that well-targeted reward schemes need to address. 
Chapter 4 reviews and synthesizes the analysis of multiple ecological-knowledge systems, i.e. local, 
public/policy maker and modeller/hydrologist ecological knowledge, in four watershed cases in 
Indonesia. Initial investment in reconciling multiple ecological knowledge systems applied in the case 
studies included in this PhD study (c.f. Chapter 4) can increase PES efficiency by clarifying 
expectations from all relevant actors, avoiding unrealistic targets for quality of watershed services, 
helping define conditionality of RWS and offering appropriate monitoring procedures, and PES 
fairness by reducing conflicts and accepting multiple perspectives. However, these case studies also 
showed that the availability of information is only a prerequisite for increasing the quality and 
sustainability of PES schemes. Interviews with practitioners in this study showed that the factors 
influencing the design and implementation of PES programs are varied and beyond the availability of 
multi-perception knowledge and scientific data. The issue of strategic use of information, a 
discrepancy between scale in the provision of environmental services and its investment, and the 
vested interests of intermediaries and donors deter the optimal use of such multiple knowledge 
analysis in designing and implementing rewards for watershed schemes. 
Chapter 5 presents the implementation of a reverse auction approach to elicit private information on 
landholders’ payments in return for soil conservation investments on private coffee farms in the 
Sumberjaya watershed, Indonesia that is dominated by coffee crops in erosion-prone uplands. Erosion 
control is an impure public good that generates both private benefits and positive externalities, in this 
case to a downstream hydropower company. The research included selecting and testing some 
elements of the auctions through two types of experiments: a laboratory auction experiment with 
students and field framed experiments with farmers. The final step of the research was to conduct a 
natural field experiment and to monitor the success and completion rate of the contract by farmers 
who won the auction for one year. Our procurement auction experiment showed ambiguous results on 
whether a competitive market-based experience could increase cost-efficiency gains (c.f. Chapter 5). 
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The auction experiment suggested that the cost estimates based on labour investments are higher than 
the auction price and the mean auction bid. Based on estimated labour costs, the areas of contracts that 
could have been enrolled under the available budget were smaller compared to the areas actually 
purchased under the auction. However, these auction bids did not reflect the real value of both 
opportunity costs and co-benefits gained by farmers by joining a conservation contract since the 
contract compliance rate was moderate. There were various reasons for this, ranging from a lack of 
leadership and coordination between members of the farmer’s groups, to the difficulty of finding grass 
seedlings, to a conservation activity’s clash with coffee harvesting time. Thus, we presumed that there 
were other motivations beyond the financial cost-benefit that prevailed among the participating 
farmers when they submitted relatively low auction bids compared to their labour investment.  
Chapter 6 describes the process of initiating the PES scheme and its design, and reviews the impacts 
of the five year scheme on local livelihoods. The assessment of these impacts was conducted through 
a series of focus group discussions with the participants and non-participants and interviews with 
implementing agencies. The livelihood impacts were discussed in terms of the five asset types 
covered in the Sustainable Livelihood Framework: financial, human, social, physical and natural. In 
analysing livelihood impacts, the data are limited to the results from the FGDs and stakeholder 
interviews, since there has been no detailed quantitative analysis so far of household level livelihood 
impacts in Cidanau. Although the PES scheme did not drastically change the livelihoods of 
participants, linkages with external stakeholders were creating opportunities for participants to 
diversify or capture greater value from their income sources. Our case study showed that exposure to 
these partners also increased the participants’ knowledge of conservation, their skills to manage the 
farmers’ organization, and helped to build networks to improve their businesses and implementation 
of the PES scheme. It also highlights the need for awareness of the social dynamics between 
participants and non-participants and design benefit packages to minimize community level conflict.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the contribution of this PhD thesis to the knowledge base on how to balance 
efficiency and fairness of the PES schemes through several analyses.  
First, the empirical observations on emerging PES-mechanisms in the Asian case studies indicate that 
the performance of PES to achieve and balance efficiency and fairness is strongly influenced by 
complex behaviour and decision making at the individual level. The behavioural differences at the 
individual level is not only limited to ES providers as the main actors of PES but was also found with 
beneficiaries, intermediaries, and supporters of PES (e.g. governments and international agents). 
Motivations of stakeholders, their perceptions, power relations and political interest towards PES have 
great influence on the design and implementation of PES. A language of co-investment in 
environmental stewardship may be more conducive to create respect, mutual accountability and 
commitment to sustainable development than PES alone. 
Second, non-financial payment has to be considered as an important incentive for ES providers. Such 
payments have weaknesses, such as giving indirect benefits to ES providers, which reduces the 
effectiveness of the payment and can trigger free-riders and patronage effects. Nevertheless, in-kind 
reward is often the most feasible transfer because the budget for PES from ES beneficiaries is 
typically small and cannot cover the full opportunity costs of the providers. Moreover, in-kind reward 
avoids neglecting non-participants and aligns with social cohesiveness characterizing rural 
communities in most developing countries. 
Third, the recognition and attempted reconciliation of multiple ecological knowledge systems, i.e. 
local, public and scientific ecological knowledge, can support the establishment of efficient and fair 
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PES schemes. Clarifying problems in the provision of ES and recommending solutions at each spatial 
scale leads to more realistic expectations of all stakeholders in implementing PES schemes. The roles 
of each actor are then well-recognized and solutions based on local contexts rather than standardized 
ones lead to mutual responsibility among PES actors.  
Fourth, the ES providers’ decision making process in joining and implementing a PES contract is 
influenced by social and institutional factors beyond monetary values. However, rural communities 
are open to a market-based approach, harnessing competitiveness among its participants as long as the 
design of the market-based instrument is transparent and does not make them worse-off.  
Fifth, evaluating an established PES using the sustainable livelihood framework can provide more 
complete insights how PES makes actors involved better or worse-off. It also can evaluate project 
implementers more fair since a broader range of impacts is captured. Our case in Indonesia suggests 
that the role of the intermediary is very important and possibly dominant. An honest and trusted 
intermediary is thus one of the key factors to success of a PES scheme. It also highlights the need for 
awareness of the social dynamics between participants and non-participants and design benefit 
packages to minimize community level conflict.  
Finally, interdependency of fairness and efficiency should be the main consideration in designing and 
implementing a PES scheme in developing countries. Neither fairness nor efficiency alone should be 
the primary aim but an intermediate PES that is “fairly efficient and efficiently fair” may bridge the 
gap between PES theory and the practical implementation of PES on the ground.  
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Over Payment for Environmental Services (PES) (in Nederlands: betaling voor ecosysteemdiensten) 
bestaan meerdere opvattingen en definities. In het begin was het PES-concept alleen bedoeld als 
instrument voor milieubeleid op basis van de vrije markt, om zo de meest efficiënte 
milieubescherming te bewerkstelligen. Het doel was om de fundamentele oorzaken van   milieupro-
blemen te verhelpen: marktfalen en beleidsvervormingen. Empirisch bewijs liet echter zien dat het 
voorschrijvende concept van PES in de praktijk niet gemakkelijk te generaliseren en implementeren 
was en dat de commodificatie van ecosysteemdiensten problematisch is. Het Coasiaanse en zuivere 
markt-principe, dat ten grondslag ligt aan het PES-concept, is een van de belangrijkste oorzaken van 
de kritische discussie rond PES. 
De overkoepelende hypothese van deze thesis is dat zonder het combineren van de aspecten 
efficiëntie en eerlijkheid of redelijkheid (fairness), het PES-concept geen duurzame oplossingen zal 
bieden en implementatie van betaling voor ecosysteemdiensten geen toename in 
ecosysteemopbrengsten of verhoging van de welvaart zal opleveren. 
Deze hypothese wordt getoetst aan de hand van drie onderzoeksvragen: 
1. Hoe reguleren huidige PES ontwerpen in Azië de balans tussen eerlijkheid en efficiëntie van 
de Payment-factor?  
2. Wat zijn de belangrijkste overwegingen bij het ontwerpen en uitvoeren van een PES-schema 
als beleidsinstrument voor meerdere doelen in de context van het dichtbevolkte Aziatische 
landschap? 
3. Hoe kunnen PES mechanismes geïntegreerd worden in een breder concept van duurzame 
ontwikkeling in de context van een ontwikkelingsland, en welke beleidsaanbevelingen 
kunnen gegeven worden? 
Na de beschrijving van het PES-concept en de ontwikkeling hiervan in de loop der tijd in Hoofdstuk 1 
worden de voorwaarden voor toepassing van PES binnen de context van Aziatische 
ontwikkelingslanden besproken in Hoofdstuk 2. Het onderzoek bespreekt de discussie betreffende het 
verlenen van geldelijke vergoedingen en de gevolgen hiervan voor landelijke ecosysteemdiensten  
(ES) (cf. Hoofdstuk 3).  
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de lessen die geleerd kunnen worden uit de synergiewerking tussen meerdere 
ecologische kennissystemen van relevante PES-deelnemers.  
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de toepassing van een veiling voor PES-aanvragen in landelijke situaties 
onderzocht.  
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Een evaluatie van een gevestigd PES-systeem op basis van duurzaam levensonderhoud wordt 
gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 6. 
Dit proefschrift combineert een kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve onderzoeksbenadering voor empirische 
casussen in Indonesië, de Filippijnen en Nepal. Die onderzoeksmethoden worden gecombineerd door 
participatief onderzoek op negen onderzoeksplaatsen, gecoördineerd door het World Agroforestry 
Centre. Participatief onderzoek biedt een progressieve aanpak bij het verhelpen van problemen met 
betrekking tot PES in de context van ontwikkelingslanden. 
Analyse van de resultaten van ervaringen met evoluerende PES-systemen in Azië suggereert dat 
strikte conditionaliteit niet mogelijk is tussen ES-leveranciers, tussenpersonen en begunstigden 
betrokken bij PES contracten (Hoofdstuk 2). Empirisch casusonderzoek leert ons dat conditionaliteit 
van PES contracten varieert van ES-contracten die tastbare voordelen hebben voor de leveranciers van 
ES-diensten door feitelijke verhoging van de levering van ES-diensten (level I), tot het onderhouden 
van agro-ecosystemen op het gewenste niveau (level II), tot prestatiegerichte acties ter verbetering 
van ES-diensten (level III), tot de ontwikkeling en implementatie van beheerplannen ter verbetering 
van ES-diensten met behoud van de lokale soevereiniteit wat betreft milieubehoud voor zowel de 
lokale als de externe baten (level IV).  
De analyse van de onderzoekslocaties in Azië wijste erop  dat bredere opvattingen van PES (i.e. 
gecommodificeerde ES-diensten, compensatie voor gederfde kansen en investering in milieu-
rentmeesterschap) kansrijk zijn als basis voor een PES-systeem dat balans brengt tussen efficiëntie en 
eerlijkheid. Deze bredere perspectieven van PES-programma’s kunnen het grootste gedeelte van de 
huidige variatie tussen PES-opvattingen omvatten, in tegenstelling tot de doorgaans gebruikte 
‘voorschrijvende’ definitie van PES. 
Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt enkele kernvragen in verband met het ontwerp en de implementatie van PES 
gericht op armoede bestrijding door het ontwikkelen en onderzoeken van twee proposities die 
gerelateerd zijn aan de vereiste voorwaarden voor PES wil dit daadwerkelijk bijdragen aan 
armoedevermindering, en aan geprefereerde vormen van de anti-armoede werkwijze. De analyse van 
inkomen en ruimtelijke informatie van Indonesische agro-ecosystemen geeft aan dat een bescheiden 
toename van 5% in het besteedbaar inkomen van een stroomopwaarts gelegen landelijk huishouden al 
zeer lastig te bereiken is, gegeven de verschillen in bevolkings- en inkomensstructuur met 
stroomafwaartse gebieden in Azië. De bevindingen uit de discussies van focusgroepen van 
verscheidene onderzoekslocaties impliceren een wezenlijke variatie tussen gemeenschappen 
betreffende armoedeconcepten en beloningsvoorkeur. Dit levert belangrijke inzichten op in de 
verschillende perspectieven die een goed afgestemd beloningsplan moet omvatten. 
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt en synthetiseert de analyse van meerdere ecologische kennissystemen, i.e. 
plaatselijke, politiek/beleids vormende en modelmatige/hydrologische ecologische kennis van 
stroomgebieden.  Initiële investering in het verenigen van verscheidene ecologische kennissystemen 
toegepast in de casusonderzoeken in dit onderzoek kan de efficiëntie van PES-systemen verhogen 
door het verhelderen van de verwachtingen van alle relevante spelers. Hiermee worden onrealistische 
doelstellingen vermeden ten aanzien van de kwaliteit van stroomgebied diensten, kan het bijdragen 
aan de definiëring van de voorwaarden van de PES conditionaliteit en het aanreiken van geschikte 
monitoringprocedures, en kan een eerlijke PES regeling bereikt worden door het verminderen van 
conflicten en het openstaan voor verschillende perspectieven.  
Deze casusonderzoeken lieten echter ook zien dat de beschikbaarheid van informatie slechts een 
voorwaarde is voor een toename van kwaliteit en duurzaamheid van PES-regelingen. Uit interviews 
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met uitvoerders van PES blijkt dat de factoren die van invloed zijn op het ontwerp en de uitvoering 
van PES-regelingen erg variëren en buiten bereik liggen van de huidige multi-waarnemingskennis en 
wetenschappelijke data. De kwestie van strategisch gebruik van informatie, een discrepantie tussen de 
levering van milieudiensten en de investering daarin, en de gevestigde belangen van tussenpersonen 
en donatoren werken het optimale gebruik van deze multiple kennis-analyse in ontwerp en 
implementatie van stroomgebiedregelingen tegen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert de invoering van een omgekeerd veilingsysteem om privé-informatie te 
onttrekken over betalingen van grondbezitters in ruil voor investering in bodembescherming op 
particuliere koffieplantages in het stroomgebied Sumberjaya, Indonesië, dat gedomineerd wordt door 
koffieplanten in erosiegevoelige hooglanden. Erosiebeheer is een onzuiver publiek goed dat zowel 
particuliere voordelen als positieve externe effecten genereert, in dit geval aan een stoomafwaarts 
gelegen waterkrachtbedrijf. Het onderzoek omvatte het selecteren en testen van een aantal elementen 
van de veilingen door twee verschillende soorten experimenten: een veiling in een 
laboratoriumomgeving met studenten en een onderzoek in het veld met daadwerkelijke boeren. De 
laatste stap in het onderzoek was om een natuurlijk veldonderzoek uit te voeren en toezicht te houden 
op het succes en de snelheid waarmee voldaan werd aan het eenjarige contract door de boeren die dit 
op de veiling hadden verkregen. Ons experiment met de inkoopveiling leverde dubbelzinnige 
resultaten op betreffende de vraag of een concurrerende markt-gebaseerde ervaring daadwerkelijk  de 
kostenefficientie zou laten toenemen. Het veilingexperiment suggereerde dat de kostenschatting van 
arbeidsinvesteringen hoger was dan de veilingprijs en het gemiddelde bod. Op basis van de geschatte 
arbeidskosten zouden de gecontracteerde arealen die binnen het budget zouden kunnen worden 
aangepakt, kleiner zijn dan de arealen die op de veiling daadwerkelijk zijn verkocht. Deze biedingen 
reflecteren echter niet de werkelijke waarde van zowel de opportunity costs als de neven-baten 
verkregen door boeren die deelnemen aan een conservatiecontract, omdat de contractnaleving matig 
was. Hier waren verscheidene redenen voor, van gebrek aan leiderschap en coördinatie tussen leden 
van de boerenbonden, tot de moeilijkheden bij het vinden van gras kiemplanten, tot een conflict 
tussen conservatie en de koffie-oogsttijd. Zo veronderstelden wij dat er andere motieven naast de 
financiële kosten-baten speelden bij de deelnemende boeren, toen zij lage biedingen deden vergeleken 
met hun arbeidsinvestering. 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft het proces van het begin van een PES-regeling en het ontwerp hiervan, en 
bespreekt de effecten van de vijf-jaar-regeling op de lokale economie. De beoordeling van deze 
effecten werd uitgevoerd door een reeks focus groep discussies (FGDs) met deelnemers en niet-
deelnemers en interviews met uitvoerende instanties. De invloed op het levensonderhoud werd 
besproken in vijf typen activa zoals gedekt in de Sustainable Livelihood Framework: financieel, 
menselijk, sociaal, fysiek en natuurlijk. Bij de analyse van de invloed op levensonderhoud zijn de 
gegevens beperkt tot de resultaten van de FGD’s en interviews met belanghebbenden, daar er geen 
gedetailleerde kwantitatieve analyse beschikbaar is van de effecten op levensonderhoud op 
huishoudelijk niveau in Cidanau. Hoewel de PES-regeling het levensonderhoud van deelnemers niet 
drastisch beïnvloed heeft, zijn er door koppelingen met externe stakeholders mogelijkheden ontstaan 
voor deelnemers om te diversifiëren of grotere waarde uit hun inkomstenbronnen te verkrijgen. Ons 
casusonderzoek toonde aan dat contact met deze externe partners ook de kennis van de deelnemers 
met betrekking tot conservatie deed toenemen, hun vaardigheden voor het beheren van de 
boerenorganisatie versterkten, en dat dit vergrote netwerk ook hun bedrijven en de implementatie van 
een PES-regeling bevorderde. Het onderzoek benadrukt ook het belang van aandacht voor de sociale 
dynamiek tussen deelnemers en niet-deelnemers en de noodzaak om bij het ontwerp van het 
beloningsschema interne conflicten in de gemeenschap te minimaliseren. 
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Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een samenvatting van de bijdrage van dit proefschrift aan de kennisbasis over hoe 
een balans tussen efficiëntie en eerlijkheid te realiseren binnen de opzet van PES-ontwerpen door 
verschillende analyses.  
Ten eerste geven de empirische observaties over opkomende PES-functionaliteit in de Aziatische 
casusonderzoeken aan dat de potentie van PES om balans tussen efficiëntie en eerlijkheid te bereiken 
sterk beïnvloed wordt door complex gedrag en besluitvorming op het niveau van het individu. De 
gedragsmatige verschillen op individueel niveau zijn niet beperkt tot de ES-aanbieders als 
hoofdspelers bij PES, maar ook bij begunstigden, tussenpersonen en voorstanders van PES (e.g. 
overheden en internationale agentschappen). Beweegredenen van belanghebbenden, hun opvattingen, 
machtsrelaties en politiek belang bij PES hebben sterke invloed op het ontwerp en implementatie van 
PES. Eensgezinde co-investering in milieubewustzijn kan meer bijdragen aan respect, wederzijdse 
verantwoording en toewijding aan duurzame ontwikkeling dan PES alleen. 
Ten tweede moet niet-financiële beloning worden beschouwd als een belangrijke stimulans voor ES-
aanbieders. Dergelijke beloningen hebben zwaktes, zoals het indirect voordelen geven aan ES-
aanbieders waarmee de effectiviteit van de daadwerkelijke betaling vermindert en de kans op  free-
rider en patronage effecten verhoogd wordt. Desondanks is in natura beloning vaak de meest haalbare 
transactie, omdat het budget voor PES van ES-begunstigden vaak klein is en ontoereikend voor de 
volledige alternatieve kosten van de aanbieders. Bovendien voorkomt in natura beloning 
verwaarlozing van niet-deelnemers en sluit ze aan bij de sociale cohesie die prevalent is in landelijke 
gemeenschappen in de meeste ontwikkelingslanden. 
Ten derde kan de erkenning en poging tot verzoening van meerdere ecologische kennissystemen, dat 
wil zeggen lokaal, publiek en wetenschappelijke ecologische kennis, het opzetten van een efficiënte 
en eerlijke PES-regeling ondersteunen. Het verhelderen van problemen in de levering van ES-diensten 
en het doen van aanbevelingen voor oplossingen op elke ruimtelijke schaal leidt tot meer realistische 
verwachtingen van alle belanghebbenden bij het invoeren van een PES-regeling. De rol van elke actor 
is dan helder en oplossingen op basis van de lokale context in tegenstelling tot gestandaardiseerde 
pakketten leidt tot een wederzijdse verantwoordelijkheid onder PES-actoren. 
Ten vierde is het besluitvormingsproces van de ES-aanbieders in deelname aan en implementatie van 
een PES-contract onderhevig aan sociale en institutionele factoren die verder gaan dan de puur 
financiële.  
Rurale gemeenschappen staan echter wel open voor een marktgerichte aanpak, inclusief de te dulden 
concurrentie onderling, zo lang de vorm van het marktinstrument transparant is en hen niet benadeelt. 
Ten vijfde kan het evalueren van een gevestigd PES-systeem op basis van het kader van een 
duurzaam bestaan een beter inzicht geven in de invloed die PES heeft op de actoren, ten gunste of ten 
ongunste. Het kan projectontwikkelaars ook eerlijker evalueren omdat er een breder scala aan effecten 
wordt meegenomen in de evaluatie. Onze casus in Indonesië suggereert dat de rol van de 
tussenpersoon zeer belangrijk is, mogelijk zelfs dominant. Een eerlijke en vertrouwde intermediair is 
daarmee een van de sleutelfactoren in het bepalen van het succes van een PES-regeling. Het legt ook 
nadruk op de noodzaak voor bewustwording van de sociale dynamiek tussen de deelnemers en de 
niet-deelnemers en op het ontwerp van beloningspakketten die de sociale conflicten in de 
gemeenschap minimaliseert. 
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Ten slotte moet de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van eerlijkheid en efficiëntie de hoofdoverweging zijn 
bij het ontwerpen en implementeren van een PES-regeling in ontwikkelingslanden. Eerlijkheid noch 
efficiëntie alleen kunnen het primaire doel zijn, maar een tussenliggende PES die “redelijk efficiënt en 
efficiënt eerlijk” is kan de kloof tussen PES-theorie en daadwerkelijke PES-implementatie dichten. 
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